People v. Allen
| Decision Date | 09 October 1924 |
| Docket Number | No. 15885.,15885. |
| Citation | 313 Ill. 156,144 N.E. 800 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. ALLEN et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Proceeding by the People of the State of Illinois against Pearl Allen and others, as legatees under the will of John Allen, deceased, to subject their legacies to inheritance tax. Judgment for defendants, and the Attorney General appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Whiteside County Court; William A. Blodgett, judge.
Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Robert W. Besse, State's Atty., of Sterling, Virgil L. Blanding, of Moline, and Albert D. Rodenberg, of Springfield, for appellant.
Ward, Ward & Ward, of Sterling (A. J. Scheineman, of Sterling, of counsel), for appellees.
December 12, 1922, John Allen, a resident of Whiteside county, died testate, leaving a widow and six children. By his will he gave to his widow all his personal property and a life estate in his real property. The remainder of the real property he devised to one of his daughters as trustee, with directions to convert the same into money as soon as practicable after the death of the widow. Out of the proceeds the trustee was directed to establish a trust fund for one of testator's daughters and to divide the residue among the other five daughters. The county court held that each of the five named daughters took a vested interest in the estate, and that each interest was worth less than $20,000, and therefore not subject to an inheritance tax. The Attorney General contends that the interest of the several children are contingent upon their surviving the life tenant, that in the event but one child survives the life tenant she would receive the entire remainder, and that under the provisions of section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Law (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 120, § 398), a tax should be assessed as if the entire remainder went to one child. He prosecutes this appeal to review the decision of the county court.
[1] The sole question to be determined on this appeal is the character of estate granted by the following direction to the trustee:
‘The balance of the proceeds of such sales shall be distributed by her between my children, Sarah A. Turney, Nellie M. Eads, Fannie D. Eads, Mable J. Allen, and herself, share and share alike, the children of any of my said children, who may be deceased to take its or their parent's share.’
That the interest created by this clause of the will is vested has been decided by this court many times. In Hawkins v. Bohling, 168 Ill. 214, 48 N. E. 94, there was a devise upon trust for the husband for life, with a direction that what real estate remained unsold at the time of the husband's death be sold ‘and the proceeds of said sale to be divided, share and share alike,’ between Ettie Bohling and Margaret Craig. The latter died before the death of the life tenant, and it was held that upon the death of the testatrix Margaret took a vested interest and that her children were entitled to her share when the period of distribution arrived. In Knight v. Pottgieser, 176 Ill. 368, 52 N. E. 934, there was a devise to the testator's wife for life, and upon her death ‘the same to go to and be divided amongst my children and their descendants, in equal shares, the descendant or descendants of a deceased child to take the parent's share in equal proportions.’ It was held that the children took vested interest, because, though the gift arose wholly out of the direction to distribute in futuro, yet such distribution was deferred merely because of the presence of the life estate and not for any reasons personal to the legatee. In Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 338, 72 N. E. 429, after a gift to the testator's wife for life, the will provided:
‘After the decease of my said wife * * * all my property both real and personal shall be divided between all of my children, both boys and girls equally, share and share alike.’
It was held that the only purpose in postponing the division of the estate was that the widow might enjoy it during her lifetime, and that the remainder taken by the children was therefore vested at testator's death. In McComb v. Morford, 283 Ill. 584, 119 N. E. 601, the testator directed that all of his property be converted into cash as soon after the death of his widow as the same could be done without loss to his estate, and that the proceeds be divided equally among his children (naming them), the children of a deceased child to take that child's share, Flossie Dunbar, a daughter of testator's deceased daughter, Almira, died after the death of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
De Korwin v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago
...294 Ill. 524, 128 N.E. 549; Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N.E. 62; Boye v. Boye, 300 Ill. 508, 133 N.E. 382; People v. Allen, 313 Ill. 156, 144 N.E. 800; Smith v. Shepard, 370 Ill. 491, 19 N.E.2d 368. See also Hodam v. Jordan, D.C., 82 F.Supp. Of course the District Court, in constr......
-
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hearne
...remainderman. See DeKorwin v. First National Bank of Chicago, supra; Smith v. Shepard, 370 Ill. 491, 493, 19 N.E.2d 368; People v. Allen, 313 Ill. 156, 158, 144 N.E. 800; Warner v. Warner, Obviously the gift to the Hearne children was not a class gift, those who were to be paid the proceeds......
-
Fay v. Fay
...N. E. 813;Carter v. Carter, 234 Ill. 507, 85 N. E. 292;Thomas v. Thomas, 247 Ill. 543, 93 N. E. 344,139 Am. St. Rep. 347;People v. Allen, 313 Ill. 156, 144 N. E. 800;Thomas v. Stoakes, 328 Ill. 115, 159 N. E. 269. The second section constituted a valid devise of the remainder to the testato......
-
McKibben v. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank
...Fay v. Fay, supra; Nicol v. Morton, supra; Thomas v. Stoakes, supra; Whittaker v. Porter, 321 Ill. 368, 151 N.E. 905;People v. Allen, 313 Ill. 156, 144 N.E. 800;Gibbs v. Andrews, 299 Ill. 510, 132 N.E. 544. In a leading case on this subject, Howe v. Hodge, 152 Ill. 252, 38 N.E. 1083, the wi......