People v. Anderson
Decision Date | 06 February 1979 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 78-1383 |
Citation | 88 Mich.App. 513,276 N.W.2d 924 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Woodrow ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Robert L. Hencken, Kalamazoo, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., James J. Gregart, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before R. B. BURNS, P. J., and J. H. GILLIS and V. J. BRENNAN, JJ.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of delivery of cocaine, M.C.L. § 335.341(1) (b); M.S.A. § 18.1070(41)(1)(b), and sentenced to a term of 5 to 14 years in prison. He appeals as of right, raising four issues.
The transaction forming the basis for defendant's conviction occurred on December 2, 1975. Defendant was not arrested until April 14, 1976. He argues that this 41/2 month delay was a denial of due process because he was unable to remember the occurrence by the time of his trial.
Mere delay between the time of the commission of an offense and arrest is not a denial of due process. People v. Fiorini (On Rehearing), 59 Mich.App. 243, 229 N.W.2d 399 (1975). There is no constitutional right to be arrested. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); People v. Noble, 18 Mich.App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969). Rather, the guideline is whether the record presents evidence of prejudice resulting from the delay which violates a defendant's right to procedural due process. People v. White, 59 Mich.App. 164, 229 N.W.2d 357 (1975); People v. Hernandez, 15 Mich.App. 141, 170 N.W.2d 851 (1968). Defendant at bar alleges prejudice because of memory loss both his own and that of his witnesses.
Even a showing of some evidence in insufficient to mandate reversal for a pre-arrest delay. If the prosecutor is able to explain the delay, show that it was not done deliberately to prejudice the defendant, and establish that no undue prejudice resulted from the delay, then a conviction may still be upheld. Hernandez, supra, at 147, 170 N.W.2d 851, White, supra, 59 Mich.App. at 165, 229 N.W.2d 357.
The prosecution justified the delay on the ground that an earlier arrest would have impaired the undercover agent's ability to conduct an ongoing narcotics investigation. This is an adequate explanation for such a delay. White, supra, People v. Rios, 27 Mich.App. 54, 58, 183 N.W.2d 321 (1970), Rev'd on other grounds, 386 Mich. 172, 191 N.W.2d 297 (1971). There was no showing that the delay was deliberate. Finally, the trial court's finding that no undue prejudice resulted is not clearly erroneous. The requirements of Hernandez have, therefore, been met. People v. Rhymes, 62 Mich.App. 27, 233 N.W.2d 171 (1975).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to impeach him by use of a prior conviction for the sale of heroin. The court recognized and properly exercised its discretion on the matter pursuant to People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974).
The third argument raised by defendant is that he was entitled to conduct an independent analysis of the alleged cocaine. Discovery in a criminal case is within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Maranian, 359 Mich. 361, 368, 102 N.W.2d 568 (1960). At present there is no inherent right to conduct an independent scientific examination with an expert of one's own choice. People v. Bell, 74 Mich.App. 270, 275, 253 N.W.2d 726 (1977). Generally, a trial court's denial of criminal discovery is not reversible if defendant is afforded full opportunity of cross-examination. People v. Jesse Smith, 81 Mich.App. 190, 265 N.W.2d 77 (1978). In the instant case defense counsel's cross-examination of the analyst who identified the cocaine was not restricted by the trial court.
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to comply with M.C.L. § 600.2167; M.S.A. § 27A.2167.
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State ex rel. Leonard v. Hey, 14712
...that "(m)ere delay between the time of the commission of an offense and arrest is not a denial of due process." People v. Anderson, 88 Mich.App. 513, 276 N.W.2d 924 (1979). A decade is not "mere". We have found no state precedent anywhere that even approaches the time lapse here present bet......
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People v. Patton, Docket No. 283921.
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People v. Betancourt
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