People v. Alejandro R. (In re Alejandro R.)

• Decision Date: 30 December 2015
• Docket Number: A144398
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE ALEJANDRO R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alejandro R., Defendant and Appellant.

243 Cal.App.4th 556

196 Cal.Rptr.3d 651

IN RE ALEJANDRO R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Alejandro R., Defendant and Appellant.

A144398

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Filed December 30, 2015

Mark R. Wilson, Emeryville, Jonathan Soglin, San Francisco, and Paula Rudman, Oakland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, Donna M. Provenzano and Joan Killeen, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Margulies, J.Appellant Alejandro R., a minor, admitted to being an accessory to illegal drug sales and was found to be a ward of the court. In addition to typical conditions of probation, the juvenile court imposed a condition requiring appellant to submit to the warrantless search of his electronic devices and his use of social media. Appellant challenges the condition as substantively invalid and unconstitutionally overbroad. We conclude, following our recent decision in In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 (Ricardo P. ), that the condition, while valid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 (Lent ), superseded on other grounds as stated in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290–292, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938, is overbroad as imposed by the juvenile court. We affirm the juvenile's court order with appropriate modification of the electronics search condition.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant, the subject of a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), admitted a misdemeanor charge of being an accessory after the fact to the transportation and distribution of marijuana, a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a). The police report from appellant's arrest stated he approached undercover officers outside a concert venue and "said something similar to, ‘yo $10 bucks for a blunt.’ " When an officer expressed interest, appellant directed him to another person seated nearby, from whom the officer purchased two marijuana cigarettes. At the time of his detention, appellant was in possession of 0.4 grams of presumed cocaine and two pills of presumed methamphetamine.

At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found appellant to be a ward of the court, but allowed him to remain at home. In addition to typical conditions of juvenile probation, the court imposed the following two conditions, which appellant challenges in this appeal: appellant must (1) "submit to a search of your ... electronics day or night and passwords day or night at the request of a Probation Officer or peace officer" and (2) "attend school on a regular basis."¹ When appellant's counsel objected generally to the electronics search condition, the court explained, addressing appellant, "As in this case with drugs, I find it's very important [and] the best way of supervising individuals like yourself [who] have drug cases, that we check your electronics, because that's where you buy and sell and very often boast with photos about your drug usage and drug paraphernalia."

II. DISCUSSION

We summarized the law applicable to juvenile probation conditions in In re D.G. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 47, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 639 (D.G. ): "Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b), the juvenile court, in placing a ward on probation, ‘may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ " (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282.) Consistent with this mandate, the juvenile court is recognized as having " ‘broad discretion in formulating conditions of probation’ " (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 (Tyrell J. ), disapproved on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430, 146 P.3d 965 ), and the juvenile court's imposition of any particular probation condition is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 100, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 668.)

"While adult criminal courts are also said to have ‘broad discretion’ in formulating conditions of probation (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67 ), the legal standards governing the two types of conditions are not identical. Because wards are thought to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and have more circumscribed constitutional rights, and because the juvenile court stands in the shoes of a parent when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, juvenile conditions ‘may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders.’ (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212.) In Tyrell J., the Supreme Court explained another aspect of the difference: ‘Although the goal of both types of probation is the rehabilitation of the offender, "[j]uvenile probation is not, as with an adult, an act of leniency in lieu of statutory punishment; it is an ingredient of a final order for the minor's reformation and rehabilitation." [Citation.] ... [¶] In light of this difference, a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court. [Citations.] " ‘Even conditions which infringe on constitutional rights may not be invalid if tailored specifically to meet the needs of the juvenile....’ " ' " (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 81–82, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519, 8 Cal.4th 727A at pp. 81–82.)

"While broader than that of an adult criminal court, the juvenile court's discretion in formulating probation conditions is not unlimited. (In re Walter P., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 100, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 668.) Despite the differences between the two types of probation, it is consistently held that juvenile probation conditions must be judged by the same three-part standard applied to adult probation conditions under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 : ‘A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality...." [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’ (Id. at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545, fn.omitted; see, e.g., In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 188, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 ; [citations].)" (D.G., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52–53, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 639.)

In addition to satisfying the Lent test, juvenile probation conditions that infringe constitutionally protected rights must be clearly stated and no more restrictive than necessary to achieve their purpose. "Under the void for vagueness constitutional limitation, ‘[a]n order must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.’ [Citations.] In addition, the overbreadth doctrine requires that conditions of probation that impinge on constitutional rights must be tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. [Citations.] ‘If available alternative means exist which are less violative of the constitutional right and are narrowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purposes contemplated, those alternatives should be used....’ " (In re Luis F., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 189, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 174.)

A. Electronics Search Condition

Appellant contends the electronics search condition violates Penal Code section 632, is invalid under Lent, and is unconstitutionally overbroad. In Ricardo P., we addressed the same arguments regarding an identical electronics search condition and affirmed the imposition of a narrowed version of the condition. For the reasons explained below, we find this case materially indistinguishable from Ricardo P., and we therefore follow that decision.²

The appellant in Ricardo P. admitted felony violations of the burglary statute after breaking into two homes. (Ricardo P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 680, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883.) The juvenile court imposed an identical electronics search condition to that imposed here and articulated the same drug-related rationale. (Id. at pp. 680–681, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883.)

The Ricardo P. court initially determined the meaning of the condition and concluded the court's reference to "electronics" included not only electronic devices and the data contained on the devices, but also "electronic accounts, such as social media accounts, that, while not stored on electronic devices, can be accessed through them." (Ricardo P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 682, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883.) The court based this construction on the juvenile court's reference, as here, to monitoring the appellant's activity on such accounts. (Ibid. ) We understand the electronics search condition at issue here to have the same meaning.

1. Penal Code Section 632

Addressing the appellant's claim that the electronic search condition violates Penal Code section 632, subdivision (a), which prohibits eavesdropping on confidential electronic communications, Ricardo P. found the claim forfeited because the appellant had not raised section 632 below. The decision also concluded the appellant lacked standing to raise the claim, since it was based on the argument the condition "might invade the privacy of the people with whom he...