People on Complaint of Palmer v. Miller

• Decision Date: 26 October 1961
• Citation: 221 N.Y.S.2d 430,31 Misc.2d 1067
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, on the Complaint of Ervin PALMER, v. Dana MILLER, Defendant. City Magistrate's Court of City of New York
• Court: New York Magistrate Court

Page 430

221 N.Y.S.2d 430

31 Misc.2d 1067

PEOPLE of the State of New York, on the Complaint of Ervin PALMER, v. Dana MILLER, Defendant.

City Magistrate's Court of City of New York.

Oct. 26, 1961.

Sanders & Linhardt, New York City, for defendant.

Paskus, Gordon & Hyman, New York City, Daniel Rosenbloom, New York City, of counsel, for the People.

MORRIS WEINFELD, City Magistrate.

On March 28, 1961, the complainant, Ervin Palmer, delivered his dog to an establishment operated under the corporate name of Poodles By Dana, Inc., at 78th Street and Second Avenue, in the City, County and State of New York, for washing and cleaning.

It appears that there was negligence by an employee of this corporation in grooming complainant's dog, but there is no evidence that defendant personally ministered to the animal or personally contributed to the injuries apparently suffered when drying apparatus was unduly left unattended, causing burns and regrettable injuries.

Apparently, criminal liability is sought to be imputed to defendant for the reason that she is an officer of the corporation referred to and serves it in a supervisory capacity.

No charge is made against the corporate owner of the establishment, although a corporation, under modern concepts, is criminally answerable for both acts of nonfeasance and misfeasance. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 29 S.Ct. 304, 53 L.Ed. 613; People v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 89 N.Y. 266; People v. Star Co., 135 App.Div. 517, 120 N.Y.S. 498; People v. Dunbar Contracting Co., 165 App.Div. 59, 151 N.Y.S. 164, affirmed 215 N.Y. 416, 109 N.E. 554. The cited authorities establish that a corporation may commit a crime where a specific intent or mental state is a necessary element . That is also the law in most foreign jurisdictions (see Tennessee: Louisville & N. R. Co. v. State, 3 Head 523; Love v. Nashville Agricultural & Normal Institute, 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304, 23 A.L.R. 887; New Jersey: State v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 84 N.J.L. 550, 87 A. 86; Massachusetts: Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Com., 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445; Michigan, Detroit & B. Plank Road Co. v. Detroit, Citizen's St. Ry. Co., 97 Mich. 583, 56 N.W. 940.

The summons herein stems from the alleged violation of Sec. 185 of the Penal Law, which prescribes as a misdemeanor certain specified maltreatment of animals.

The pivotal inquiries here relate to whether the acts of other corporate employees may be charged to defendant, for the reason that she acted in a supervisory capacity; and whether wilful intent is an essential ingredient or element before criminal liability may attach .

There are limited areas where a crime may be charged to a corporate director, and a presumption of knowledge is charged to a director, even though actual knowledge be lacking (Sec. 667, Penal Law), but such conditions do not here obtain.

It is noteworthy that in the provisions of law applicable to injuries administered to human beings, wilfulness or intent are necessary elements of the crime. See, i. e., the Assault provisions of the Penal Law, secs. 240-244; Homicide, secs. 1044-1052; Hazing, sec. 1030; Endangering life or health of child, sec. 483; Maiming, sec. 1400; Abortion, sec., 80.

One who aids or abets in the commission of a crime may be cast in the role of a principal under sec. 2, Penal Law, but here, again, intent is a prerequisite under the statutory definition.

It is ordinarily true that it is within the competence of the legislature to declare an act criminal regardless of the intent of the actor, but the power to eliminate mental intent or consciousness of wrongdoing is valid when applied to situations and laws...