People v. Alba

Decision Date30 June 1980
Citation104 Misc.2d 1095,430 N.Y.S.2d 923
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Vicente ALBA, Defendant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. (Richard L. Giampa and Alan D. Marrus, Asst. Dist. Attys., of counsel), for plaintiff.

William M. Kunstler, New York City, for defendant.

DONALD J. SULLIVAN, Justice:

The Court conducted an extensive "Mapp" suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of a gun discovered by a Court Officer during a body search of defendant (CPL 710.20; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081). The People produced eight witnesses, namely Uniformed Court Officers David Adler and Paul Villanueva, Assistant District Attorney Deirdre Thurber, Borough Chief Clerk (of the Bronx Criminal Court) Joseph Carney, Detective Charles Wells, Office of Court Administration Analyst Robert Swift, Senior Court Officer Ralph Edwards and Captain James Jackson. Defendant called no witnesses on his behalf. The findings of fact that follow are essentially uncontroverted.

Court Officers David Adler and Paul Villanueva and Assistant District Attorney Deirdre Thurber testified substantially the same, namely that on March 12, 1978, at or about 7:00 p. m., the defendant entered the arraignment part Courtroom AR3 Bronx County Criminal Court, in the company of four others carrying a large attache case (bag); that in said courtroom there were also approximately sixty other spectators, a number of whom were carrying bags; that they recognized the defendant having seen him on prior occasions during court proceedings and community demonstrations; that based on newspaper articles and observations, they believed him to be an activist and terrorist and member of the F.A.L.N. (a so-called Puerto Rican liberation group); that they came to the conclusion that the attache case may contain a bomb; that a recess was declared for the purpose of inspecting it; that C.O. Adler approached defendant in the hall of the courthouse requesting permission to search the bag and when defendant refused said permission, placed him under arrest; that C.O. Adler indicated that he believed that he had the authority to compel a person to submit to a search of an attache case; that the individual's failure to comply constituted a violation for which he could be arrested; that pursuant to a body search of the defendant, a defaced, .38-caliber revolver with holster The Chief Clerk, Joseph Carney, indicated that the Courthouse had been the recipient of anonymous bomb threats in the past; that he gave oral instructions regarding the routine inspections of packages brought into the building and examination of suspicious bulges on persons entering the building; that there were posted signs at the entranceway indicating "ALL PERSONS ENTERING THIS BUILDING ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH"; that, since the subject incident occurred on a weekend, the responsibility of administrative searches devolved upon the court officers in the arraignment parts as the entranceway was not manned; that similar aforementioned signs were posted on the courtroom doors; that no specific instructions were issued to court officers in the event a visitor refused to be searched, but it was his understanding that if the visitor refused to be searched he would be permitted to leave the building.

and cartridges (People's exhibit # 1 in evidence), which is the subject of this hearing, was discovered in and about defendant's waistband.

The testimonies of Bomb Squad Detective Charles Wells, Police Captain James Jackson, Senior Court Officer Ralph Edwards and Office of Court Administration Analyst Robert Swift provided statistical details of the numerous records of bomb hoaxes, bomb explosions, assaults and possession of dangerous weapons in the national, state and city courthouses. The Court will and does take notice of these statistics and of the substantial need to take the most stringent safety and security precautions in courthouses. It is clear that such measures are required for the protection of the judges, court personnel, attorneys, defendants and visitors, as well as to prevent damage to the structures itself.

The central issues presented are two-fold: (1) Was there probable cause to arrest the defendant stemming from his refusal to permit a courthouse search of his attache case? (2) Was the warrantless courthouse arrest, search incident thereto and seizure of defendant's gun justified on the basis of either defendant's implicit assent or exigent circumstances? Stated another way, does a courthouse visitor shed his constitutional rights at the courthouse gate? (See, Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731.)

