People v. Amos

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Citation11 Cal.Rptr. 834,190 Cal.App.2d 384
Docket NumberCr. 7454
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Charles AMOS, Defendant and Appellant.
Decision Date21 March 1961

James Charles Amos, in pro. per., for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, John F. Foran, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

ASHBURN, Justice.

Convicted of possession of heroin in violation of § 11500, Health & Safety Code, defendant appeals from the judgment. He was also charged with three prior felony convictions, viz., attempted burglary, manslaughter and violation of § 11500, Health & Safety Code. During the trial defendant expressly admitted all of said charges of prior convictions. At the time of sentencing counsel for defendant moved to strike the priors; the deputy district attorney pointed out that all of them were admitted in open court and, doubtless referring to § 11718 Health & Safety Code, 1 declined to consent. The court then found to be true the allegation of a prior conviction of § 11500, expressly stated that it made no finding upon the other two priors and sentenced defendant to state prison for the term prescribed by law. Thus defendant received the minimum sentence permitted under the statute, assuming that such procedure is sanctioned by law. Cf. People v. Powell, 187 Cal.App.2d 709, 10 Cal.Rptr. 116. If not so sanctioned appellant could not complain for the error, if any, is in his favor.

Appearing in propria persona he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of guilty and that the heroin which forms the basis of his conviction was inadmissible because obtained through unlawful search and seizure. There is no merit in either of these contentions.

The claim of insufficiency of the evidence is but an invitation to this court to reweigh the proofs. This we cannot do. People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885, 256 P.2d 911, 916: 'The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. It is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. '* * * The court on appeal 'will not attempt to determine the weight of the evidence, but will decide only whether upon the face of the evidence it can be held that sufficient facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt. For it is the function of the jury in the first instance, and of the trial court after verdict, to determine what facts are established by the evidence, and before the verdict of the jury, which has been approved by the trial court, can be set aside on appeal upon the ground' of insufficiency of the evidence, 'it must be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached in the court below. * * * We must assume in favor of the verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence, and then determine whether such facts are sufficient to support the verdict.' If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the defendant will not warrant interference with the determination of the jury.'' Viewing the evidence most favorably to respondent's case and remembering that the trial judge 'could have accepted portions of defendant's testimony and statements, disbelieved other portions' People v. Matlock, 51 Cal.2d 682, 695, 336 P.2d 505, 511, 71 A.L.R.2d 605, the facts are as follows.

At about 11:00 p. m. on June 29, 1960, defendant was walking south on the east side of Burlington Avenue near Eleventh Street, in Los Angeles; a police car slowly drove up behind him; he glanced back at it, a furtive glance. Officer Pryor thus explained the term 'furtive glance,' as used by him: 'I define to be a furtive glance when a person will glance and then looks away quickly and then starts to peek back over his shoulder again. That to me would be, I would think, furtive.' Having passed defendant the police backed their car and stopped him. As they got closer he seemed to be extremely nervous. This was in a vicinity where burglaries occur 'every once in a while,' and the officers thought he might be a burglar. They had with them a report upon a 'rubber ball strangler' for whom the police were searching as the result of strangulation of an elderly woman; they also had a composite drawing of that suspect which the officers (Pryor and Millsap) thought defendant resembled. Asked for identification he showed them a property slip disclosing that he had been arrested for petty theft. The officers placed him in their car while they checked with head-quarters to see if he was wanted. He was not arrested at that point; merely detained for the purpose and during the time of making reasonable inquiries; such a detention does not in and of itself amount to an arrest. See, People v. King, 175 Cal.App.2d 386, 390, 346 P.2d 235; People v. Anushevitz, 183 Cal.App.2d 752, 754, 6 Cal.Rptr. 785; People v. Galceran, 178 Cal.App.2d 312, 315-316, 2 Cal.Rptr. 901. Although the police had not yet mentioned the matter to him, defendant began to talk about the 'rubber ball strangler' as soon as he got into the car. He constantly talked about it and was so nervous he was asked what was wrong, replying, 'Oh, nothing. You are just police officers and that shakes me up.' Defendant fit so well the description the police had of the strangler that, although they had no warrant, they arrested defendant and took him to Central Station to see if he should be booked for the strangulation crime.

Before placing him in the automobile the police frisked him for weapons but found none; neither did they then discover the box of heroin which later came to light. When the police car arrived at Central Station Officer Pryor, who was seated on the left side of the rear seat, alighted through the left door. His brother officer who was the driver also got out on that side. Defendant was seated on the right side of the rear seat. He tried to follow Pryor out the left door but was told to stop, that he would be taken out on the right. This car had been drawn from a police car pool about 4:30 p. m. of that day. Only one other person had been in it, a rape victim; Officer Pryor testified that when he let her out of the car 'there was nothing in the back seat when she left.' When he opened the right rear door for defendant to alight he saw a small green and yellow box, which later proved to be a container for heroin, sitting on the ledge or frame of the door. It could not have been there while the door was closed, for the act of shutting the door would have mashed it or have driven it inside. The officer saw defendant kick it as he got out and saw it fall on the pavement some four to five feet from the rear wheel. Pryor, who had heard defendant say he had some pills he took for his eyes and nose, said to defendant: 'Just a minute. You dropped your pills.' He said: 'Those aren't mine. They must be yours because I never seen them before. They aren't mine.' Pryor: 'Oh, * * * they aren't yours? * * * They weren't there before you got in the car.' Defendant: 'I don't know but they aren't mine. They must be yours. You found them and that is where you found them right on the ground there. That's where you found them. You didn't get them off of me.' Pryor: 'They weren't there before you got in the car, so if they fell out of the car it stands to reason, I didn't have them, my partner didn't have them, my partner was not sitting back there, so I would say they were yours.' Pryor picked up the box and opened it, seeing capsules of some dirty white powdery substance (which later proved to be 64 capsules of heroin); at this time the defendant became more vehement in his denials of anything concerning the box, and Pryor said to him: 'It seems you had a reason to be nervous. Maybe you aren't the murderer but it is quite likely you are carrying heroin.' When defendant arrived at the Homicide Bureau the officers in...

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