People v. Anderson

Decision Date29 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. S094710.,S094710.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Neal ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Neoma D. Kenwood, Berkeley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Gerald A. Engler and Moona Nandi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

Over two centuries ago, William Blackstone, the great commentator on the common law, said that duress is no excuse for killing an innocent person: "And, therefore, though a man be violently assaulted, and hath no other possible means of escaping death, but by killing an innocent person, this fear and force shall not acquit him of murder; for he ought rather to die himself than escape by the murder of an innocent." (2 Jones's Blackstone (1916) p. 2197.)

We granted review to decide whether these words apply in California. We conclude that, as in Blackstone's England, so today in California: fear for one's own life does not justify killing an innocent person. Duress is not a defense to murder. We also conclude that duress cannot reduce murder to manslaughter. Although one may debate whether a killing under duress should be manslaughter rather than murder, if a new form of manslaughter is to be created, the Legislature, not this court, should do it.

I. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was charged with kidnapping and murdering Margaret Armstrong in a camp area near Eureka called the South Jetty. Defendant and others apparently suspected the victim of molesting two girls who resided in the camp. Ron Kiern, the father of one of the girls, pleaded guilty to Armstrong's second degree murder and testified at defendant's trial.

The prosecution evidence showed that a group of people, including defendant and Kiern, confronted Armstrong at the camp. Members of the group dragged Armstrong to a nearby field, beat her, put duct tape over her mouth, tied her naked to a bush, and abandoned her. Later, defendant and Kiern, in Kiern's car, saw Armstrong going naked down the street away from the jetty. The two grabbed Armstrong, forced her into the car, and drove away. They then put Armstrong into a sleeping bag, wrapped the bag with duct tape, and placed her, screaming, into the trunk of Kiern's car.

Witnesses testified that defendant picked up a large rock, brought it to the trunk, and handed it to Kiern. Kiern appeared to hit Armstrong with the rock, silencing her. Kiern testified that defendant said Armstrong had to die. After they put her into the trunk, defendant dropped a small boulder onto her head. Kiern also said that defendant picked up the rock again, handed it to Kiern, and told him to drop it on Armstrong or something would happen to his family. Kiern dropped the rock but believed it missed Armstrong. Kiern and defendant later commented to others that Armstrong was dead.

The evidence indicated that defendant and Kiern disposed of Armstrong's body by rolling it down a ravine. One witness testified that Kiern stated he had stepped on her neck until it crunched to ensure she was dead before putting her in the ravine. The body was never found.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He said he had tried to convince Kiern to take Armstrong to the hospital after she had been beaten. When he and Kiern saw her going down the road beaten and naked, Kiern grabbed her and put her in the backseat of the car. Back at camp, Kiern put Armstrong in the sleeping bag and bound it with duct tape. At Kiern's instruction, defendant opened the trunk and Kiern put Armstrong inside. Kiern told defendant to retrieve a certain rock the size of a cantaloupe. Defendant said, "Man, you are out of your mind for something like that." Kiern responded, "Give me the rock or I'll beat the shit out of you." Defendant gave him the rock because Kiern was bigger than he and he was "not in shape" to fight. When asked what he thought Kiern would have done if he had said no, defendant replied: "Punch me out, break my back, break my neck. Who knows." Kiern hit Armstrong over the head with the rock two or three times. Kiern's wife was standing there yelling, "Kill the bitch."

Defendant testified that later they left in Kiern's car. They pulled over and Kiern opened the trunk. Armstrong was still moaning and moving around. Defendant tried to convince Kiern to take her to a hospital, but Kiern refused. Defendant got back into the car. A few minutes later, Kiern closed the trunk, got in the car, and said, "She's dead now. I stomped on her neck and broke it." A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and kidnapping. Based primarily on his testimony that Kiern threatened to "beat the shit out of him, defendant contended on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on duress as a defense to the murder charge. The Court of Appeal concluded that duress is not a defense to first degree murder and affirmed the judgment. We granted defendant's petition for review to decide to what extent, if any, duress is a defense to a homicide-related crime, and, if it is a defense, whether the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing a duress instruction.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether Duress Is a Defense to Murder

At common law, the general rule was, and still is today, what Blackstone stated: duress is no defense to killing an innocent person.1 "Stemming from antiquity, the nearly `unbroken tradition' of Anglo-American common law is that duress never excuses murder, that the person threatened with his own demise `ought rather to die himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent.'" (Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits (1989) 62 So.Cal. L.Rev. 1331, 1370, fns. omitted; see also id. at p. 1343 & fn. 83, and cases cited.)2

