People v. Adamson

• Decision Date: 29 September 1949
• Docket Number: Cr. 4989
• Citation: 210 P.2d 13,34 Cal.2d 320
• Parties: PEOPLE v. ADAMSON.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 13

210 P.2d 13

34 Cal.2d 320

PEOPLE v. ADAMSON.

Cr. 4989.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Sept. 29, 1949.

Morris Lavine, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Walter L. Bowers, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Simpson, District Attorney, Jere Sullivan and Robert Wheeler, Deputy Attorneys General, Los Angeles, for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

There are before this court defendant's appeal from a judgment denying his petition for coram nobis and the People's motions that this court dismiss such appeal, vacate all orders staying execution of the sentence, ¹ direct the trial court to proceed in the manner provided by law with execution of its sentence (which imposes the death penalty), and direct immediate issuance of the remittitur. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we have concluded that the motions of the People should be granted.

By his petition for coram nobis (which is, in legal effect, a motion to vacate a judgment (People v. Adamson (1949), 33 Cal.2d 286, 287-288, 201 P.2d 537)) defendant attacks a judgment of conviction of first degree murder which has been affirmed by this court (People v. Adamson (1946), 27 Cal.2d 478, 165 P.2d 3; rehearing denied) and by the United States Supreme Court (Adamson v. California (1947), 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223; rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 784, 68 S.Ct. 27, 92 L.Ed. 367). He contends: That he was given only two days in which to prepare his defense and was thus deprived of the right to effective aid of counsel. That 'there has been a constant and systematic exclusion of colored persons in the appointment of judges' of the Los Angeles Superior Court, wherein he was convicted, thus denying to defendant, a Negro, 'due process of law and equal protection of the law.' 'That the mode and method of selection of jurors in Los Angeles County was such as to permit systematic and persistent exclusion of members of the colored or African race on account of race * * *, and that the jury commissioner called only white persons to attend the trial and try Admiral Dewey Adamson * * *, and that the jury selected to try your petitioner consisted entirely of women, all white. That such procedure and proceedings denied him the equal protection of the law and due process of law.' That defendant was convicted upon false testimony of fingerprint experts and of Mrs. Frances Turner, used by the State with knowledge of its falsity.

The judgment attacked on the above grounds was rendered on November 27, 1944. It was affirmed on appeal on January 4, 1946 (People v. Adamson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 478, 165 P.2d 3); a petition for rehearing was denied on January 31, 1946; and defendant was resentenced by the trial court on February 15, 1946. On June 23, 1947, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of this court (Adamson v. California, supra, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223), and on October 13, 1947, that court denied a petition for rehearing, 332 U.S. 784, 68 S.Ct. 27, 92 L.Ed. 367. On November 18, 1947, the trial court set February 6, 1948, as the date for defendant's execution. On January 30, 1948, just one week before the date set for his execution, defendant petitioned this court for the writ of habeas corpus. The petition was denied. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to this court (Adamson v. California (February 5, 1948), 333 U.S. 831, 68 S.Ct. 610, 92 L.Ed. 1115). Thereafter (later in the day on February 5, 1948), a judge of the United States District Court granted a stay of execution to permit consideration of a petition for habeas corpus in that court. On February 16, 1948, the district judge denied the petition for habeas corpus and on March 2, 1948, he refused a certificate of probable cause for appeal. On March 29, 1948, the trial court again fixed a date for execution: June 4, 1948. Thereafter a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied defendant's application for certificate of probable cause for an appeal from the District Court order (Ex parte Adamson (May 11, 1948), 167 F.2d 996). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Court of Appeals (Ex parte Adamson (June 1, 1948), 334 U.S. 834, 68 S.Ct. 1342, 92 L.Ed. 1761). On June 2, 1948, defendant filed his petition for coram nobis in the trial court and that court ordered execution stayed and issued its order to show cause why the petition should not be granted. The People then filed a 'Motion for a Denial of the Relief Prayed For' with affidavits denying generally and controverting specifically the material allegations of the petition, and also a 'Demurrer.' On July 12, 1948, the trial court made its order that 'Demurrer to petition * * * is sustained without leave to amend.' Defendant attempted to appeal from this non-appealable order (see People v. Adamson (1949), supra, 33 Cal.2d 286, 201 P.2d 537). After dismissal of this purported appeal the trial court, on February 15, 1949, heard argument and rendered the 'Judgment Denying Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis' from which the present appeal is taken, and set May 6, 1949, as the date of execution. On April 25, 1949, defendant filed with this court an application for stay of judgment pending appeal and, some of the justices being of the view that defendant had shown probable cause for reversal, on May 4, 1949, we granted defendant's application for stay or execution. After further consideration we are satisfied that the appeal is devoid of merit.

