People v. Adams

• Decision Date: 17 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 70462,70462
• Citation: 144 Ill.2d 381,163 Ill.Dec. 483,581 N.E.2d 637
• Parties: , 163 Ill.Dec. 483 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Daniel ADAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 637

581 N.E.2d 637

144 Ill.2d 381, 163 Ill.Dec. 483

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Daniel ADAMS, Appellant.

No. 70462.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 17, 1991.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Asst. Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, Kurt Christensen, law student, for appellant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Roland W. Burris, Attys. Gen., Springfield, James E. Ryan, State's Atty., Wheaton, Kenneth R. Boyle, William L. Browers, Cynthia N. Schneider, Office of the State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, of counsel, for the people.

Justice CUNNINGHAM delivered the opinion of the court:

Background

On December 2, 1987, defendant, Daniel Adams, pled guilty and was convicted in Du Page County of one count of criminal sexual assault. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 12-13(a)(3).) The victim was the defendant's daughter, who was 12 years of age when the act was committed.

In exchange for the plea of guilty, the defendant was sentenced to three years of imprisonment, to be served concurrently with a three-year term from Stephenson County. The latter sentence arose through a probation violation stemming from a 1985 conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 12-16(b).) The defendant's daughter was also the victim in that conviction.

After the plea was entered, the prosecuting attorney informed the court that, pursuant to the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act (the Registration Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars. 221 through 230), the defendant would be required to sign a form to comply with the statute. The court then ordered the defendant to sign the form, and the defendant complied.

In May 1988, the State filed a motion to have the defendant certified as a habitual child sex offender. The defense moved to dismiss on the grounds the court no longer had jurisdiction and the Registration Act violated the principle of equal protection. The court subsequently requested briefs from the parties on these issues.

The opposing motions were heard in July 1988, at which time the court denied the defendant's motions with respect to both issues. The court delayed certifying the defendant as a habitual child sex offender until he could be brought before the court.

On August 18, 1988, the defendant appeared before the trial court. He was advised of his duty to register as a habitual child sex offender, and the court then entered an order certifying him as such.

The defendant filed a timely appeal to the appellate court. In response to the issues presented by the defendant, the appellate court affirmed the judgment. (198 Ill.App.3d 74.) The defendant, having properly appealed to this court, raises essentially the same issues. They are: (1) whether the Registration Act is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) whether the Registration Act denies equal protection and due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution; and (3) whether the trial court failed to certify the defendant as a habitual offender in a timely manner.

The legislature passed the statute in question in response to concern over the proliferation of sex offenses against children. The Registration Act was designed to aid law enforcement agencies by requiring habitual child sex offenders to register with the local law enforcement authorities whenever they move. (84th Ill.Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, June 23, 1986, at 208.) This requirement lasts for 10 years upon completion of the parole or release from prison. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 227.) The registration itself consists of a signed statement by the person giving such information as may be required by the Department of State Police. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 228.) This may include the fingerprints and photograph of the person registering. Failure to register is a Class A misdemeanor. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 230.) The information supplied is to be held in confidence by the law enforcement agency, and the unauthorized release of the supplied information is a Class B misdemeanor. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 229.) Those convicted of sexual assault or sexual abuse as defined in sections 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961, after a prior conviction of any of the above in Illinois or a substantially similar offense in another State, are subject to the registration requirements of the Registration Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 222.

Eighth Amendment

The defendant argues that the statute is a punishment, cruel and unusual in nature, and therefore violative of the Federal and State Constitutions.

The statute prescribes a duty on the part of an individual on the basis of a criminal conviction. The question to be answered is whether this duty is punishment. Traditional notions of punishment aid little in the resolution of this issue since the statutory duty is neither imprisonment nor a fine. It imposes no restraints on liberty or property. In short, by traditional definition, the duty to register is not punishment.

For this analysis Trop v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 is the most appropriate authority, due to its focus on the eighth amendment. Trop concerned the constitutionality of section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 whereby, inter alia, a soldier convicted of desertion could be summarily stripped of his United States citizenship. The petitioner challenged the validity of the statute based upon an eighth amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment.

Trop determined that the purpose of the statute should be evaluated in order to determine whether it is penal in nature. (Trop, 356 U.S. at 96, 78 S.Ct. at 595, 2 L.Ed.2d at 639.) The debates of the legislature here show the purpose of the statute to be nonpenal. Specifically, the legislature sought to create an additional method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual abuse. (84th Ill.Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, June 23, 1986, at 208.) The Registration Act was designed to aid law enforcement agencies. With the registration requirement, the habitual offender's address is readily available to law enforcement agencies, which may then question and, if necessary, detain him under appropriate circumstances.

Trop determined that the severity of the disability as well as all the circumstances surrounding the legislative enactment may also be relevant factors in concluding whether a disability is penal. (Trop, 356 U.S. at 96, 78 S.Ct. at 595-96, 2 L.Ed.2d at 639-40.) The disability imposed by the Registration Act falls short of being severe. Apart from the relatively simple act of complying, the requirement is an innocuous duty compared to the potential alternative of spending an extended period of years in prison.

The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute reveal a legislature deeply concerned with the proliferation of sex offenses against children. Aside from the education of the children themselves, the most logical alternative available to the legislature was to monitor the movements of the perpetrators by allowing ready access to crucial information. The Registration Act serves this purpose.

Defendant, however, suggests a case to aid in our determination. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, has set forth, in the context of the fifth and sixth amendments to the Federal Constitution, various tests to determine whether a law is penal or regulatory in character. These tests, however, are for use when conclusive evidence of legislative intent is unavailable. (Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169, 83 S.Ct. at 568, 9 L.Ed.2d at 661.) As we have stated, the intent with respect to the Registration Act is clearly nonpenal in nature, focusing not on the burden to any particular defendant, but rather on the advantages given to law enforcement agencies in the protection of children.

The defendant asserts that compliance with the Registration Act will subject him to interrogation and detention whenever a sex offense occurs. However, as the appellate court pointed out, the registrant's constitutional safeguards will still be in place to protect him from unwarranted police harassment. 198 Ill.App.3d at 82, 144 Ill.Dec. 402, 555 N.E.2d 761.

Additionally, we find it significant that the legislature chose not to specifically address problems particularly associated with pedophiles. No attempt is made in the statute to correct the behavior of sex offenders. Although the legislature took note of the recidivist nature of sex offenders (84th Ill.Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, June 23, 1986, at 217), it included no provision in the statute mandating counseling or any other remedial measure particularly appropriate to pedophiles. (Cf. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 11-20.1(d) (mandating psychiatric evaluations for repeat pornography offenders).) The absence of such corrective measures in the statute, while not controlling, further impels us to conclude it is nonpenal.

The disability fails to meet the guidelines set forth for determining what constitutes punishment. For these reasons, the Registration Act does not constitute punishment under the eighth amendment.

Defendant next challenges the statute on the basis of article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution. He asserts that the Registration Act is a disproportionate penalty to the crime committed in that it requires him to register even after his debt to society has been paid. The Registration Act is clearly less burdensome upon an individual than an extended jail term and is not a disproportionate penalty under the Illinois Constitution.

Assuming, arguendo, the disability is punishment, it would nevertheless fail to meet the requirements of cruel and unusual...