People v. Agnello
| Citation | 221 N.E.2d 658,35 Ill.2d 611 |
| Decision Date | 01 December 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 39132,39132 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Sidoro AGNELLO, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Maurice J. Garvey, Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Kenneth L. Gillis, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.
Defendant, Sidoro Agnello, was found guilty of robbery by a jury in the criminal court of Cook County and sentenced to life imprisonment in the penitentiary under the Habitual Criminal Act. This court affirmed his conviction in People v. Agnello, 22 Ill.2d 352, 176 N.E.2d 788. Defendant filed a petition for a hearing under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which was dismissed on motion without a hearing on the merits. Defendant appeals to this court from the order of dismissal.
The defendant's lengthy Pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act contained allegations (1) that the indictment under which he was convicted of robbery was fatally defective and that there were other irregularities with regard to the indictment; (2) that the trial court erred in not conducting a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial; (3) that he was denied his constitutional right to defend himself in the trial court; and (4) that the State knowingly used perjured testimony against him at the trial. The latter three points are argued in defendant's brief filed in this court by his court-appointed counsel.
The People filed a motion to dismiss defendant's petition on the grounds: (1) That the petition failed to raise any constitutional questions within the purview of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act; and (2) that our prior decision in People v. Agnello, 22 Ill.2d 352, 176 N.E.2d 788, was Res judicata as to the issues raised in the petition. The People's motion to dismiss was allowed by the criminal court of Cook County, and the proceedings were dismissed without any hearing on the merits of the petition. The sole issue before this court, therefore, is whether the motion to dismiss was properly granted below.
The purpose of the post-conviction hearing is to provide an independent post-conviction remedy to persons where substantial constitutional rights are alleged to have been violated in the proceeding which resulted in their conviction. We have previously held that a post-conviction proceeding is not intended to provide a defendant with a second review of matters which have already been considered by this court on review. (People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761; People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824.) Furthermore, as we stated in People v. Ashley, 34 Ill.2d 402, 408, 216 N.E.2d 126, 129,
In this case, the defendant could have raised but did not raise on his original review the questions of the alleged defective indictment, the alleged error in not conducting a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial, and his contention that he was denied his constitutional right to defend himself at the trial. Unlike the situation in People v. Hamby, 32 Ill.2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456, where the defendant sought to raise issues on his original writ of error but was not permitted to do so by his court-appointed counsel, there is no indication in the record of the original appeal that ...
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People v. Stewart, 77-13
...... People v. Armes (1967), 37 Ill.2d 457, 227 N.E.2d 745; People v. Agnello (1966), 35 Ill.2d 611, 221 N.E.2d 658 (where defendant waived issues of a defective indictment, his competency to stand trial, and his constitutional right to defend himself since there was no indication in the record of the original appeal that defendant disagreed with the presentation made by his ......
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People v. Purifoy
...... The State does cite to cases which hold that in post-conviction proceedings issues which could have been raised on direct appeal are waived if there is no indication that defendant disagreed with the presentation made by appointed appellate counsel. (People v. Agnello (1966), 35 Ill.2d 611, 613, 221 N.E.2d 658; People v. Hamby (1965), 32 Ill.2d 291, 295, 205 N.E.2d 456 (no waiver . Page 662 . [123 Ill.Dec. 199] because defendant's conflict with appellate counsel was apparent).) Those cases, however, are [172 Ill.App.3d 991] not applicable to the case at ......
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People v. Carbona
...... (People v. Brasfield (1966), 35 Ill.2d 560, 221 N.E.2d 225.) Only when application of the waiver principle would be inconsistent with fundamental fairness has this rule been relaxed by the court. People v. Agnello (1966), 35 Ill.2d 611, 221 N.E.2d 658; People v. Armstrong (1975), 29 Ill.App.3d 1029, 331 N.E.2d 834. Application of the waiver principle would not be inconsistent with fundamental fairness in this case because defendant's letter to the trial judge indicates that she knew of ......
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People v. Frank
......Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239), or of fundamental fairness[48 Ill.2d 504] (People v. Hamby, 32 Ill.2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456) where appointed counsel on appeal thwarted the defendant's vigorous and manifest efforts (see People v. Kamsler, 39 Ill.2d 73, 233 N.E.2d 415; People v. Agnello, 35 Ill.2d 611, 221 N.E.2d 658; People v. Ashley, 34 Ill.2d 402, 216 N.E.2d 126) to raise additional issues. In view of the need to protect the right to appeal with the aid of competent counsel, and upon appraisal of the spirit and ultimate purpose of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, we conclude ......