People v. Allen
Decision Date | 02 June 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 99977.,99977. |
Citation | 856 N.E.2d 349,222 Ill.2d 340,305 Ill.Dec. 544 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Peri ALLEN, Appellee. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, Joliet (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Russell K. Benton, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.
Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Fletcher P. Hamill, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.
James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, Joliet (Domenica A., Osterberger, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for amicus curiae Paul J. Kaupas, Will county Sheriff.
After a jury trial in the circuit court of Will County, defendant, Peri Allen, was found guilty of burglary and was sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that defendant had "adequately alleged plain error" where the trial court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear an electronic stun belt as a restraining device at trial without the explicit analysis and finding of necessity required by People v. Boose, 66 Ill.2d 261, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977). 354 Ill.App.3d 442, 446, 290 Ill.Dec. 284, 821 N.E.2d 335. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (177 Ill.2d R. 315), and granted Paul J. Kaupas, Will County sheriff, permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State (155 Ill.2d R. 345(a)).
Defendant was indicted for the offense of burglary for entering a motor vehicle, belonging to Will County Auto Wreckers, with the intent to commit a theft. Prior to jury selection on February 11, 2003, defense counsel asked to approach the bench for a sidebar conference with the trial judge, after which the judge stated: Two days later, after the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict and immediately prior to the State resting and defense counsel calling defendant to the stand, the following colloquy occurred:
No further mention of the "security device" was made at trial, and defendant did not include any issue concerning the restraint in his posttrial motion.
On direct appeal, the sole issue raised by defendant was "whether it was error for the defendant to be forced to wear an electronic security belt as a restraining device at trial." 354 Ill.App.3d at 443, 290 Ill.Dec. 284, 821 N.E.2d 335. Initially, we agree with the appellate court that while the trial court never referred to the "security device" as an electronic stun belt, "we feel confident in our assessment that it was indeed that type of restraining device." 354 Ill.App.3d at 443, 290 Ill.Dec. 284, 821 N.E.2d 335. The State does not suggest what the bulging security device under defendant's shirt might have been, other than a stun belt. The appellate court's finding is especially probable where, in People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App.3d 1001, 1003, 283 Ill.Dec. 801, 808 N.E.2d 1089 (2004), another recent Will County circuit court case, the State asked the appellate court to validate the Will County sheriff's "standard operating procedure" of requiring all felony defendants in custody to wear a stun belt while appearing in court. Even the dissent agrees that such a "blanket policy" existed in the Will County sheriff's department. 222 Ill.2d at 379, 305 Ill.Dec. at 566, 856 N.E.2d at 371 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J. and Kilbride, J.) In addition, there is at least one other case pending before this court involving the use of electronic stun belts on felony defendants in Will County. See People v. Johnson, 356 Ill.App.3d 208, 292 Ill.Dec. 177, 825 N.E.2d 765 (3d Dist.2005), appeal denied, 221 Ill.2d 655, 306 Ill.Dec. 279, 857 N.E.2d 678 (2006).
Having agreed with the appellate court that defendant was wearing an electronic stun belt, we now examine whether Boose, which generally applies to the "physical restraint" of defendants in the courtroom (Boose, 66 Ill.2d at 266, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303), also applies to the concealed electronic restraint involved in this case. First, the Will County sheriff, as amicus curiae, argues, inter alia, that an electronic "security belt" is not a restraining device that lends itself to due process scrutiny pursuant to Boose, citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). However, Deck does not speak to the circumstances present here. In Deck, the United States Supreme Court concluded that due process "prohibit[s] the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial." (Emphasis added.) Deck, 544 U.S. at 629, 125 S.Ct. at 2012, 161 L.Ed.2d at 963. Nowhere in Deck does the Court consider the question raised herein, i.e., whether a concealed electronic stun belt worn under a defendant's garments should be classified as a "physical restraint" which lends itself to due process scrutiny. Accordingly, Deck does not support the argument of amicus, as it does not even address concealed restraints. Indeed, we find that the Deck Court's stated reasons which prompt due process scrutiny in visible restraint cases — the presumption of innocence, securing a meaningful defense, and maintaining dignified proceedings — may be applied with like force to stun belts which are not necessarily visible to the jury. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 631, 125 S.Ct. at 2013, 161 L.Ed.2d at 963-64.
In In re Staley, 67 Ill.2d 33, 37, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977), this court stated:
Thus, even when there is no jury, any unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it hinders the defendant's ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the proceedings. See Staley, 67 Ill.2d at 36-37, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72; Martinez, 347 Ill.App.3d at 1005-06, 283 Ill.Dec. 801, 808 N.E.2d 1089. We therefore agree with the appellate court herein which, citing Martinez, concluded that an electronic stun belt "is no less a restraint than manacles or handcuffs." 354 Ill.App.3d at 445, 290 Ill.Dec. 284, 821 N.E.2d 335.
As noted by defendant, it appears that almost every court which has reviewed this issue has held that electronic stun belts are restraining devices the use of which is subject to the same restrictions as shackles. See, e.g., United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1299 (10th Cir.2000); People v. Mar, 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1219-20, 52 P.3d 95, 106, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 175 (2002); People v. Melanson, 937 P.2d 826, 835 (Colo.App.1996); Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478, 479, 499 S.E.2d 60, 61 (1998); State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 529-30, 817 N.E.2d 29, 52-53 (2004). One exception to this approach for dealing with electronic stun belts is found in Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1194 (Ind.2001), wherein the Supreme Court of Indiana banned the use of such restraints from its courtrooms altogether. However, contrary to the dissent's contention, in this case we are not faced with the question of whether stun belts should continue to be used in Illinois courtrooms. Rather, we are asked to determine whether, and we find that, this court's holdings in Boose and Staley regarding shackles apply equally to those defendants who are restrained by means of an electronic stun belt worn under their clothing at trial, and that nothing in Deck precludes application of due process protections to such cas...
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