People v. Allen
| Decision Date | 15 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 151843.,Calendar No. 3. |
| Citation | 499 Mich. 307,884 N.W.2d 548 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. ALLEN. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Ronald J. Shafer, Prosecuting Attorney, and Linus Banghart–Linn, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
John W. Ujlaky, Lansing, for defendant.
ZAHRA
, J.
This case presents the question whether someone convicted of failing to comply with the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA)1 as a second offender, MCL 28.729(1)(b)
(SORA–2),2 can be subject to sentence enhancement under the habitual offender act (HOA).3 The trial court sentenced defendant as a second-offense habitual offender on the basis of his prior conviction for violating the registration requirements of MCL 28.729(1)(a) (SORA–1) and his instant conviction for violating MCL 28.729(1)(b) (SORA–2).4 There can no dispute that at the time of sentencing, defendant had been convicted of two felonies. But because defendant could not be convicted of SORA–2 without first having been convicted of SORA–1, defendant maintains that his SORA–1 conviction cannot also be used under the HOA to enhance the sentence imposed for the SORA–2 conviction. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant. We reverse. We hold that the sentence imposed for defendant's SORA–2 conviction can be enhanced under the habitual-offender statutes because the Legislature created separate offenses for subsequent violations of SORA. Nothing in SORA or the HOA precludes a sentencing court from enhancing the maximum sentence provided for SORA–2 by the applicable habitual-offender statute. This conclusion is consistent with Michigan caselaw addressing the application of the habitual-offender statutes to other recidivism statutory schemes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, remand the case to the Ionia Circuit Court, and direct that court to reinstate defendant's original judgment of sentence of 2 to 10.5 years as a second-offense habitual offender for his SORA–2 conviction.
As a result of a 2007 misdemeanor conviction of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant was required to register on the Michigan Sex Offender Registry semiannually for 25 years. Defendant failed to properly register and in February 2010 pleaded guilty of SORA–1, a felony, and was sentenced to 5 years' probation, with the first 4 months served in jail. On April 30, 2012, defendant registered his address as 6123 Clarksville Road in Clarksville, Michigan. He verified that address on January 9, 2013. In March 2013, Clarksville police received an anonymous tip that defendant was not living at the Clarksville Road address, but at 211 West Riverside. After investigating, police determined that the Clarksville Road address was vacant and that defendant was staying at 211 West Riverside, the home of his spouse.5 Defendant was arrested for failing to comply with SORA. In June 2013, a jury convicted defendant of SORA–2. Although MCL 28.729(1)(b)
provides for a maximum sentence of 7 years, the trial court sentenced defendant under MCL 769.10(1)(a) as a second-offense habitual offender to 2 to 10.5 years' imprisonment.6
Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence under the habitual-offender provisions. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the sentence imposed for defendant's SORA–2 conviction could not be enhanced under the applicable habitual-offender statute.7
The Court of Appeals noted that the “language of MCL 769.10(1)(a)
directs a sentencing court to sentence the offender for a subsequent offense to a maximum term ‘that is not more than 1 ½ times the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of that offense....’ ”8 The Court of Appeals concluded that MCL 28.729(1), which delineates SORA–1, SORA–2 and SORA–3, set forth one offense with escalating punishments for repeat convictions, stating:
The maximum term prescribed for a first conviction of that offense is 4 years' imprisonment. MCL 28.729(1)(a)
. Thus, under MCL 769.10(1)(a) defendant would be subject to no more than 6 years' imprisonment—1 ½ times 4 years is 6 years. The trial court erred by basing defendant's sentence on 1 ½ times the maximum prison sentence (7 years) provided under MCL 28.729(1)(b) because that provision sets forth the punishment for a second conviction of failure to comply with SORA. The plain language of MCL 769.10(1)(a) clearly directs a court to enhance a sentence by increasing the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of the subsequent offense, not the longest term prescribed for a second conviction.[9
]
As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that SORA and the HOA conflicted because under the applicable habitual-offender statute, defendant was subject to not more than a 6–year prison sentence, while under SORA–2, MCL 28.729(1)(b)
