People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 19 December 1923
• Docket Number: No. 15533.,15533.
• Citation: 141 N.E. 727,310 Ill. 389
• Parties: PEOPLE v. ANDERSON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

310 Ill. 389

141 N.E. 727

PEOPLE

v.ANDERSON.

No. 15533.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 19, 1923.

Error to Third Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Wells M. Cook, Judge.

A. Anderson was convicted of an assault with a deadly weapon, an automobile, and on judgment of affirmance by the Appellate Court he brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

Lightfoot & Braun and Rankin & Lustfield, all of Chicago (Ode L. Rankin, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago, and George C. Dixon, of Dixon (Edward E. Wilson and Clyde C. Fisher, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

FARMER, C. J.

Plaintiff in error (hereafter called defendant) was charged by information in the municipal court of Chicago with an assault with a deadly weapon, an automobile, with intent to inflict on Mrs. M. A. Carroll a bodily injury without any provocation and under circumstances showing an abandoned and malignant heart. A jury was waived and cause heard by the court. Defendant was found guilty and fined $500 and costs. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment, and defendant has sued out a writ of error to review the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Counsel for defendant insist that at most the evidence shows defendant was doing a lawful act-driving on a public street-in a negligent manner, without any intent to injure Mrs. Carroll or any other person, and there was an entire failure of the proof to establish the intent charged in the information; that it is not sufficient to prove negligence and injury caused thereby, but the intent to inflict it must be proved. The state contends the proof shows defendant drove his car on Michigan boulevard, in Chicago, across Randolph street, contrary to the signal of the traffic policeman, and at such a high rate of speed as to show reckless, willful, and wanton disregard of the safety of pedestrians, from which the law implies malice, and the intent to injure a particular person need not be proved.

[1][2] The offense charged in the information is defined by the statute to be an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict upon the person of another a bodily injury, where no considerable provocation appears, or where the circumstances of the assault show an abandoned or malignant heart. We have sustained convictions for manslaughter where the death was caused by the reckless driving of an automobile, wherein we held an intent to kill, or malice, was not required to be proved. People v. Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N. E. 398, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1077;People v. Camberis, 297 Ill. 455, 130 N. E. 712;People v. Schwartz, 298 Ill. 218, 131 N. E. 806. Under the law as laid down in those cases we have no doubt where the proof is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that under the circumstances of the injury the conduct of the driver of an automobile was so reckless, wanton, and willful as to show an utter disregard for the safety of pedestrians, a conviction for assault to commit a bodily injury would be warranted. An injury caused by negligence, not amounting to a reckless, willful, and wanton disregard of consequences to others, cannot be made the basis of a criminal action. The question here presented for decision is whether the proof shows, beyond reasonable doubt, that defendant's conduct was so willful and wanton as to constitute the crime charged.

[3] Defendant was driving his car, a Ford sedan, south on Michigan boulevard, in Chicago, at 10:45 p. m., March 20, 1921. Mrs. Carroll and her brother-in-law approached Michigan boulevard on foot on the sidewalk on the south side of Randolph street, intending to continue east across Michigan boulevard. When she and her companion arrived at the corner of Randolph street and Michigan boulevard, they stopped to wait for the signal to cross. There was an island in Michigan boulevard directly east of where Mrs. Carroll stood, at which Traffic Policeman Weldon was stationed to control the traffic on the two streets at that place, which he did by blowing a whistle and waving his hand. Two blasts of the whistle meant the north and south traffic should stop, and the east and west traffic should move. One blast meant the east and west traffic should stop, and the north and south traffic should move. Mrs. Carroll testified she and her companion stood on the corner until the whistle blew for the north and south traffic to stop and the east and west traffic to move, and the policeman motioned them to cross Michigan boulevard. She looked, saw no car coming, and started to cross. That was the last she remembers, as she was rendered unconscious by being struck by defendant's car. She could not remember how far she had gone into Michigan boulevard. She was seriously injured. It was either raining at the time, or had been shortly before. The witness thought it was not raining at the time of her injury.

Traffic Policeman Weldon testified he was at the south island at Michigan boulevard and Randolph street; that he signaled the north and south bound traffic to stop, and the east and west bound traffic to move on. Mrs. Carroll and her companion were standing on the corner and appeared to want to cross Michigan boulevard. He motioned them to cross. They started, and had gone about 8 or 10 feet when they were hit by defendant's car. Mr. Carroll was thrown to one side, and Mrs. Carroll was dragged about 40 feet. The witness testified the car was going about 36 miles an hour when it hit Mrs. Carroll. With a whistle he signaled the north and south traffic to stop and also held up his hand. He testified defendant must have been 40 or 50 feet north of the crossing when he blew the whistle. The first he saw of the car was when it struck the Carrolls. The traffic north and south was very light at the time. Defendant did not stop, but drove on across Randolph street. Defendant stopped as quick as he could after hitting the Carrolls, but did not bring his car to a stop until it had run 100 feet south of Randolph street. Witness did not see the car before it hit the Carrolls. From the distance the car went after hitting them before it stopped, he believed it was going 30 or 35 miles an hour. He thought, if defendant had been driving slower, he could have stopped sooner. It was not raining at that particular time, but had rained earlier in the evening, and the pavement was wet. Defendant's wife and another man were in defendant'scar. Witness said there were no cars on defendant's right to prevent him going to the curb after the accident. There was a car following him 75 or 100 feet. Witness blew his whistle loud to make it heard above the noise.

Daniel T. Carroll was with Mrs. Carroll when she was struck by the automobile. He testified that he heard two whistles, and the officer standing at the island in Michigan boulevard beckoned them to cross. They started, and when about 8 or 10 feet from the corner were struck. Witness was knocked unconscious. When he returned to consciousness, he was 10 or 15 feet south of the Randolph street curb. He testified he looked to the north just before he started to cross the street. He had no idea how fast the car was going.

Henry Hopf, automobile superintendent for the Buick Motor Company, testified he was driving at Michigan avenue and Randolph street, going south, when the injury occurred. He slowed down at Randolph street. He was so far back he did not hear the whistle. As he aproached Randolph street, driving slowly, the first thing he noticed was two bodies rolling on the street. The lady was at the left of the car, and the man on its right. The witness was able to stop at the north side of the crossing. The policeman motioned to him and said, ‘Come on quick! Get that Ford!’ and he drove after it, trying to get in front of it. The driver slowed the car down immediately after the...