The Failure to State any Ground for Relief within the Scope of the Writ of Coram Nobis.

In this state a motion to vacate a judgment in the nature of a petition for coram nobis is a remedy of narrow scope. (See People v. Darcy (1947), 79 Cal.App.2d 683, 693, 180 P.2d 752; People v. Martinez (1948), 88 Cal.App.2d 767, 774, 199 P.2d 375.) Its purpose is to secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if the trial court had known it and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not then known to the court. (People v. Gilbert (1944), 25 Cal.2d 422, 442, 154 P.2d 657; In re Lindley (1947), 29 Cal.2d 709, 725-726, 177 P.2d 918; People v. Tuthill (1948), 32 Cal.2d 819, 821, 198 P.2d 505.) The applicant for the writ 'must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ; otherwise he has stated no ground for relief.' (People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal.2d 502, 513, 197 P.2d 330, 336.)

With expansion of the function of habeas corpus in this state, an application for that writ has become the proper remedy to attack collaterally a judgment of conviction which has been obtained in violation of fundamental constitutional rights. Thus, the appropriate writ to secure relief from a judgment of conviction obtained by the use of false testimony known by the prosecution to be false is not coram nobis but habeas corpus (In re Lindley, supra, page 725 of 29 Cal.2d, page 928 of 177 P.2d; see People v. Mooney (1918), 178 Cal. 525, 174 P. 325; Mooney v. Holohan (1934), 294 U.S. 103, 113, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406; In re Mooney (1937), 10 Cal.2d 1, 73 P.2d 554), although coram nobis has been used for this purpose (see People v. Kirk (1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 496, 498, 173 P.2d 367). And habeas corpus, not a nonstatutory motion to vacate the judgment (in the nature of a petition for coram nobis), is the proper proceeding to raise the question of systematic, discriminatory exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury which indicted defendant, a Negro. (See People v. Montgomery (1942), 51 Cal.App.2d 444, 125 P.2d 108.) Habeas corpus can be used to advance the contention of denial of the right to counsel, at least where no other remedy is available. (See In re Egan (1944), 24 Cal.2d 323, 337, 149 P.2d 693, 701 ('It may be assumed that a petitioner would be entitled to release on habeas corpus if he could show that deprivation of counsel resulted in an unfair trial or in substance in no trial at all'); In re Jingles (1946), 27 Cal.2d 496, 498, 165 P.2d 12 (proceeds directly to consideration of the merits of the contention, without discussing whether the writ is a proper remedy); In re Tedford (1948), 31 Cal.2d 693, 192 P.2d 3 (same); In re McCoy (1948), 32 Cal.2d 73, 76, 194 P.2d 531 (habeas corpus is available where petitioner has no other adequate remedy); see also In re Connor (1940), 16 Cal.2d 701, 705, 108 P.2d 10, 13 ('Under the general rule well established in this state, but which admits of some modification under exceptional circumstances, this contention cannot at this late date be made the basis of a successful collateral attack by habeas corpus upon the validity of the judgment'; the contention could have been raised by direct appeal or by a non-statutory motion to vacate the judgment).)

Defendant's application for the writ of coram nobis ignores the above summarized holdings as to the respective functions of that writ and of habeas corpus. Apparently defendant formerly recognized that in this state habeas corpus rather than coram nobis is the appropriate proceeding in which to raise the questions whether he was deprived of the right to counsel and whether there was discrimination against Negroes in the selection of judges and trial jurors in Los Angeles County, for he advanced these contentions in his petitions for habeas corpus addressed to this court and to the United States District Court. Defendant now repeats these contentions without suggesting any reason why he should be permitted to reiterate the same collateral attacks upon the judgment in various proceedings. Furthermore, he does not even attempt to make the showing fundamentally necessary for issuance of the writ of coram...