People v. Adamson

Decision Date20 February 1964
Docket NumberCr. 3476
Citation225 Cal.App.2d 74,36 Cal.Rptr. 894
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Tim Jesse ADAMSON and Robert Baird, Defendants and Appellants.

Robert J. Nareau, Woodland, for appellants.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., by Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

PIERCE, Presiding Justice.

Defendants, Adamson and Baird, found guilty by a jury of first degree robbery, appeal.

The charge on which defendants were tried was the robbery of a Sacramento liquor store on December 1, 1962. Admitted in evidence over objection was evidence of another robbery of a Reno grocery described by an eyewitness clerk as having been committed by the two defendants on December 15, 1962. It was admitted for the limited purpose of proving facts relevant to the crime charged, including a common design or modus operandi. The jury was cautioned and instructed regarding the limited purposes for which the evidence was received. Defendants assert that the evidence was nevertheless improperly received and that the error was prejudicial.

The principles of law which determine the admissibility of the kind of evidence under discussion are simple and well settled. These rules are not, however, always easy to apply.

Evidence of other criminal acts committed by a defendant offered merely to prove his propensity for crime is inadmissible. '[I]n a criminal prosecution the defendant can be tried for no other offense than that which he is charged in the indictment or information; evidence of collateral independent crimes is not admissible. * * *' (People v. Albertson, 23 Cal.2d 550, 576, 145 P.2d 7, 20.) But as was recently reasserted by our Supreme Court in People v. Henderson (Nov. 1963), 60 A.C. 459, at page 471, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77, at page 84, 386 P.2d 677, at page 684 (quoting from People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504, 509, 218 P.2d 981):

'* * * 'It is settled in this state that except when it shows merely criminal disposition, evidence which tends logically and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any material fact sought to be proved by the defense, is admissible although it may connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge.'' (See also People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 578, 305 P.2d 1.)

After this quotation the court adds (on page 471-472 of 60 A.C., on page 84 of 35 Cal.Rptr., on page 684 of 386 P.2d; 'Although evidence of prior offenses carries with it the risk that its probative value may be outweighed by its possible prejudicial effect, evaluation of this risk rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the foregoing rule evidence is admitted of similar acts which tend to show either guilty knowledge, intent (or motive) or design. (People v. Coefield, 37 Cal.2d 865, 870, 236 P.2d 570.)

It has been observed that the trial court, vested with a discretion, should nevertheless receive such evidence with extreme caution and 'if its connection with the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the minds of the jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact, carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt.' (People v. Albertson, supra, 23 Cal.2d 550, 577, 145 P.2d 7, 20.)

The frequency with which appeals reach appellate courts in which evidence of other crimes has been received in evidence (the basis for admission being one or another of the several inclusionary grounds stated above) gives cause for reflection as to whether, in fact, doubts are being resolved in favor of the accused. It has been observed by a critical law review commentator (in 5 Hastings Law Journal, p. 74) that the categories of inclusionary evidence 'have so riddled the general rule of exclusion 1 that the rule has become the exception and the exceptions the rule.'

Sound reasoning has prompted a warning to trial courts of the dangers inherent in an indiscriminate acceptance of evidence of other crimes. It is stated in People v. Albertson, supra, at page 577 of 23 Cal.2d, at page 20 of 145 P.2d:

"* * * It does not reflect in any degree upon the intelligence, integrity, or the honesty of purpose of the juror that matters of a prejudicial character find a permanent lodgment in his mind, which will, inadvertently and unconsciously, enter into and affect his verdict. The juror does not possess that trained and disciplined mind which enables him either closely or judicially to discriminate between that which he is permitted to consider and that which he is not."

Because of the tendency noted for seemingly greater and greater tolerance in the acceptance of evidence of other crimes, we have examined most carefully the evidence in the case at bench to determine whether evidence of the Reno robbery was sufficiently relevant and material to prove a necessary element of the offense for which defendants were on trial so that the trial court was within the bounds of discretion in admitting such evidence. We have concluded that it was, and now state the facts which explain why the evidence was properly received. 2

Principal prosecution witness at the trial was a Mrs. Ruby Wilson, the clerk and only occupant of the store when the Sacramento robbery was committed. She positively identified the two defendants as the miscreants. Besides the courtroom identification, she had identified photographs of the two defendants from an estimated number of ten others exhibited to her. These had been selected from police records on the basis of her description of the men who had held up the store. This photo-identification had occurred before the defendants were apprehended. After their arrest, she also identified the two in separate 'line-ups.'

Nevertheless, her identification was vigorously attacked by the defense. The two defendants, testifying on their own behalf, presented alibi evidence supported by corroborating witnesses. The corroboration was not unchallenged by the prosecution but proof of alibi was sufficiently strong to constitute production of other evidence by the prosecution to support the charge most important. Thus evidence of the Rano incident if it did strongly indicate a design, or modus operandi, was both relevant and material.

Such proof was undertaken first by Mrs. Wilson's testimony of the methods of the two men who robbed her: the shorter man, identified as Adamson, had produced a revolver and pointed it toward her. It was held by the man, close to his hip. The other man, identified as Baird, had gone behind the counter to the cash register and, of its contents, he took only currency, ignoring the coins. When the holder of the gun had noted her scrutiny of him he told her to turn around.

The Reno incident...

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19 cases
  • People v. Curcio
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 3, 1967
    ...Evidence of similar acts by a defendant is admissible to show either guilty knowledge, intent, motive, or design (People v. Adamson, 225 Cal.App.2d 74, 76, 36 Cal.Rptr. 894). In People v. Wade, 53 Cal.2d 322, 330, 1 Cal.Rptr. 683, 689, 348 P.2d 116, 122, we find the following 'It is the gen......
  • People v. Haston
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    • California Supreme Court
    • August 19, 1968
    ...to both the other crimes and the charged crime. (See People v. Peete (1946) 28 Cal.2d 306, 319, 169 P.2d 924; People v. Adamson (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 74, 36 Cal.Rptr. 894; People v. Houston (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 187, 33 Cal.Rptr. 26; People v. Scott (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 249, 253--254, 32 C......
  • Tarkington v. State, 5494
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1971
    ...both cases initiated the robbery with the question, 'Would you believe this is a holdup?' and then pulled a gun; People v. Adamson, 225 Cal.App.2d 74, 36 Cal.Rptr. 894 (1964), where the robbery charged occurred in Sacramento, California, two weeks prior to another in Reno, and in both cases......
  • Davenport v. Davenport (In re Davenport)
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    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • July 20, 2011
    ...23 Cal.2d 550, 577, 145 P.2d 7; accord People v. Williams (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 970, 977–978, 90 Cal.Rptr. 292;People v. Adamson (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 74, 77, 36 Cal.Rptr. 894;People v. Channell (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 99, 111, 288 P.2d 326.) Only proof that the evidence actually figured in th......
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