People v. Adam
| Decision Date | 28 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 44722,44722 |
| Citation | 280 N.E.2d 205,51 Ill.2d 46 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Sam ADAM, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
R. Eugene Pincham, Charles B. Evins, Edward M. Genson, Arnette Hubbard, James D. Montgomery, Leo Holt and George Howard, Chicago, for petitioner.
Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (Robert A. Novelle, George Pappas, Nicholas A. DeJohn, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for respondents.
Defendant, Sam Adam, appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook County adjudging him in contempt of court and sentencing him to 10 days in the House of Correction. We allowed his motion for leave to file an original action in Habeas corpus and have consolidated the original action and the appeal for consideration and opinion.
The record shows that Shirley Walker was called to testify before the September, 1971, Cook County grand jury which was investigating an alleged obstruction of justice in a police investigation of a murder. Defendant Adams, Miss Walker's attorney, was called to testify before the same grand jury. He testified that he was her attorney and, although ordered to do so by the circuit court, he refused to answer the following questions:
'1. When did you become the lawyer for Shirley Walker?
2. Would you tell the Ladies and Gentlemen of the Grand Jury the circumstances surrounding your employment as Shirley Walker's lawyer?
3. I now ask you, Mr. Adam, to inform this Grand Jury as to that conversation that took place between you and Miss Walker and Mr. Pincham on Tuesday morning, September 28, 1971, as you were enroute here to the Criminal Courts Building in Mr. Pincham's car?'
Defendant refused to answer the questions primarily on the ground that to do so would result in the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege, and secondarily on the ground that there was no showing of probable cause for 'invading and violating his Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his person against unreasonable search and seizure.' The circuit court found his refusal to answer to be contemptuous, imposed sentence, and these proceedings followed.
We consider first defendant's contention based upon the alleged violation of his rights under the fourth amendment. Although the authorities cited by the defendant tend to support his argument that an overly broad Subpoena duces tecum may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure impermissible under the fourth amendment, we find no authority for the proposition that a grand jury must have probable cause to subpoena a witness to testify. We hold, therefore, that insofar as defendant's refusal to testify was based on the constitutional argument, the circuit court did not err in ordering him to answer the questions.
Defendant contends that all of the matters within the scope of the three questions which he refused to answer are protected from compulsory disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The People contend that assuming, Arguendo, that the matters about which defendant was interrogated were privileged, Miss Walker had already testified regarding them and the privilege was thereby waived. Defendant argues that because Miss Walker had been granted immunity, her testimony was compelled and involuntary, and there was, therefore, no waiver of the privilege.
The attorney-client privilege exists in order that one who is, or seeks to become a client, may consult freely with counsel without fear of compelled disclosure of information communicated by him to the attorney whom he has employed, or seeks to employ. The...
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