People v. Amigon

• Decision Date: 18 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1-06-3528.,1-06-3528.
• Citation: 903 N.E.2d 843,388 Ill. App. 3d 26
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rene AMIGON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

903 N.E.2d 843

388 Ill. App. 3d 26

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rene AMIGON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-06-3528.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

February 18, 2009.

Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, County of Cook (James E. FitzGerald, Manny Magence, Heather Fahrenkrog, Assistant State's Attorneys, Of Counsel), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jed Stone, John Curnyn, Stone & Associates, L.L.C., Waukegan, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Justice GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Rene Amigon, was convicted of the murder of Alphonso Ruiz who died of pneumonia more than five years after he was shot and paralyzed by the defendant. The defendant contends (1) his nonelectronically recorded custodial statement should not have been admitted at trial, and (2) the State failed to prove causation. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

At a prior trial, the defendant was convicted of the murder of Enson Rodriguez and the aggravated battery with a firearm of Alphonso Ruiz. There, the State proved that on October 20, 1995, the defendant, an 18-year-old member of the Latin Kings street gang, shot at Rodriguez and Ruiz, both members of the Two-Six, a rival gang. The State's evidence included testimony from Ruiz and the court-reported statement the defendant made on October 27, 1995. The defendant received a 30-year sentence for aggravated battery with a firearm for the Ruiz shooting. The record does not reveal his murder sentence.

Although Ruiz survived the shooting, a bullet severed his spinal cord, rendering him quadriplegic. In early 2001, he was living with family members, taking college classes, and learning to drive a handicap-modified car. On March 13, 2001, Ruiz went into cardiac arrest. He was taken to the hospital, where he died the following day of pneumonia. He was 22 years old.

Upon learning of Ruiz's death, the State charged the defendant with Ruiz's murder pursuant to sections 9-1(a)(1) and 9-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)).¹

Prior to his murder trial, the defendant moved to suppress his 1995 court-reported statement on the basis that it did not comply with section 103-2.1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2006)) because it was not electronically recorded. The court denied the motion.

The defendant's murder trial commenced on September 26, 2006.² Two eyewitnesses—a nurse who had been on her way to work and a Two-Six gang member—identified the defendant as Ruiz's shooter, who was wearing a sweatshirt at the time. The State introduced Ruiz's testimony from the prior trial that established that while Ruiz was talking to Rodriguez on October 20, 1995, he saw a Hispanic male wearing a hooded sweatshirt pull out a gun and fire five shots at them. The State also introduced the defendant's 1995 statement in which he admitted he shot Ruiz because he knew Ruiz was a Two-Six member and Two-Six members had recently vandalized the defendant's car.

To establish Ruiz's 2001 death was caused by the 1995 shooting, the State presented expert forensic pathology testimony from Dr. Nancy Jones, the assistant medical examiner that conducted an autopsy of Ruiz.

Dr. Jones explained that pneumonia is an infection in the lungs that reduces a person's ability to exchange air. Ruiz's pneumonia was caused by a "community acquired" bacteria, meaning Ruiz contracted the bacteria prior to being admitted to the hospital on March 13, 2001. There was no way for Dr. Jones to determine how Ruiz contracted the pneumonia-causing bacteria.

In Dr. Jones's opinion, Ruiz "died as a result of pneumonia due to quadriplegia due to a gunshot wound to the neck." Her opinion was not altered by the fact that Ruiz's spinal cord injury occurred more than five years before his death. Dr. Jones explained how the prior gunshot wound was significant to the pneumonia:

"Well, the reason it's significant to the pneumonia is, we need an intact nervous system in order to breath adequately and to prevent ourselves from developing pneumonia or infections. We need to be able to take deep breaths, filling our lungs. And we need to be able to expel that air completely because any time we can't completely empty out the lungs, it allows for secretions, mucosa, saliva to accumulate in the lungs, typically in the lower lungs, and it becomes a growth media for bacteria. So anything that can compromise your ability to breath is going to increase [y]our risk for developing pneumonia.