The Court does not believe that a citizen merely by entering the hallowed portals of a courthouse is per se deprived of his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Moreover, under the particular facts and circumstances in this case, the Court is constrained to conclude that the warrantless arrest, the ensuing search incident thereto and seizure of the weapon lacked probable cause, voluntary consent and exigent circumstances, jeopardizing defendant's constitutional rights to be free from an unreasonable arrest, search and seizure guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions (U.S.Const., 4th Amdt.; N.Y.Const., Art. 1, § 12).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

At the outset, it is axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment proscribes the arrest of an individual without magistrate authorized warrant or the existence of probable cause (Dunaway v. New York, 440 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824; People v. Oden, 36 N.Y.2d 382, 368 N.Y.S.2d 508, 329 N.E.2d 188; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564; People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582, 313 N.E.2d 49). The statutes authorizing arrests without warrants are found in Article 140 of the Criminal Procedure Law. A police officer (CPL 140.10) and peace officer (CPL 140.25) are authorized to arrest a person without a warrant when they have "reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed" a crime. A uniformed court officer is included within the definition of "peace officer" under CPL 1.20, subd. 33. Reasonable or "(p)robable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observe as trained officers. (Citations omitted.) In dealing with probable cause, we deal with probabilities; these are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. (See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, (69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879.))" (People v. Tolentino, 40 A.D.2d 596, 597, 335 N.Y.S.2d 958, 960). A probable cause arrest exists when "the facts and circumstances within their . . . (the arresting officer's) knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" a crime has been or is being committed by the arrestee (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327). The probable cause requirement, devised by the framers of our Constitution, "represented the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment" (Dunaway v. New York, supra, 99 S.Ct. p. 2254). The determination rests upon an assessment of "all the facts and circumstances" of each case (People v. Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 699, 376 N.Y.S.2d 497, 339 N.E.2d 182). Of course, the burden of going forward in the first instance to show the existence of probable cause rests with the People, albeit the ultimate burden of establishing the illegality of the arrest or seizure falls upon the defendant (People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 209 N.E.2d 694; People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 306 N.Y.S.2d 673, 254 N.E.2d 905; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307). Mere, suspicion or equivocal behavior susceptible to interpretation of innocent conduct or the refusal to comply with a request to search either alone or in combination with the arresting officer's knowledge of a defendant's general reputation, does not normally reach the level of probable cause (People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 216, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562; People v. Yedvobnik, 48 N.Y.2d 910, 425 N.Y.S.2d 50, 401 N.E.2d 173 (bookmaker reputation); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, (6th Cir.); see People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 406 N.E.2d 471, 1980). As stated in People v. Elwell, supra, the purpose of the stringent probable cause standards provided in the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and the comparable State Constitution (N.Y.Const., Art. 1, § 12) ". . . is protection of innocent and guilty alike from search or arrest based upon suspicion or upon common rumor and report rather than upon proof of reasonable grounds for believing a crime to have been committed, either through direct evidence or through reasonable inferences from suspicious acts. . . . Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic human right of liberty."

The record before the Court in the case at bar discloses the following list of factors relied upon by the People, which essentially provided the stimulus for the initial stop, culminating in the arrest and discovery of the weapon during the search incident thereto: (1) defendant's reputation as a reputed member of the F.A.L.N., an alleged terrorist type organization; (2) his entry into the courtroom with a large attache case; (3) awareness of defendant's previous arrest for possession of weapons; (4) knowledge of...

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2 cases
  • People v. Alba
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • 25 Junio 1981
    ...J.P., and SANDLER, SULLIVAN, MARKEWICH and LUPIANO, JJ. MARKEWICH, Justice. This case involves the propriety of an order, 104 Misc.2d 1095, 430 N.Y.S.2d 923, made after a hearing, suppressing a handgun found on defendant's person in a courthouse. All testimony came from People's witnesses; ......
  • Legal Aid Soc. of Orange County v. Crosson, 91 Civ. 3468 (GLG).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 26 Febrero 1992
    ...courthouses that have given rise to an immediate need for protective measures. See, e.g., McMorris, 567 F.2d at 899; People v. Alba, 104 Misc.2d 1095, 430 N.Y.S.2d 923, 931 (Bronx County Supreme Court 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 81 A.D.2d 345, 440 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1st Plaintiff contends tha......

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