People v. Akis
| Citation | 63 Ill.2d 296,347 N.E.2d 733 |
| Decision Date | 14 May 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 47548,47548 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Samuel AKIS, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago , for the People.
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Robert B. Thompson and Ronald P. Alwin, Asst. Public Defenders, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
The defendant, Samuel Akis, was charged with unlawful use of weapons (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 24--1(a)) and carrying a firearm without an Illinois Firearm Owner's Identification Card (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 83--2). He was convicted of both charges in a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. The appellate court reversed the convictions. (27 Ill.App.3d 74, 326 N.E.2d 532.) We granted the State leave to appeal.
At approximately 11 p.m. on December 1, 1972, Chicago police officer Thomas Boyd and his partner observed and automobile traveling west on 59th Street at an excessive rate of speed. Defendant was driving the vehicle accompanied by James Bates, in the front seat, and a second passenger in the back seat. The officers focused their spotlight on defendant's automobile and brought it to a stop.
Officer Boyd testified that he could see inside the defendant's car and that he observed the defendant moving around as if reaching in his pocket and removing something and handing it to James Bates, the front seat passenger. As the defendant's car was stopping, Officer Boyd saw the front seat passenger drop a gun to the ground. The weapon was a loaded .32-caliber revolver.
After recovering the weapon, the officers placed the occupants of defendant's automobile under arrest and informed them of their rights. Officer Boyd testified that he then asked Bates where he had gotten the gun. Bates responded that the defendant had given him the gun. The defendant was then asked if he had State and city registration cards for the weapons. He replied that he did not.
At the trial both the defendant and Bates maintained that no gun had been passed between them and subsequently dropped outside the car. The defendant also testified that his defroster did not work and that he could not see out of the back windows.
The appellate court held that the State had failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse the holding of the appellate court.
This court has often held that it is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. (People v. Zuniga (1973), 53 Ill.2d 550, 293 N.E.2d 595; People v. Hurst (1969), 42 Ill.2d 217, 247 N.E.2d 614.) Where the evidence is merely conflicting a court of review will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. People v. Clark (1964), 30 Ill.2d 216, 195 N.E.2d 631.
We find ample evidence in the record to support the judgment of the trial court. The arresting officer testified that he saw the defendant 'moving around as if reaching in his pocket and removing something; and I observed him reach over and hand something to the passenger.' Shortly thereafter he saw the passenger drop the revolver to the ground. During this time the officer's observation was aided by the spotlight that had been focused upon the defendant's car, and the officer testified that he distinctly remembered being able to see inside the car. The defendant denied that he handed a gun to the passenger and stated that the windows were too foggy to see out. However, the trial court was not compelled to accept this version in light of the convincing and competent testimony of the arresting officer.
Defendant is additionally linked to the revolver by the passenger's statement, made in defendant's presence, that the gun had been given to him by the defendant. The defendant maintains that the officer's testimony concerning this statement was hearsay. Though to objection was raised at trial, defendant contends that this court cannot now consider the statement. We do not agree with this contention.
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People v. Smith
...use of the report, and the evidence, though hearsay, may be "considered and given its natural probative effect." (People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill.2d 296, 299, 347 N.E.2d 733.) In view of the limited purpose for which the report was used--to provide the bare outlines of the incident--I do not ......
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People v. Young
...of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. (People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill.2d 296, 347 N.E.2d 733; People v. Garner (1981), 102 Ill.App.3d 755, 58 Ill.Dec. 378, 430 N.E.2d 320.) Where the evidence is merely conflicting a court o......
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People v. Banks
...evidence is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its natural and probative effect. People v. Akis, 63 Ill.2d 296, 299, 347 N.E.2d 733 (1976). Here, the agreed statement of facts stipulates that the police officers all testified consistently with their reports and ......
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People v. Stewart
...of some of the State's witnesses. It is the function of the jury to determine credibility of the witnesses. (People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill.2d 296, 298, 347 N.E.2d 733.) In circumstantial evidence cases, the jury need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of......