People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 27 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1-03-1615.,1-03-1615.
• Citation: 352 Ill. App.3d 934,817 N.E.2d 1000,288 Ill.Dec. 350
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

817 N.E.2d 1000

352 Ill. App.3d 934

288 Ill.Dec. 350

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-03-1615.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

September 27, 2004.

Michael Pelletier, Michael H. Orenstein, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, Judy L. DeAngelis, Office of the Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, for Appellee.

Justice GORDON delivered the judgment of the court and the following opinion:

Petitioner, Clifford Anderson, appeals the summary dismissal of his "Motion to Vacate Unconstitutional and Void Judgments," which he characterizes as a motion for relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter Code). 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002). Petitioner contends that the circuit court did not have authority to summarily dismiss this kind of pleading.¹

I. BACKGROUND

After three trials, petitioner was convicted of the murder of two of his coworkers. Petitioner was found eligible for the death penalty, but received a prison sentence of natural life.² Petitioner exhausted his direct appeals on October 14, 1994. He later filed a postconviction petition which was summarily dismissed, and we affirmed the dismissal. People v. Anderson, No. 1-91-0470, 264 Ill.App.3d 1118, 225 Ill.Dec. 641, 683 N.E.2d 1304 (1994) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). Subsequently, he filed a petition for state habeas corpus in the circuit court of Will County alleging that his sentence violated the United States Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The Will County court denied the petition and the Third District Appellate Court affirmed its determination. Anderson v. Snyder, No. 3-01-0836 (2002) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). Petitioner then, on February 5, 2003, 12 years after his conviction, filed the instant "Motion to Vacate Unconstitutional and Void Judgments," which referenced section 2-1401 of the Code, in the circuit court of Cook County. In this motion, defendant claimed that the judgment against him was void. The basis for this contention was the same as that in his petition for habeas corpus: that his sentence violated Apprendi. Defendant claimed that he received a sentence of natural life because the court found that he committed the murders in a "brutal and heinous" manner, though the State never charged him with such conduct and such allegation was never put to proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury.

The circuit court denied petitioner's motion sua sponte, without notifying petitioner that it was considering dismissing the motion or allowing him the opportunity to argue against dismissal. In its written order, the circuit court explained that it found the motion to be untimely and barred by principles of res judicata and waiver. The circuit court emphasized that petitioner's only means of avoiding the two-year limitations period for section 2-1401 petitions, when he did not allege legal disability, duress, or fraudulent concealment, was to demonstrate that the judgment against him was void. The circuit court correctly observed, however, that our supreme court has held the imposition of an extended-term sentence, after a defendant has been found death eligible, does not violate Apprendi. People v. Ford, 198 Ill.2d 68, 260 Ill.Dec. 552, 761 N.E.2d 735 (2001). The court concluded, therefore, that defendant's judgment was not void, making his motion untimely. The court further noted that petitioner's Apprendi arguments were previously presented in his petition for habeas corpus and were therefore barred by res judicata. To support its res judicata and waiver analysis, the court cited to supreme court precedent addressing petitions under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)) (Act). On the same day it filed its written order, the circuit court made a recorded statement that petitioner's "pro se petition for relief from judgment * * * * fail[ed] to state any grounds for relief" because defendant erroneously concluded that his sentence was based on brutal and heinous conduct when, in fact, the sentence was based on the commission of multiple killings.

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court recognized his motion as a section 2-1401 petition, but then committed reversible error when it employed a form of procedure, summary dismissal, not recognized under the Code to dispose of it. Petitioner relies on the Second District case of People v. Pearson, 345 Ill.App.3d 191, 280 Ill.Dec. 461, 802 N.E.2d 386 (2003), to support his position. The State, on the other hand, argues that the circuit court recharacterized petitioner's motion as a petition under the Act ("postconviction petition"), and summarily dismissed it as authorized by the Act. The State contends that this recharacterization was proper, and in fact required, under our supreme court's precedents. Finally, the State suggests that were any procedural error to have occurred, it would have been harmless because petitioner's claim is substantively without merit. We affirm as only harmless error occurred below.

