People's Sav. Bank v. Wilcox

• Citation: 3 A. 211,15 R.I. 258
• Parties: PEOPLE'S SAV. BANK v. WILCOX and others.
• Decision Date: 12 February 1886
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

3 A. 211

15 R.I. 258

PEOPLE'S SAV. BANK

v. WILCOX and others.

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.

Filed February 12, 1886.

Bill of interpleader.

James Tillinghast, for complainant.

Edwin D. McGuinness, for respondent Holder N. Wilcox.

George T. Brown, for the other respondents.

DURFEE, C. J. Mary A. Wilcox died November 4, 1882, leaving on deposit in the People's Savings Bank, in the city of Providence, the sum of about $800. Shortly before her death, she made a gift causa mortis of the money to the defendant George A. Sayer, delivering to him the bankbook to that intent, in trust, nevertheless, to pay from said money her debts and funeral expenses, and to pay the residue over to one Emma B. Mosher, her cousin. She was, when she died, and for some time had been, a domiciled inhabitant of the city of Providence, resident therein, though she had at a previous period resided in the town of Tiverton. Shortly after her death, to-wit, on December 4, 1882, the defendant Holder N. Wilcox, her uncle and one of her next of kin, was appointed administrator on her estate by the court of probate of Tiverton on his application, wherein she was described as "late of Tiverton, deceased." Subsequently, to-wit, on March 11, 1885, the defendant George A. Sayer was appointed administrator on her estate by the municipal court of the city of Providence, a court exercising probate jurisdiction in said city. The defendants both claim the deposit,—Wilcox as administrator, and Sayer both as administrator and as donee causa mortis. The question is, which of the two is entitled to it?

Sayer contends that the court of probate of Tiverton` had no jurisdiction to appoint Wilcox, and that his appointment is therefore null and void. Wilcox contends that his appointment cannot be questioned collaterally, but must be presumed to be valid until it is set aside in some direct proceeding. There is a diversity of decisions upon the question raised by this contention. The conflict is irreconcilable. The reasons are strong on both sides. On the one side it is urged that where a court, even though it be an inferior tribunal, has jurisdiction under particular circumstances, its decision that the circumstances exist ought to be as conclusive, until set aside in some direct proceeding, as its decision on any other question of fact in the case. This is a view which strongly commends itself when the parties have been heard; but the question may be decided by default, though the practice is a bad one, without hearing and without any actual notice, when the notice is by publication or posting, the parties having no reason to be on the lookout for notice from a court which has no jurisdiction. The appointment of Wilcox was made without hearing. Again, it is urged for the security of persons dealing with the administrator on the supposition that he had been properly appointed, the appointment ought to be sustained. There is great cogency, in point of policy, in this argument, and we have been greatly inclined to yield to it. But, on the other hand, the question arises, how, upon principle, can a court acquire jurisdiction by simply deciding that it has it, when the circumstances which are necessary to give it do not exist?

We have come to the conclusion, after much consideration, that the rule applicable to courts of limited jurisdiction which is the better established on principle and authority is this: That where the jurisdiction depends on some collateral fact which can be decided without deciding the case on its merits, then the jurisdiction may be questioned collaterally and disproved, even though the jurisdictional fact be averred of record, and was actually found upon evidence by the court rendering the judgment. Chew v. Holroyd, 8 Exch. 249; Bunbury v. Fuller, 9 Exch. 111; Wanzer v. Howland, 10 Wis. 8; Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. 390; Holyoke v. Haskins, 5 Pick. 20; Jochumsen v. Suffolk Sav. Bank, 3 Allen, 87; Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn. 273-285; Fowle v. Coe, 63 Me. 245; Salladay v. Bainhill, 29 Iowa, 555; Wyatt's Adm'r v. Rambo, 29 Ala. 510-520; Wilson v. Fraizer, 2 Humph. 30; Johnson v. Corpenning, 4 Ired. Eq. 216; Moore v. Smith, 11 Rich. 569-577; Burns v. Van Loan, 29 La. Ann. 560; Miller v. Jones, 26 Ala. 247; Brown v. Foster, 6 R. I. 564; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 820. But on the other hand, where the question of jurisdiction is involved in the question which is the gist of the suit, so that it cannot be decided without going into the latter question, there the judgment is collaterally conclusive, because the question of jurisdiction cannot be retried without retrying the case on its merits, which is not permissible in a collateral proceeding. Brittain v. Kinnaird, 1 Brod. & B. 432; Regina v. Bolton, ...