People v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 26 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | J,No. 95406,No. 8,95406,8 |
| Citation | 521 N.W.2d 538,446 Mich. 392 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James King ANDERSON, III, Defendant-Appellant (After Remand). anuary Term. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., Counsel of Record, Mark S. Mackley, Pros. Atty., and J. Ronald Kaplansky, Asst. Atty. Gen. Dept. of Atty. Gen. Pros. Attys. Appellate Service, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.
Jeanice Dagher-Margosian, Ann Arbor, for defendant-appellant.
In this case, we are called upon first to determine whether admission of a postarraignment statement by the defendant violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, second, if it was a violation, whether the admission of this statement and the admission of certain hearsay statements in violation of MRE 803(4) can be deemed harmless errors. With regard to the postarraignment statement, we find that it was admitted in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moreover, we are not persuaded that this error was harmless and therefore reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In light of this holding, however, we do not find it necessary to independently review whether the hearsay admissions were also harmful.
Defendant was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. § 750.520b; M.S.A. § 28.788(2), for allegedly engaging in certain sexual acts with his nine-year-old daughter. On February 10, 1989, a Kalkaska County jury found defendant guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to fifty to seventy-five years in prison.
The crucial testimony at trial came from the complainant, Detective Bruce Gaultier, social worker Barbara Cross, 1 and defendant. 2 Complainant testified first and stated that the sexual abuse occurred when she visited defendant, 3 her natural father, at Sue Rebone's home during Christmas vacation. Although she testified regarding several occasions of sexual abuse, complainant only specifically discussed the sexual acts of one night. 4
The alleged sexual conduct occurred at the end of the evening, after complainant retired to sleep in one bedroom, Ms. Rebone to another, with defendant remaining on the living-room couch. During the night, defendant allegedly entered complainant's bedroom wearing just his underwear. Complainant indicated that he then pulled down his underwear, pulled down her underwear, and raised her nightgown. She then testified to two specific sexual acts during which defendant inserted his finger into her vagina 5 and anus. 6 Each time complainant told defendant to stop because she knew it would hurt. 7 Aside from these two specific sexual references, complainant alluded to defendant inserting his penis in her, but did not explain where he inserted his penis or when this occurred. 8 However, she was certain that it did not occur on the same night as the above two sexual acts.
Both Detective Gaultier and Ms. Cross corroborated these two acts and testified about other, additional sexual acts spanning, in some cases, years. Detective Gaultier testified first. However, before testifying, the trial judge conducted a midtrial evidentiary hearing to determine theadmissibility of certain statements 9 made to Detective Gaultier. The statement crucial to this appeal is defendant's admission that he had sexual thoughts about his daughter, but would immediately clear them from his mind. This statement occurred in a police car when defendant was returning from taking a polygraph examination in another city. At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Gaultier testified that defendant received and waived his Miranda 10 rights one hour earlier at the polygraph examination. Also, before obtaining this statement in the patrol car, Detective Gaultier "asked [defendant] if he was familiar with his Miranda rights that he had previously waived earlier that day?" On the basis of defendant's Miranda waiver, the judge admitted the statement. 11
After the jury returned, Detective Gaultier related this statement to the jury. On cross-examination, however, defense counsel presumably attempted to mitigate the prejudice of the statement by eliciting from Detective Gaultier defendant's denial of each of the following allegations: (1) attempting to insert his penis into complainant's vagina, (2) inserting his tongue into her vagina, and (3) putting his penis in her mouth. 12 On redirect examination, the prosecutor, without objection by defense counsel, essentially elicited a detailed recount of every allegation recorded by Detective Gaultier from his conversations with complainant. 13
The prosecutor then emphasized this testimony in closing argument:
Mr. Gaultier ... was able to list and reiterate from a conversation with [complainant] ... every single [thing] that you found out today. It's interesting, ladies and gentlemen. Detective Gaultier testified to you that when he was speaking with the defendant, the defendant admits to him he has sexual thoughts about his nine-year-old daughter. That's a very specific descriptive term, sexual thoughts. [Emphasis added.]
Following Detective Gaultier's testimony, Ms. Cross confirmed some of the allegations when testifying as an expert in psychiatric social work about the following: 14
During that session specifically what she told me was that he tried to stick it in her, is the way she put it. That he put his pinkey [sic] in her, and she was referring to her vaginal area.
* * * * * *
She told me that her dad had put his penis in her mouth; that he had put vaseline all over her vagina; all over her butt; that he asked her to do the same thing to him and that she had; and she was real upset telling me that, because she felt so guilty and so bad; she told me that he had put his mouth on her vagina; that he had tried to stick it in her; that he had touched her breasts; and that he had told her not to tell anyone or she'd be in trouble if she did.
After the prosecution presented its case, defendant testified and denied all these allegations. He even stated that he did not recall complainant's visit to Ms. Rebone's home on the date in question and suggested that complainant was lying. 15 Nevertheless, the jury convicted defendant as charged.
Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, raising several claims of error, 16 only two of which are pertinent to this Court's review: (1) defendant's claim that it was error requiring reversal to permit Detective Gaultier, in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, to testify about defendant's statement that he had sexual thoughts about his daughter, and (2) defendant's contention that it was error requiring reversal to allow Ms. Cross, pursuant to MRE 803(4)'s medical treatment hearsay exception, to recount complainant's statements describing the alleged sexual conduct. On September 9, 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 120714), holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation, but finding Ms. Cross' testimony hearsay but harmless.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, this Court remanded the case 17 to the Court of Appeals to consider defendant's statement to Detective Gaultier in light of People v. Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56 (1984), and to determine whether that statement and the hearsay testimony of Ms. Cross were harmless errors.
On remand, in a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, presuming 18 a Sixth Amendment violation, but deeming this error, as well as the hearsay testimony, harmless. Judge Cavanagh dissented, reasoning that the errors were not harmless.
Defendant again sought leave to appeal in this Court, which was denied on May 14, 1993. 19 On motion for reconsideration, however, this Court granted leave to appeal. 20 After granting an opportunity for full briefing and argument, this Court, while retaining jurisdiction, ordered a remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing regarding defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim in light of Bladel, supra, aff'd sub nom Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), and Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). 21 Specifically, we ordered the court to determine whether defendant initiated further communications with the police by requesting a polygraph examination, and, if so, whether defendant waived his right to counsel at both the polygraph examination and in the patrol car.
On remand, three witnesses testified, the most pertinent of whom was Detective Gaultier. He clarified the factual development regarding his initial contact with defendant, defendant's arrest and arraignment, and the arrangements for the polygraph examination. Detective Gaultier testified that before attending the polygraph examination, defendant had been arraigned and requested counsel. 22 Apparently, defendant requested a polygraph examination during an initial interview with Detective Gaultier, before his arrest and arraignment, at which time Detective Gaultier indicated that he would make the arrangements and provide transportation if needed. After being arraigned, appointed counsel, and released on bond, Detective Gaultier contacted defendant regarding the polygraph examination by leaving a message at defendant's residence. Upon receiving the message, defendant contacted Detective Gaultier and accepted his offer to provide transportation. At the examination, the polygraph examiner obtained defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights by way of a standard waiver form. Moreover, Detective Gaultier reaffirmed defendant's waiver of his Miranda warnings before obtaining the contested statement by asking him whether he remembered his rights being read to him earlier...
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