II. ANALYSIS

Initially, we observe that, contrary to the State's contention, there is no question that the circuit court decided to treat petitioner's motion for what it purported to be on its face, namely, a section 2-1401 petition. The State draws to our attention to a brief comment of the court, shortly after its receipt of the motion, that "[i]t is a post-conviction petition." However, in both the subsequent written order and in comments made immediately prior to the issuance of the written order, the circuit court identified the motion as coming under section 2-1401. Plus, in the written order, the circuit court carefully evaluated the motion under the standards applicable to section 2-1401 petitions, even though it cited to precedents evaluating waiver and res judicata under the Act. Further, we detect no error by the circuit court treating the motion as a section 2-1401 petition. Two courts, with which we agree, have concluded that circuit courts have discretion as to whether they will recharacterize petitions for collateral relief to fall under the Act. People v. Helgesen, 347 Ill.App.3d 672, 283 Ill.Dec. 113, 807 N.E.2d 718 (2004); People v. Knox, 336 Ill.App.3d 275, 270 Ill.Dec. 647, 783 N.E.2d 222 (2003). In 1997, the legislature added subsection (d) to section 122-1 of the Act. That subsection provides:

"A person seeking relief by filing a petition under this Section must specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section. A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this Article." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(d) (West 2002).

Interpreting that section, the Helgesen court explained in a case where the circuit court recharacterized a "Motion to Vacate Void Judgment," which addressed identical Apprendi claims as the case at bar, "If the court need not do so, then, by the strongest of implications, it also may do so. Thus, the trial court did not err in construing defendant's motion as a petition under the Act." (Emphasis in original) Helgesen, 347 Ill.App.3d at 676,283 Ill.Dec. 113,807 N.E.2d at 722.

The State argues that People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill.2d 555, 280 Ill.Dec. 311, 802 N.E.2d 236 (2003), and People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill.2d 479, 292 N.E.2d 379 (1973), actually require that petitioner's motion be treated as a postconviction petition because the motion presented a constitutional, as opposed to a fact-based claim. The State highlights that the Pinkonsly court cited to the Fourth District's opinion in People v. Gandy, which said where "the section 2-1401 petition is prepared pro se and alleges a deprivation of constitutional rights cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the trial court is to treat it as such." Gandy, 227 Ill.App.3d 112, 139, 169 Ill.Dec. 165, 591 N.E.2d 45, 64 (1992). We, however, disagree.

The Pinkonsly petitioner filed a "petition to reduce sentence," referring to section 2-1401, which alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his sentence from all of his past attorneys, including his trial, appellate, and previous section 2-1401 counsel. The Pinkonsly court evaluated whether such a claim was appropriate under section 2-1401, and, as the State contends, cited to Gandy when noting that the petitioner was not seeking recharacterization of his petition. However, the Pinkonsly court then observed that any such recharacterization would have been inappropriate, in part because the petition was "clearly brought under section 2-1401." Pinkonsly, 207 Ill.2d at 566, 280 Ill.Dec. 311, 802 N.E.2d at 244. We do not see Pinkonsly's single citation to Gandy as the adoption of its holding when the Pinkonsly court subsequently declined to apply that holding in the case before it. Therefore, Pinkonsly does not mandate the recharacterization of petitioner's pleading as a postconviction petition.

We likewise find Palmer unavailing to the State. Palmer openly encouraged recharacterization of pro se petitions, however labeled, to postconviction petitions when those petitions presented constitutional claims cognizable under the Act. Palmer,53 Ill.2d at 484,292 N.E.2d at 382. However, the Palmer court specifically stated that this approach was to benefit defendants who might otherwise, based on their lack of legal skill, seek relief through a procedure which could not grant relief. Palmer,53 Ill.2d at 484,292 N.E.2d at 382. As the State points out in arguing the lack of substantive merit in petitioner...