, defendant was subject to a 7–year maximum sentence.10 The Court of Appeals described MCL 28.729(1)(a) to (c)
as “set [ting] forth the penalties for failing to comply with the requirements of SORA.”11 Because the maximum prison sentence prescribed under the applicable habitual-offender statute is different from the maximum prison sentence prescribed under SORA–2 the Court of Appeals concluded that “the two statutes irreconcilably conflict.”12 The Court of Appeals held that because SORA–2 specifically applies to subsequent violations of SORA, whereas the HOA generally applies to subsequent felony convictions, SORA is controlling and defendant's maximum sentence should have been 7 years.13
We granted leave to address “whether the second-offense habitual-offender enhancement set forth under MCL 769.10
may be applied to the sentence prescribed under MCL 28.729(1)(b).”14
We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.15 When interpreting a statute, courts must strive to give effect to the Legislature's intent.16 “The focus of our analysis must be the statute's express language, which offers the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent.”17 The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed in the statute.18 When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is not permitted and the statute is enforced as written.19
In this case we examine the interplay between several statutes: the HOA, SORA, and the sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.1 et seq.
“[A] court's duty is to give meaning to all sections of a statute and to avoid, if at all possible, ifying one by an overly broad interpretation of another.”20 More specifically, it is appropriate to read the sentencing guidelines and the HOA, which are part of Michigan's Code of Criminal Procedure,21 “together with the substantive statutes that the Legislature has enacted that define crimes and prescribes fines and costs.”22 Thus, the sentencing guidelines, the HOA, and SORA should be read in pari materia.23
In 1927, Michigan enacted the HOA as part of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure.24 It contains three sections to enhance sentences imposed on recidivist offenders. MCL 769.10
applies to those sentenced for their second felony convictions, MCL 769.11 applies to those sentenced for their third felony convictions, and MCL 769.12 applies to those sentenced for their fourth or higher felony convictions. This Court has repeatedly stated that, by enacting the HOA, “the legislature did not intend to make a separate substantive crime out of being a habitual offender but rather, for deterrent purposes, intended to augment the punishment for second or subsequent offenses.”25
Importantly, in 1998 the Legislature expressly instructed courts when enhancement under the HOA is inapplicable. Each of the three enhancement sections states: “A conviction shall not be used to enhance a sentence under this section if that conviction is used to enhance a sentence under a statute that prohibits use of the conviction for further enhancement under this section.”26 We presume, as we must, that the Legislature was well aware of these provisions of the HOA when it amended SORA in 1999 to create SORA–1, SORA–2, and SORA–3.27 We also presume that the Legislature was aware that Michigan courts had applied the HOA to other recidivism criminal statutes at the time the pertinent provisions of SORA became law.28 Significantly, the Legislature added nothing to SORA to exempt it from application of the HOA.
The Legislature has also demonstrated that when it intends to do so, it is able to exclude particular categories of felonies from the HOA.29 For example, the HOA was amended in 1978 to explicitly exclude application of the HOA to subsequent major controlled substance offenses by adding the following language to MCL 769.10
and substantially similar language to MCL 769.11 and MCL 769.12 :
If the subsequent felony is a major controlled substance offense, the person shall be punished as provided by Act No. 196 of the Public Acts of 1971, as amended, being sections 335.301
to 335.367 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.[30
]
The HOA makes no such exception for convictions under SORA's recidivism provisions, MCL 28.729(1)(a), (b), and (c)
. The Legislature has amended various criminal statutes to expressly prohibit application of the HOA to an offense,31 but it has not seen fit to adopt a similar exception for SORA–2 and SORA–3 convictions, although it has had numerous opportunities to do so.32
There being no statutory bar to the application of the HOA to SORA, the trial court sentenced defendant as a second-offense habitual offender under MCL 769.10(1)(a)
, which states:
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