People v. Aldridge, Docket No. 12524

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
• Citation: 209 N.W.2d 796,47 Mich.App. 639
• Docket Number: Docket No. 12524,No. 2,2
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Henry ALDRIDGE, Defendant-Appellant
• Decision Date: 25 June 1973

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209 N.W.2d 796 47 Mich.App. 639 PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William Henry ALDRIDGE, Defendant-Appellant. Docket No. 12524. Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2. June 25, 1973.
Released for Publication Aug. 24, 1973.

[47 Mich.App. 640] H. Eugene Bennett, Sheffer, Bell & Bennett, Lansing, for defendant-appellant.

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Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Raymond L. Scodeller, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and BRONSON and T. M. BURNS, JJ.

BRONSON, Judge.

Defendant was convicted by jury verdict of breaking and entering in violation of M.C.L.A. § 750.110; M.S.A. § 28.305. From the trial court's [47 Mich.App. 641] sentence of 2 1/2 to 15 years, defendant appeals as a matter of right. The facts precipitating defendant's conviction may be briefly summarized as follows.

On the afternoon of December 21, 1970, Frankie Scott locked the windows and doors of his house prior to leaving for work as was his customary practice. He also checked to see whether his pistol and holster were in their usual location between the mattress and springs. Upon returning from work at 11:45 p.m., Scott was told that someone was running out of his house by Michael Leeks, a neighbor. Scott found his back door open and observed two men running out the front door. He began chasing these men and ultimately caught one during the pursuit. Scott's captive, subsequently identified as defendant, was turned over to police officers responding to the reported crime. The officers frisked defendant and found a pistol and holster in his right rear pocket. The pistol and holster were identified as those Scott kept between his mattress and springs. Defendant was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon ¹ and subsequently indicted for breaking and entering.

The two issues raised for our consideration are based upon alleged errors committed during defendant's trial upon the breaking and entering offense. Immediately after the selection of the jury, defense counsel requested the disclosure of the prosecution's dossier of the impaneled jury. This disclosure motion was based upon defense counsel's understanding that the dossier existed, was collected by police agencies in the immediate area, and possibly contained (1) information regarding the jurors' and their families' adverse contact with the law and (2) information of whether the jurors [47 Mich.App. 642] were prosecution minded. Defense counsel offered to supply proofs on this matter, but the trial judge denied his motion without specifying the reason therefor. It is this denial of requested discovery which raises the primary issue for our consideration.

During the trial the prosecution offered the testimony of William Martin, the arresting police officer, as part of its case in chief. This officer described the information received upon arriving at the scene of the crime and the search of defendant, a suspected participant. In response to the question, 'What did you do after making the search of the defendant?', this witness stated, 'First I placed him under arrest for C.C.W., carrying a concealed weapon; then I put him in the car'. Defendant moved for a mistrial since this testimony interjected the commission of another offense for which defendant was not on trial. ² The trial judge denied the motion, finding the error harmless and stating that he would give the appropriate cautionary instruction. This testimony and ruling raises the second issue for our consideration:

I. DID THE INTRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY REGARDING A SEPARATE CHARGE INTO THE TRIAL RECORD CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR?

We consider the second issue first, finding it devoid of merit. The challenged testimony referred to defendant's arrest for an independent offense for which he

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was not being tried. The issue created by the admission of this type of evidence was considered by this Court in People v. Smedley, 37 Mich.App. 325, 329, 194 N.W.2d 383, 386 (1971). The Smedley panel [47 Mich.App. 643] disposed of the issue by quoting the following language from People v. Savage, 225 Mich. 84, 86, 195 N.W. 669 (1923):

'It is elementary that the acts, conduct and demeanor of a person charged with a crime at the time of, or shortly before or after the offense is claimed to have been committed, may be shown as a part of the Res gestae. Proof of such acts is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that they may tend to show the commission of another crime.'

