People v. Ana C. (In re Ana C.)

• Decision Date: 10 August 2016
• Docket Number: A145411
• Citation: 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 263,2 Cal.App.5th 333
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE ANA C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ana C., Defendant and Appellant.

2 Cal.App.5th 333

206 Cal.Rptr.3d 263

IN RE ANA C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.The People, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Ana C., Defendant and Appellant.

A145411

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Filed August 10, 2016

Christopher Love, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Huy T. Luong, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Streeter

, J.

Ana C. (Minor), a ward of the juvenile court, appeals a dispositional order continuing her wardship, removing her from parental custody, committing her to the San Mateo County Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility, Margaret J. Kemp Camp for Girls (Girls Camp), and imposing various conditions of probation. The sole focus of her appeal is on whether six of these probation conditions are facially unconstitutional for vagueness. We vacate one of the challenged conditions and modify two others, but otherwise affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2014, Minor, then 17 years old, was arrested following a joyriding incident involving a stolen car. According to the probation report, a California Highway Patrol officer spotted the car driving erratically on Highway 101 and initiated a traffic stop, but the car accelerated to a speed exceeding 90 miles per hour and eventually crashed along the side of a freeway off-ramp. Appellant and two friends emerged from the car. The two others, one of whom was Minor's boyfriend, Eduardo F., fled the scene, but Minor was arrested. Minor falsely reported to the arresting officer that she had been driving. The officer determined that Eduardo F. had been driving, which was confirmed when, following Eduardo F.'s later arrest, he admitted to having been the driver. There was also evidence that, before the crash, Minor had been drinking. Following her arrest, she submitted to a blood test, which showed a blood alcohol level of .01 percent.

Based on this incident, the district attorney filed a petition under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code¹

charging Minor with stealing a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ), driving a vehicle with wanton disregard for the safety of others (Pen. Code, § 2800.2), possession of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) ), selling a vehicle without the vehicle registration number (Veh. Code, § 10751, subd. (a) ), displaying a false license plate (Veh. Code, § 4463, subd. (a)(1) ), resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1) ), possessing burglary tools (Pen. Code, § 466 ), giving false information to a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 31 ), and falsely reporting a crime to a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148.5, subd. (a)

). Minor admitted two misdemeanor counts (resisting arrest, and falsely reporting a crime) and the remaining counts were dismissed.

In August and September 2014, the juvenile court sustained the section 602

petition, as modified, and declared Minor to be a ward of the court with a maximum confinement time of 14 months, detaining her in the custody of her mother, and imposing various conditions of probation. Among the conditions of probation was a curfew requiring Minor to be home between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.; a stay-away order barring Minor from seeing Eduardo F.; a ban on possession or use of alcohol, drugs or tobacco (the Alcohol, Drugs and Smoking Ban); a ban on possession of drug paraphernalia (the Drug Paraphernalia Ban); and a requirement that Minor attend school regularly (the School Attendance Requirement). For the first 30 days of Minor's wardship, the court placed her under house arrest in her mother's home, subject to electronic monitoring (the Electronic Monitoring Condition). Minor was directed to “obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program,” and, while she was subject to electronic monitoring, the probation department was given discretion to detain her for up to five days in [Juvenile Hall] for any “violation of Court orders or the Electronic Monitoring Agreement.”

Within three weeks of the declaration of her wardship, according to a probation report, Minor left her mother's home without permission and cut her electronic monitoring bracelet from her ankle. As a result, she was charged in a second section 602

petition with misdemeanor vandalism, and in a section 777 notice of probation violation she was charged with violating the terms of her probation. On November 5, 2014, Minor admitted the vandalism allegation, and her maximum confinement time was extended to 18 months. Minor was detained in juvenile hall for 27 days, and ordered to participate in family preservation services so that she and her mother could receive counseling assistance designed to facilitate successful at-home completion of her probation. The Electronic Monitoring Condition, which was limited by its terms to a 30–day period, was vacated.

Upon a referral from the probation department based on a report that Minor left her mother's home in violation of her curfew, on March 19, 2015 Minor was found to have violated her probation. The court ordered 30 days of detention in juvenile hall and committed Minor to the G.I.R.L.S. Program, an out-of-home placement,² but stayed the G.I.R.L.S. Program commitment in order to give Minor another chance to demonstrate that she could meet the terms of her probation while detained at home. At the section 777 hearing, in light of the reportedly strained relationship between Minor and her mother, the court ordered mediation in addition to the previously-ordered family preservation services.

In April 2015, according to a probation report, Minor left her mother's home in violation of her curfew again, this time for a period of several days. After finding Minor to be in violation of her probation, on June 15, 2015, the juvenile court determined that in-home detention had failed, removed Minor from her mother's custody, and ordered her into the G.I.R.L.S. Program at Girls Camp (the June 15 Dispositional Order). The June 15 Dispositional Order was structured to anticipate what would occur once Minor completed phase one of the G.I.R.L.S. Program. When released from Girls Camp, Minor was to begin phase two of the G.I.R.L.S. Program and was to return to her mother's custody, but would remain subject to the conditions of probation that were originally imposed on her in September 2014, with some additions and modifications.

Several of the added conditions in the June 15 Dispositional Order focused on alcohol and drug use and on Internet activity.³ To prevent interference with chemical testing for drug usage, Minor was barred from “consum[ing] any poppy seed products or other substances known to adulterate or interfere with chemical testing” (the Poppy Seed Products Ban). To track Minor's Internet activities, the court imposed an electronic search condition requiring Minor to surrender, upon demand by her probation officer or a peace officer, all encryption keys or passwords to electronic devices used by her. And to prevent deletion of digital data from any of her electronic devices, the court ordered that “The Minor shall not possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that device” (the Data Deletion Tools Ban).

The June 15 Dispositional Order also reinstated the Electronic Monitoring Condition, placing Minor under electronically monitored house arrest for at least 30 days following her release from Girls Camp. Minor's probation officer was given discretion, as appropriate, to extend the time Minor will be subject to the electronic monitoring, to detain Minor at Girls Camp for violation of electronic monitoring program rules, to lift or impose house arrest, and to adjust Minor's curfew. The June 2015 Dispositional Order stated: “During the Minor's time in the Girls Program, the probation officer has the discretion ... to place the Minor on and vacate the Electronic Monitoring Program, ... or House Arrest/Supervision, and to impose or adjust a curfew.”

Minor timely appealed, and now argues that the Alcohol, Drugs and Smoking Ban, the Drug Paraphernalia Ban, the Poppy Seed Products Ban, the Electronic Monitoring Condition, the Data Deletion Tools Ban, and the School Attendance Requirement are unconstitutionally vague.⁴

II. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law in Probation Cases Involving Claims of Facial Vagueness

It is just as true for juveniles as it is for adults that probationers “ ‘ “ ‘do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” ’ ” ' ” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1350, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 335

(Pirali ).) If anything, “[t]he permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults. ‘[E]ven where there is an invasion of protected freedoms “the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.” ’ [Citation.] This is because juveniles are deemed to be ‘more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘ “a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.” ’ ” (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 584 (Victor L. ).)

Whether adults or juveniles, however, probationers “ ‘are not divested of all constitutional rights. “A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a [constitutional] challenge on the ground of...