People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 27 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. S004709,S004709
• Citation: 801 P.2d 1107,276 Cal.Rptr. 356,52 Cal.3d 453
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 801 P.2d 1107 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Stephen Wayne ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 356

276 Cal.Rptr. 356

52 Cal.3d 453, 801 P.2d 1107

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Stephen Wayne ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S004709.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 27, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1991.

William M. Goodman, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, David R. Callaway, San Gatos, and Topel & Goodman, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White and Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., Harley D. Mayfield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jay M. Bloom and Gil P. Gonzalez, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

Defendant Stephen Wayne Anderson appeals from a judgment imposing the death penalty following his conviction of first degree murder and burglary, accompanied by a felony-murder special circumstance. In People v. Anderson (1985) 38 Cal.3d 58, 210 Cal.Rptr. 777, 694 P.2d 1149 (Anderson I ), we reversed defendant's original judgment as to penalty and set aside the special circumstance finding because of the court's failure to instruct on intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder special circumstance. (See Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.)

We affirmed the judgment in all other respects. On retrial, the jury again found the special circumstance allegation true and returned a death verdict. Thereafter, the trial court denied defendant's motion to modify the sentence (Pen.Code, § 190.4, subd. (e); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated). Defendant's appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)

I. FACTS

A. Special Circumstance Phase

The evidence on retrial of the special circumstance allegation largely paralleled the evidence introduced at defendant's first trial and summarized in Anderson I. Defendant confessed to the burglary/murder of an elderly woman, Mrs. Lyman. Defendant had scrutinized the premises for several days, awaiting indications that the occupants were on vacation. He arrived at the house shortly before midnight on May 25, 1980, cut through a screen door and removed a pane of glass from a second door to gain entry. Armed with a handgun, he entered the bedroom where Mrs. Lyman was sleeping. She awoke and began to scream. Defendant turned toward her and fired his weapon, killing her. As defendant admitted, "I sleep with my gun. Somebody come at me and I--I'm going to blow them away. You know, that's the first thing I thought of, you know."

Defendant ransacked the house, finding approximately $112. He turned on the television set and was eating some noodles when sheriff's deputies, alerted by neighbors, arrived and arrested him.

Defendant did not testify with respect to the special circumstance issue. He called a psychiatrist, Dr. Thompson, who testified that he had a brain abnormality which, when affected by alcohol, diminished his capacity to form a specific intent. A psychologist, Dr. Beaber, testified that one's survival instincts, coupled with a perception of danger, might arouse action without thought. On rebuttal, a neurologist, Dr. Hunt, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Oshrin, disputed the theory that defendant had a brain abnormality or reacted unthinkingly or impulsively to Mrs. Lyman's presence.

B. Penalty Phase

The People introduced evidence of defendant's prior convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault of a prisoner, as well as evidence of two unadjudicated murders involving victims Blundell and Glashien.

The defense called a prison chaplain, Eshelman, who opined that defendant's many occupations (e.g., plumber, electrician, cook and carpenter) would be useful to the prison. Defendant testified on his own behalf. Among other things, he denied any intent to kill Mrs. Lyman, disputed killing Glashien, claimed he killed Blundell in self-defense, related facts about his troubled childhood, and submitted poems and stories he wrote in prison.

On rebuttal, the People introduced statements by defendant to the effect that he was born or trained to be a killer and always wanted to be a killer.

II. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE CONTENTIONS

Before addressing defendant's specific contentions, we observe that, by reason of our decision in People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, overruling Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, any asserted errors pertaining to the contested intent-to-kill issue were necessarily harmless. Anderson overruled Carlos's holding that the 1978 death penalty law imposes a blanket intent-to-kill requirement on all felony-murder special circumstances. Anderson held that intent to kill need be charged and proved for a felony-murder special circumstance only where the defendant was an aider and abettor to the homicide and not the actual killer. (43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138-1147, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Here, defendant does not dispute, and the evidence confirms, that he personally killed Mrs. Lyman in the commission of a burglary of her house. As we have recently held, Carlos should not be deemed "the law of the case," in light of Anderson and, accordingly, many of defendant's present challenges to the special circumstance finding on retrial may be deemed irrelevant. (See People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 637-639, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849.)

A. Disclosure of Defendant's Prior Reversed Death Sentence

During the jury selection process, and on voir dire, the court informed the jurors that a previous jury had convicted defendant of first degree murder and burglary and had sentenced him to death, but that this court, on defendant's automatic appeal, had ordered a retrial of the special circumstance and penalty issues because "the rules had changed" regarding the need to instruct on the issue of defendant's intent to kill. Defendant made no objection to these voir dire disclosures. He now contends, however, that the trial court erred in relating the foregoing information to the jury.

Defendant contends that, by reason of the court's disclosures, the jury improperly learned that a prior jury had found death to be the appropriate penalty for defendant, that the jury's verdict was subject to an automatic appeal to this court, and that we reversed the death judgment and special circumstance finding based on a "change of rules" regarding the need to prove defendant's intent to kill.

Initially, defendant suggests that the foregoing information was irrelevant and potentially prejudicial, coming at a time (October and November 1985) when this court's disposition of death penalty cases was becoming a subject of discussion and controversy. Defendant argues that the jury was thereby led to speculate on impermissible matters, including the availability of an appeal to this court, a matter tending to reduce the jury's sense of responsibility regarding the seriousness of its task. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 155-159, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430.) Although defendant does not concede the point, it seems clear that any possible prejudice resulting from the court's disclosures was limited to the jury's penalty determination, for the evidence supporting the felony-murder special circumstance was overwhelming.

As we recently observed, "The fact that a first jury deadlocked, or the numerical vote of the first jury, is irrelevant to the issues before the jury on a penalty retrial." (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 178, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857, italics added.) Defendant argues that, by a parity of reasoning, the first jury's vote to impose death was irrelevant to the issues. No reason appears why the court could not have simply explained that the judgment had been reversed and remanded for retrial, without also disclosing the first jury's verdict.

Defendant cites several federal cases recognizing the prejudicial nature of disclosing to a jury engaged in determining a defendant's guilt or innocence the fact that the defendant had been previously convicted on the same charges. (E.g., United States v. Bagley (9th Cir.1985) 772 F.2d 482, 488 [dictum]; United States v. Williams (5th Cir.1978) 568 F.2d 464, 471.) Defendant also cites an Illinois case (People v. Hope (1986) 116 Ill.2d 265, 108 Ill.Dec. 41, 44-45, 508 N.E.2d 202, 205-206), which reversed a judgment on the ground that two jurors in the sentencing phase of a capital case were exposed to news stories indicating the defendant had been previously sentenced to death on charges unrelated to the capital case being tried.

In the present case, the court disclosed that a prior jury had imposed the death penalty on defendant for the same offense. A similar disclosure was made to the jury in People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 639-641, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849, involving another retrial for Carlos error. In Whitt, without reaching the merits, we concluded that any error in informing the jury regarding the prior death sentence and subsequent reversal on automatic appeal was invited by defendant's own conduct in (1) submitting, at the court's direction, a proposed statement covering these matters (without referring to the automatic nature of the appeal), and (2) failing to object to the court's own statement covering these matters. We further opined that defense counsel had tactical reasons for not objecting to the statement, namely, his reliance on a penalty phase defense of "Death Row redemption," to the effect that defendant had reformed after being initially sentenced to die.

Similar reasoning governs our decision here. Prior to trial, defense counsel asked the court whether the jury would be told about the procedural history of the case. The court announced its intention to "pretty much level"...