The present testimony regarding the discovery of the pistol and holster on defendant's person at the scene of the crime was necessary to establish the larcenous intent element of the offense charged. Similarly, this testimony was admissible as part of the res gestae notwithstanding its tendency to show the commission of another crime. The incidental degree of prejudice caused by the admission of this evidence was appropriately cured by the trial judge's cautionary instruction that the jury disregard any references to other crimes in their deliberation as to defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged. In this context, the trial judge properly denied defendant's motion for mistrial.

II. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED DISCOVERY OF THE PROSECUTION'S DOSSIER UPON THE IMPANELED JURY PREPARED BY POLICE AGENCIES CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR?

The type of disclosure requested by defendant below creates a question of first impression for this jurisdiction. The implicit discovery problem raised challenges our thinking upon what is reasonable, fair, and just. Our evaluation is founded upon the concept of fundamental fairness rather than upon [47 Mich.App. 644] the current underpinnings of criminal discovery. We draw upon the area of criminal discovery for guidance because of its effect and interrelationship with the problem raised, but do not treat it as one requiring an interpretation or extension of current rules governing the disclosure of Evidence valuable to defendant. With this preface, we proceed to delineate the basis for our holding that disclosure of the prosecutor's dossier upon prospective jurors must be made to defendant upon request.

We recognize that discovery in a criminal trial is a rapidly developing area of the law. The extent to which defendants are permitted to discover particular items depends upon the rules employed, state or Federal, and the jurisdiction selected for review. But this much may be gleaned from the developing case law--there is a trend favoring the expansion of criminal discovery. ³ This trend is no less apparent in Michigan. ⁴ Unlike many jurisdictions, Michigan's progressive attitude toward criminal discovery had an early impetus. In People v. Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 251 N.W. 594 (1933), the Court held that a defendant had a right to inspect a

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witness-police officer's report written in the regular course of his duty and immediately forwarded to his supervisor. Although the disclosure sought was [47 Mich.App. 645] justified by a finding that such was necessary to defendant's exercise of his right to impeach a witness, the Court referred to several concepts relevant to the present issue. The Dellabonda Court stated:

'The only legitimate object of the prosecution is to show the whole transaction as it was, whether its tendency is to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405 (1872); People v. Etter, 81 Mich. 570, 45 N.W. 1109 (1890). A public prosecutor has no right to suppress testimony. Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16 (1874). It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney to furnish all the evidence within his power bearing upon the issue of guilt or innocence in relation to the main issue or to give some good excuse for not doing so. People v. Swetland, 77 Mich. 53, 43 N.W. 779 (1889); People v. Germaine, 101 Mich. 485, 60 N.W. 44 (1894).' ⁵ At pp. 500--501, 251 N.W. at p. 599. (Emphasis added.)

'As said in People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 573--574, 18 N.W. 362, 363 (1884):

"The State has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons. But surely the state has no such interest; its interest is that accused parties shall be acquitted, unless upon all the facts they are seen to be guilty; and if there shall be in the possession of any of its officers information that can legitimately tend to overthrow the case made for the prosecution, or to show that it is unworthy of credence, the defense should be given the benefit of it. There was therefore no privilege to preclude the giving of the testimony for which the defense called." At p. 504, 251 N.W. at p. 600. (Emphasis added.)

Significantly, this language recognizes the prosecution's duty to insure the fairness with which trials are conducted by not interposing obstacles to the disclosure of the facts.

[47 Mich.App. 646] The criminal trial encompasses a purpose which must not be obfuscated by the adversary climate in which it is conducted. The Court in People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 621, 97 N.W.2d 739, 740 (1959), described this purpose by stating that:

'The legal concept of a criminal trial has changed considerably in modern times. It is seen less as an arena where two lawyer gladiators duel with the accused's fate hanging on the outcome and more as an inquiry primarily directed toward the Fair ascertainment of truth.' ⁶

(Emphasis added.)

The prosecutor's office, as the people's representative, insures the fairness within our system of justice by seeking the ascertainment of truth as a goal in addition to its adversary function. In People v. Jordan, 23...