People on Complaint of Cirile v. Catalano
| Decision Date | 30 September 1960 |
| Citation | 205 N.Y.S.2d 618,25 Misc.2d 342 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York on the Complaint of Policewoman Marie CIRILE v. Joseph CATALANO, Defendant. City Magistrates' Court of New York, Manhattan Arrest Court |
| Court | New York Magistrate Court |
Ellsworth A. Monahan, Counsel for Legal Bureau, Police Department, New York City, by Patrick J. Finnegan, New York Ctiy, of counsel, for the People.
William S. Miller, New York City, for defendant.
WEINKRANTZ, Magistrate.
The defendant is charged with being a vagrant, in violation of the provisions of Sec. 887, subd. 4(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of New York.
The testimony establishes that the defendant, in his office, known as the Lane Employment Agency, located at 115 West 42nd Street, in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, did personally interview three females, to wit: Lilly Fernandez, age 17, on June 17, 1960; Karyn Kauff, age 17, on July 11, 1960; and Policewoman Marie Cirile, on July 14, 1960, and that he offered each of these females employment with unnamed employers, but that the witnesses Fernandez and Kauff would have to go to bed with the respective bosses, and that the witness Cirile would have to go to bed with the defendant. Together with the rest of the uncontradicted testimony, it is clear that the defendant, by promises of high salaries and other emoluments in their new jobs, induced or enticed and was procuring these girls for the purpose of committing the acts proscribed by Subd. 4(c) of Sec. 887 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of New York. (Any act of intercourse by the witnesses Fernandez and Kauff would per se be unlawful by virtue of their age.)
In order to come within the purview of Sec. 887, Subd. 4(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defendant must, 1, loiter, 2, in or near any thoroughfare or public or private place, and 3, for the purpose of inducing, enticing or procuring another to commit lewdness, fornication, unlawful sexual intercourse, or any other indecent act.
To properly define loitering, in its legal sense, the Court is bound by reasonable usage, the application of the word to specific facts in the adjudicated cases, the language of the statute, and all the facts and circumstances of each specific case.
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Ed., Vol. II, defines 'Linger' as synonymous with 'Loiter', and defines 'linger' as, to remain or wait long, to be slow in parting or quitting anything.
Murray's, A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol. VI, 'Founded mainly on the materials collected by the Philological Society,', Oxford, England--1908, defines loitering as 'that loiters or idles; in early use, that leads a vagabond life.'
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 2nd Ed., 1959, gives as synonymous with 'loiter', the word 'linger', and with 'linger', the word 'stay', and, as synonyms for the word 'stay', the words: to remain, to wait, to abide, to tarry, to linger. Certainly, the record establishes that, at least on three separate occasions within one month, to wit: June 17, 1960, July 11, 1960, and July 14, 1960, the defendant remained, waited, abided, tarried and lingered at his employment office with the three People's witnesses, Fernandez, Kauff and Cirile, respectively.
As was held in People on Complaint of Sullivan v. Strauss, Mag. Ct., 114 N.Y.S.2d 322, at page 324, It may be well to point out here that, in the instant case, the only testimony in the record of the use made by the defendant of his employment office, is the use thereof for the 'inducing, enticing or procuring' within the meaning of Section 887, subd. 4(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In People v. Choremi, 301 N.Y. 417, at page 420, 94 N.E.2d 81, at page 82, the Court of Appeals said: 'Even assuming that one may 'loiter' as the word is used in the criminal statutes under consideration * * * in one's own home, the record is devoid of any proof of such an act.' In other words, the majority opinion is based upon a deficiency of proof and is not a holding that, as matter of law, one may not loiter in one's own home. Cannot one then loiter in one's office? The defendant's office was an employment agency and, consequently, was necessarily open to and available to the general public seeking employment. In the instant case, the inducing, enticing or procuring did not take place in a private residence to which no one but the lawful occupant could have the right of access, nor by telephone, but in an office to which the general public was invited and authorized by law to come, and the inducing, enticing or procuring was done by the defendant in person, face to face with the witnesses herein.
In People v. Gould, 306 N.Y. 352, 118 N.E.2d 553, the Court of Appeals held that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial