People v. Adams

• Decision Date: 07 May 1981
• Citation: 53 N.Y.2d 1,439 N.Y.S.2d 877,422 N.E.2d 537
• Parties: , 422 N.E.2d 537 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Clarence ADAMS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 877

439 N.Y.S.2d 877

53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 537

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Clarence ADAMS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 7, 1981.

Henry Winestine and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. (Timothy J. McGinn, and Steven R. Kartagener, Asst. Dist. Attys., of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JASEN, Judge.

On this appeal, we are once again called upon to delineate the bounds of the exclusionary rule. The specific question presented is whether evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of a closet in the defendant's apartment should have been suppressed. To answer this question, we must determine whether, under the circumstances of this case, the reasonable, although mistaken, reliance by police officers on the authority of an individual to consent to a search should result in the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of that search.

At 9:00 P.M. on September 13, 1976, Housing Patrolman Rudolfo Quinones was on duty at Tinton Avenue and 163rd Street in Bronx County. Alerted by a commotion across the street from where he was standing, Quinones observed a man, later identified as defendant, holding a gun to a woman's head. As Quinones approached the couple, the defendant released the woman and began to move in Quinones' direction. Drawing his gun, Quinones ordered the defendant to halt and drop his weapon. The defendant, who was then approximately 25 feet away, fired two shots at Quinones. Patrolman Quinones fired two shots in return and defendant fell to the ground. Believing defendant to be wounded, Quinones began to walk toward him. The defendant suddenly wheeled and fired two more shots at Quinones which fortunately also missed their mark. Quinones was then not able to return any shots because some bystanders had come into the line of fire. Thereupon, defendant got to his feet and fled through the crowd that had gathered at the scene, disappearing into a nearby wooded area. Quinones radioed for assistance and several police cars soon arrived. Quinones gave the arriving officers a brief description of the perpetrator and the gun he was carrying which, according to Quinones, was "like a .32." A search of the immediate vicinity by the officers proved to be unsuccessful.

At this point, a woman, Arah Blue, approached the police and identified herself as the girlfriend of the gunman. She provided the police with the defendant's name and address and urged the police to go to his apartment because he had threatened to kill her. The police were also told by Blue that defendant kept weapons and ammunition at the apartment and that she was in fear that he might have returned there to carry out his threat against her. Blue then escorted Quinones and the other officers to the defendant's nearby apartment and gave them access by opening the door with a key she was carrying. Upon entering, a cursory inspection of the premises revealed that neither the defendant nor anyone else was present. Blue then pointed out the closet in which she claimed defendant stored his weapons. One of the officers opened the closet door and inside the police found a .308 calibre rifle, 25 rounds of ammunition for the rifle and 44 rounds of .32 calibre ammunition. ^{1 1} The police seized these items and exited the apartment without otherwise searching the premises. Upon leaving the building, Blue informed the officers that she did not live in the apartment, but resided elsewhere. Five days later, defendant was arrested and charged, inter alia, with the attempted murder of Patrolman Quinones.

Defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his closet. After a hearing, at which only Quinones was called to testify as to the events of September 13, defendant's motion was denied. Noting that it was incumbent upon the police to pursue their investigation by going to the apartment to see if the defendant was there and that entry to the premises "was granted by somebody who ostensibly had permission" to admit them, the suppression court ruled that no warrant was necessary under the circumstances in order to conduct the limited search of the closet.

On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, 72 A.D.2d 156, 423 N.Y.S.2d 936, defendant's conviction, two Justices concurring in result and one Justice dissenting. According to the court (p. 159, 423 N.Y.S.2d 936), the "limited search was, in effect, conducted by Blue, a private individual, not the police" and, therefore, provided no basis for suppression. Alternatively, the Appellate Division adopted the reasoning of the suppression court in denying defendant's motion to suppress, to wit: that the police needed no warrant under the circumstances because they were given permission to open the closet by one appearing to have authority to consent to the search.

The defendant contends that his motion to suppress was erroneously denied. He argues that the entry by the police into his closet was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, is subject to the exclusionary rule. ² The defendant, while conceding that the information provided by Arah Blue gave the police probable cause to search for weapons in the closet, nevertheless asserts that the failure to obtain a warrant requires that the evidence seized be suppressed. We disagree.

At the outset, we reject the proposition, apparently adopted by the court below, that the search of defendant's closet is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny because it was, in effect, conducted by Arah Blue, a private individual. Of course, it is well settled that evidence obtained as a result of an unauthorized search by a private party is not subject to the exclusionary rule. (Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048; People v. Gleeson, 36 N.Y.2d 462, 465, 369 N.Y.S.2d 113, 330 N.E.2d 72; People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 382, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874, 239 N.E.2d 625.) There is, however, no authority for the proposition that a search actually conducted by police officers, although at the direction of a private individual, is not subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the law is quite to the contrary. Where, as here, there has been affirmative participation by government officials in obtaining evidence, the police cannot avoid the constitutional limitations imposed upon them by claiming that the acts of a private party are also involved. (Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819; People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 528, 419 N.Y.S.2d 447, 393 N.E.2d 443; People v. Esposito, 37 N.Y.2d 156, 371 N.Y.S.2d 681, 332 N.E.2d 863; cf. People v. Adler, 50 N.Y.2d 730, 431 N.Y.S.2d 412, 409 N.E.2d 888.) Evidence obtained by the police from the defendant's closet clearly was the fruit of a "search" within the meaning of the Constitution and, therefore, calls into play the full panoply of Fourth Amendment considerations.

Although by its express terms the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has made it clear that "a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is 'per se unreasonable * * * subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' " (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576; see, also, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 84 S.Ct. 889, 891, 11 L.Ed.2d 856.) Two such exceptions to the warrant requirement which have developed over the years are searches conducted pursuant to consent (Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-594, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1261-1262, 90 L.Ed. 1453; Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630, 66 S.Ct. 1277, 1280, 90 L.Ed. 1477) and searches undertaken in what have come to be called "exigent circumstances" (see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290; Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486; People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607. Elements of both exceptions to the warrant requirement are present in this case.

It is well established that the police need not procure a warrant in order to conduct a lawful search when they have obtained the voluntary consent of a party possessing the requisite authority or control over the premises or property to be inspected. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, supra; Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453, supra; People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 179 N.E.2d 339.) Furthermore, it is equally clear that these permissive searches are not limited to those instances where consent was given by the defendant. Rather, a lawful search may be conducted without a warrant where "permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." (United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684; People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652, 397 N.E.2d 1319.) However, the question whether a warrantless search may be sustained merely upon a showing that the searching officers reasonably, albeit erroneously, believed that the consenting party had sufficient authority over the premises or property to permit the search has been expressly left open by the Supreme Court (United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 177, n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at p. 996, n. 14) and heretofore has not been addressed by this court.

Other courts addressing this issue in analogous situations have, for the most part, refused to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a reasonable,...