The other thing about it is, that individual who has paralysis or quadriplegia or paraplegic from injuries to their spinal column also begin to undergo medical wasting. They become thinner and their immune systems become compromised because of that muscle wasting, that inability to move and get around adequately. So individuals with damage to the spinal cords are compromised [respiratory]-wise because they can't breath as adequately, but they're also compromised because their immune system isn't as strong as it would normally be in an individual who didn't have those problems."

Dr. Jones also explained the nerves in Ruiz's third, fourth, and fifth vertebrae that controlled his diaphragm for breathing had been damaged in the shooting. Thus, "Ruiz's ability to expand his lungs regularly or completely and fully for normal pulmonary toilet" was reduced.

Essentially, "Ruiz acquired a bacterial pneumonia in the community * * * because he was a quadriplegic, had atrophy and muscle wasting and his respi[ra]tory capabilities were compromised because the gunshot wound made him more susceptible [to pneumonia] than a normal 22 year old would be." In her opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the manner of Ruiz's death was homicide.

On cross-examination, Dr. Jones acknowledged the pneumonia "probably" was not connected with anything the defendant did or did not do. She also testified that several of the victim's organs, including his heart, kidneys, and pancreas, were harvested for transplant. His lungs were not.

After the jury found the defendant guilty of murder, the trial court sentenced him to a mandatory term of natural life in prison. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Electronically Recorded Statement

The defendant first contends the trial court erred in admitting his 1995 court-reported statement at trial. According to the defendant, his statement should have been presumed inadmissible because it was not electronically recorded as required by section 103-2.1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2006)).

Section 103-2.1(b) provides:

"An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding brought under Section 9-1 * * * of the Criminal Code of 1961 * * * unless:

(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and

(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered."

725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2006).

An electronic recording "includes motion picture, audiotape, or videotape, or digital recording." 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(a) (West 2006). There are numerous exceptions to the electronic recording requirement. 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(e) (West 2006).

Section 103-2.1, approved in 2003, became effective on July 18, 2005, almost 10 years after the defendant's court-reported statement was taken, but more than one year before this murder trial commenced. We understand the defendant to claim that the date of this murder trial triggers the application of section 103-2.1. We understand the State to claim that section 103-2.1 has no application here because the date of the defendant's custodial interrogation predates the passage of the section.

Because this issue involves whether section 103-2.1(b) initially bars the admission of the defendant's statement, a legal challenge, our review is de novo. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 197, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006) (the ultimate issue of a defendant's "legal challenge" to the denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo).

"Where, as here, a case implicates a statute enacted after the events giving rise to the litigation, Illinois courts evaluate the temporal reach of the new law in accordance with the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)." People v. Brown, 225 Ill.2d 188, 201, 310 Ill.Dec. 561, 866 N.E.2d 1163 (2007). Where the legislature expressly provides for the delayed implementation of a statute, the legislature expresses its intent that the statute apply prospectively only. People v. Gilbert, 379 Ill.App.3d 106, 111, 318 Ill.Dec. 17, 882 N.E.2d 1140 (2008), citing Brown, 225 Ill.2d at 201, 310 Ill.Dec. 561, 866 N.E.2d 1163.

The defendant argues the legislature's use of the phrase "in any criminal proceeding" indicates the legislature intended section 103-2.1(b) to apply in all murder cases tried after the section's effective date, even those like his where the statement was taken prior to the date the statute went into effect. He points to People v. Johnson, 368 Ill.App.3d 1073, 307 Ill.Dec. 153, 859 N.E.2d 153 (2006), that, in his view, requires this court "to analyze the admissibility of the statement under the statute" even where the statement is made prior to the statute's effective date.

The defendant in Johnson was a juvenile indicted in May 2003 as an adult for murder. The juvenile gave an inculpatory statement after he was confronted with a videotaped statement of a co-arrestee. While the co-arrestee's statement was videotaped, it is unclear whether the juvenile's statement was electronically recorded. Johnson, 368 Ill.App.3d at 1076-78, 307 Ill.Dec. 153, 859 N.E.2d 153....