People v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 28 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 60502,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 409 Mich. 474,295 N.W.2d 482 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elva Jean ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Atty., Appeals, Anne B. Wetherholt, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
State Appellate Defender Office by Kim Robert Fawcett, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
After the prosecution had examined some, but not all, of its witnesses in a murder case, the trial judge, over vigorous prosecutorial objection, accepted Anderson's plea of guilty to the charge of manslaughter, dismissed the murder charge and discharged the jury. The prosecution seeks, by this appeal, the opportunity to retry Anderson on a charge of first-degree murder. The issue is whether retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 1
We hold:
b) may have been erroneous both procedurally and in terms of the questions of law on which it was founded, and
c) came about with defendant's cooperation and consent.
Elva Jean Anderson was charged with first-degree murder. Willie Young testified that he saw her shoot and kill Willie Ray Russell. 2
Young, a doorman at a hotel, testified that Barbara Golden and Russell came to the hotel and went to the front desk. Golden kept looking "funny" at Young. She talked with the desk clerk and with Young. After Young said, Russell left the hotel. Golden made a telephone call, and then waited with Young in the hallway of the hotel.
About 20 minutes later, a taxicab pulled up and two passengers stepped out; Anderson was one of them. Golden ran up to Anderson, who slapped her. Anderson, Golden and the other person who had arrived in the cab walked around the side of the hotel. About two to three minutes later, Young saw Anderson pull a shotgun out of her "britches" and open the door to the car in which Russell was now sitting. A brief conversation ensued, Young heard Golden say "don't shoot him," and then he heard a shot. After the shot, Young heard Anderson say "(m)otherfucker, I bet you won't try to rape nobody else."
Anderson was bound over on a charge of first-degree murder. A pretrial motion to quash was denied.
At trial, the prosecution had presented its first five witnesses, but had not yet completed presenting its case, when the judge entertained a motion for reduction of bond. Over the prosecutor's objection the judge granted Anderson's release on personal bond, stating that "the proofs (of murder) in this case are not strong."
Thereupon, an off-the-record side bar conversation was held with counsel. Immediately thereafter, following an apparently brief conversation between Anderson and her counsel, she offered to plead guilty to a charge of manslaughter.
Over the prosecutor's objection, the judge proceeded to take Anderson's guilty plea, advising her of her rights and establishing a factual basis for her plea. She said that Golden was her lover and had called her saying that a man was waiting outside the hotel with a gun and was trying to rape her and asked Anderson to come pick her up. Anderson said that she brought her shotgun because she believed Golden when she said that a man with a gun was waiting outside the hotel and was trying to rape her. Anderson said that she approached the car in which Russell was sitting because she believed that he had attempted and still intended to rape Golden. She asked Russell to get out of the car, "because I didn't want to shoot him," and repeated the request several times. Anderson thought that Russell "was digging for a gun or something" and when he didn't come out she shot him.
The judge accepted Anderson's plea to the charge of manslaughter, said he was dismissing the "charges of murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree" and discharged the jury. 3
The Court of Appeals, 77 Mich.App. 357, 258 N.W.2d 225, reversed and remanded for trial on first-degree murder. It held that the judge was not authorized to accept a plea to a lesser offense and dismiss the murder charge over the prosecutor's objection, and declared that "no double jeopardy question arises."
The people contend, relying on Genesee Prosecutor I 4 and Genesee Prosecutor II, 5 that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the judge erred in dismissing the murder charge. Anderson claims that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further prosecution for murder whether the judge erred or not. We agree that reprosecution is constitutionally impermissible.
In Genesee Prosecutor I this Court held that a judge is not authorized, over the prosecutor's objection, to accept a plea of guilty of an offense not charged or included in the information or indictment. Genesee Prosecutor II enlarged this holding and declared that a judge cannot, over the prosecutor's objection, accept a plea of guilty of a lesser included offense and dismiss the charge of the greater offense; we set aside a plea of guilty of manslaughter and remanded for trial on the charged offense of murder. In those cases, however, the plea was offered and the charge dismissed before trial and impaneling of a jury. We noted that there was no double jeopardy issue in Genesee Prosecutor II because the defendant "has not been tried for murder." 6
The judge's actions in accepting a plea of guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter and dismissing the murder charge appear to have been violative of Genesee Prosecutor II. It is, however, a separate question, one controlled by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause would be violated by a retrial of Anderson for murder after jeopardy had attached in respect to that charge. We conclude (part III, infra ) that the Double Jeopardy Clause would be violated by retrial because the judge made a factual determination upon the prosecutor's proofs that one or more elements of murder could not be established. This is true notwithstanding that the judge's acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense over the prosecutor's objection appears to have violated the specific dictates of Genesee Prosecutor II.
The constitutional protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are implicated only when jeopardy has "attached." Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury has been impaneled and sworn. 7
The Clause secures the defendant's interests in (1) the finality of judgments, 8 and (2) protection against multiple prosecutions. 9
If a trial ends in a judgment of acquittal, both interests are implicated, and there can be no retrial. 10 This has been called "the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence," 11 and is absolute. It applies whether the acquittal is based on findings of a judge or the verdict of a jury, 12 and whether it is erroneously based 13 or brought about with the defendant's voluntary participation. 14
Where, however, the trial or proceeding does not end in a judgment of acquittal or conviction, only the second interest is implicated, and the constitutional protections are not absolute. The defendant has an interest in avoiding harassment from repeated proceedings 15 and in having his guilt decided by the jury impaneled to try him. 16 The people, however, have a competing interest in having one complete opportunity to try those accused of breaking the law. 17 Where there is no judgment of conviction or acquittal, these interests are balanced. 18
If the trial or proceeding ends without the defendant's consent, further prosecution is generally barred; the defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal" 19 was taken from him, and reprosecution smacks of harassment. An exception is recognized, and retrial permitted, where "manifest necessity" compelled the termination of the first trial or proceeding. 20
Where the defendant himself brings about the termination of the proceeding on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, retrial is generally permitted. 21 The defendant, having deliberately chosen to take the case from the jury cannot complain of the loss of the first trier of fact or of prosecutorial harassment through multiple prosecutions; he must live with "the consequences of his voluntary choice." 22 An exception is made, and retrial barred, when the defendant's motion is induced by bad faith conduct of the prosecutor or judge. 23
The prosecution contends that it is apparent from statements by the judge following acceptance of the guilty plea and dismissal of the murder charge that he merely found an abuse of discretion in the pretrial charging process. From this it argues that the trial did not end in an acquittal on the murder charges there was no "final judgment" that Anderson has an interest in preserving; because the trial was terminated on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, with Anderson's cooperation and over prosecutorial objection, her interests are subordinate to those of the people; she cannot complain of harassment by multiple prosecution; the people seek only "one fair opportunity" to convict, which was wrongfully taken from it by the judge.
We reject the premise of the people's argument. We conclude that the judge's action was an acquittal of the murder charges for double jeopardy purposes. No balancing of interests is required; reprosecution is barred.
To be sure, the judge did not say that he was directing a verdict, and no formal judgment of acquittal was entered. The determination of what the judge...
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