People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 03 April 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 154761
• Citation: 209 Mich.App. 527,531 N.W.2d 780
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Darrell ANDERSON, a/k/a James Jamison, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 780

531 N.W.2d 780

209 Mich.App. 527

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Darrell ANDERSON, a/k/a James Jamison, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 154761.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 5, 1995, at Detroit.

Decided April 3, 1995, at 9:20 a.m.

Released for Publication May 24, 1995.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., Richard Thompson, Pros. Atty., Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Div., and Anica Letica, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.

Michael J. McCarthy, P.C. by Michael J. McCarthy, Redford, for defendant.

Before JANSEN, P.J., and MICHAEL J. KELLY and HOOD, JJ.

JANSEN, Presiding Judge.

Following a jury trial in the Oakland Circuit Court, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L. § 750.83; M.S.A. § 28.278, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; M.S.A. § 28.424(2). He was subsequently sentenced to the mandatory terms of two years' imprisonment for the convictions of felony-firearm, the mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole for the conviction of first-degree murder, and life imprisonment for the conviction of assault with intent to commit murder. Defendant appeals as of right and we affirm.

This case arises out of the shootings of Donald Davis and Rhonda Welch on August 12, 1990, in the City of Pontiac. Pontiac police officers James Courtney and James Martinez responded to a 911 trouble call shortly after 11:00 p.m. When they arrived at 436 Erwin Street, Courtney saw Davis propping himself up on one arm and waving his other arm. Davis was bleeding and was very excited and nervous. Davis told the officers that he had been shot and that his wife, Welch, had also been shot and was still in the house. Courtney testified that Davis told him that Robert Adams had shot him, while Martinez testified that Davis stated that "Little Rob" had shot him. Police officer Valer Gross arrived shortly after Courtney and Martinez. Gross testified that Davis told him that "Little Rob, Robert Adams" had done this to him.

Courtney and Martinez found Welch in a bedroom in the house. She was already dead at the time and was bleeding from her head and left hand. The medical examiner who performed the autopsy, Dr. Linda Biedrzycki, testified that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. One wound was to the right side of Welch's head, one wound was to the left side of her chest, and the third wound was to the left hand. Davis survived his three gunshot wounds, but he died of a drug overdose before trial.

Sherrie Williamson, a juvenile correction officer supervisor in South Carolina, testified that defendant spoke to her about the shootings. Defendant was being held in a juvenile detention facility in Columbia, South Carolina, on April 27, 1991, when he told Williamson his true name and age and that he had escaped from a facility in Michigan where he had been sent for killing two people. Defendant told Williamson that he would rather be in Michigan to be near his family. On April 28, 1991, defendant admitted to Ryan Alexander, a social worker at the detention facility, that he had been involved in the shootings of two people in Pontiac, Michigan.

Defendant now raises five issues on appeal. We do not find any issue to require reversal.

I

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting his statement made to Sherrie Williamson. It is defendant's contention that Williamson was a law enforcement officer for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that Williamson was required to give defendant Miranda warnings before eliciting the statement. We hold that while the trial court did not employ the correct analysis, it reached the proper decision. The trial court did not err in admitting the statement, because there was no custodial interrogation as contemplated by Miranda. Therefore, Williamson was not required to give defendant Miranda warnings before defendant gave his statement.

At the evidentiary hearing, Williamson testified that she is a juvenile correction officer supervisor in South Carolina. On April 27, 1991, defendant requested to see her. Defendant was brought to Williamson's office. According to Williamson, defendant shared the information, and she did not ask him any questions. Williamson reduced defendant's statement to writing. Defendant told Williamson that his real name was Robert Anderson (not Marco Smith) and he told her of identifying scars that he had. Defendant also told Williamson who his parents were, that he was eighteen years old (not thirteen years old), and that he was from Pontiac, Michigan. Defendant said that he had run away from a facility in Michigan and that he had killed two people in Pontiac. Defendant said that he wanted to return to Michigan to be closer to his family and because he did not wish to be moved around to various detention centers in South Carolina.

At the hearing, defendant testified that he did have a conversation with Williamson on April 27, 1991, in her office at the juvenile detention center. He told her that he was wanted in Michigan for criminal accusations, but he denied giving Williamson any details of the crimes. Defendant stated that he spoke with Williamson for thirty to forty-five minutes. It is undisputed that Williamson did not advise defendant of any Miranda warnings before he gave the statement.

The trial court ruled that, assuming that Williamson was a police officer and that there was a custodial setting, the statement was admissible because the statement was voluntarily made under the totality of the circumstances. The trial court's analysis was erroneous, because where there is a custodial interrogation--that is, where Miranda warnings must be given--the failure to give Miranda warnings requires suppression of the statement, except that the statement can be used for impeachment purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). Thus, the trial court should have determined whether it was necessary for Williamson to have given defendant Miranda warnings before defendant gave his statement.

The critical issue to be resolved is whether there was a custodial interrogation to trigger the requirements of Miranda. It is now axiomatic that Miranda warnings need only be given in cases involving custodial interrogations. People v. Hoffman, 205 Mich.App. 1, 8, 518 N.W.2d 817 (1994). Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990). As the Supreme Court has explained, however, volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and are admissible. Miranda, supra, p. 478, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1630; Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Thus, the procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required where the suspect is in custody and is subjected to interrogation. " 'Interrogation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." Id., p. 300, 100 S.Ct. at p. 1689.

There can be little question that defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. That is, defendant, who was detained in a juvenile facility in South Carolina on an assault conviction, was certainly in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a significant manner. People v. Hill, 429 Mich. 382, 399, 415 N.W.2d 193 (1987).

Defendant, however, was not subjected to an interrogation. Interrogation, for purposes of Miranda, refers to express questioning or its functional equivalent. In other words, interrogation refers to express questioning and to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Innis, supra, p. 301, 100 S.Ct. at p. 1690. At the evidentiary hearing, Williamson testified that she did not ask defendant any questions and that she did not ask any follow-up questions regarding his identity. Defendant testified that he could not remember if Williamson asked him any questions. Further, it was defendant who initiated the conversation, because he requested to speak with Williamson. Defendant was brought to Williamson's office, and he shared the information with her. Under these circumstances, there is no indication that Williamson asked any questions, nor were there any words or actions by Williamson that she should have known would reasonably likely have elicited an incriminating response.

Further, the statement was not initiated by the police. This distinction is critical because constitutional protections apply only to governmental action. Grand Rapids v. Impens, 414 Mich. 667, 673, 327 N.W.2d 278 (1982). Thus, a person who is not a police officer and is not acting in concert with or at the request of the police is not required to give Miranda warnings before eliciting a statement. Id. Accordingly, it has been held that private security guards not acting at the instigation of the police or functioning with their assistance or cooperation need not give Miranda warnings before eliciting an inculpatory statement, Impens, supra, pp. 677-678, 327 N.W.2d 278, and that a Department of Social Services caseworker who was not charged with the enforcement of criminal laws and was not acting at the behest of the police was not required to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights. People v. Porterfield, 166 Mich.App. 562, 567, 420 N.W.2d 853 (1988). Further, the Supreme Court has held that Miranda warnings are not required where the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to an undercover law enforcement officer ...