The basic rationale behind allowing the defense of duress for other crimes "is that, for reasons of social policy, it is better that the defendant, faced with a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil (violate the criminal law) in order to avoid the greater evil threatened by the other person." (LaFave, Criminal Law, supra, § 5.3, p. 467.) This rationale, however, "is strained when a defendant is confronted with taking the life of an innocent third person in the face of a threat on his own life.... When the defendant commits murder under duress, the resulting harm—i.e. the death of an innocent person—is at least as great as the threatened harm—i.e. the death of the defendant." (U.S. v. LaFleur, supra, 971 F.2d at p. 205.) We might add that, when confronted with an apparent kill-an-innocent-person-or-be-killed situation, a person can always choose to resist. As a practical matter, death will rarely, if ever, inevitably result from a choice not to kill. The law should require people to choose to resist rather than kill an innocent person.

A state may, of course, modify the common law rule by statute. The Model Penal Code, for example, does not exclude murder from the duress defense. (See LaFave, Criminal Law, supra, § 5.3(b), p. 469, fn. 13.) Defendant contends the California Legislature modified the rule in the 19th century and made duress a defense to some murders.

Since its adoption in 1872, Penal Code section 263 has provided: "All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] ... [¶] ... Persons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed the act or made the omission charged under threats of menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused." Defendant contends the reference to a "crime ... punishable with death" means that the crimes to which duress is not a defense include only those forms of murder that are punishable with death, and that these forms change with changes in death penalty law. In 1872, when the current Penal Code was adopted, all first degree murder was punishable with death. (People v. Green (1956) 47 Cal.2d 209, 218, 302 P.2d 307.) Today only first degree murder with special circumstances is so punishable. (§§ 190, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a).) Accordingly, defendant contends that today, duress is a defense to all murder except first degree murder with special circumstances. In effect, he argues that a killing under duress is either first degree murder with special circumstances or no crime at all. Because the prosecution did not allege special circumstances in this case, he continues, duress provides a full defense.

The sparse relevant California case law is inconclusive. In People v. Martin (1910) 13 Cal.App. 96, 102, 108 P. 1034, the court noted that "[i]t has ever been the rule that necessity is no excuse for killing an innocent person." It cited but did not construe section 26 and ultimately found duress was not available under the facts because the person was not in immediate danger. (People v. Martin, supra, at pp. 102-103, 108 P. 1034.) In both People v. Son (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 224, 232-233, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, and People v. Petro (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 245, 247-248, 56 P.2d 984, the court cited section 26 and stated that duress was not available as a defense, but in each case the defendant had been convicted of a form of murder then punishable with death. In People v. Moron (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 398, 114 Cal.Rptr. 413, the court stated in dicta, without analysis, that our decision in People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, which had declared unconstitutional the death penalty law then in effect, "rendered meaningless the exception pertaining to capital crimes of Penal Code section 26," and therefore "the defense of compulsion was available to defe...

To continue reading

Request your trial
170 cases
  • People v. Landry, S100735
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • December 12, 2016
    ...we have since held that duress is not a defense to murder, nor does duress reduce murder to manslaughter. (People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 772–785, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368 (Anderson ); see People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 249–250, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348, 212 P.3d 639 ;......
  • People v. Daveggio
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • April 26, 2018
    ...under duress, like any killing, may or may not be premeditated, depending on the circumstances." ( People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 784, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368.) For example, "[i]f a person obeys an order to kill without reflection, the jury might find no premeditation an......
  • People v. Soto, S236164
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • April 30, 2018
    ...self-defense rationale to any killing that would otherwise have malice, whether express or implied.’ ( People v. Anderson [ (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767,] 782, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368.) ‘A defendant who acts with the requisite actual belief in the 4 Cal.5th 975necessity for self-defense d......
  • People v. Soto, S236164
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • April 30, 2018
    ...self-defense rationale to any killing that would otherwise have malice, whether express or implied.' ( People v. Anderson [ (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767,] 782, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368.) 'A defendant who acts with the requisite actual belief in the necessity for self-defense does not act w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Duress and the underlying felony.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 99 No. 4, September 2009
    • September 22, 2009
    ...murder and then explained why the circumstances changed for felony murder. Id. at 733-34, 738. (20) Id. at 740. (21) People v. Anderson, 50 P.3d 368, 379 (Cal. 2002); People v. Sims, 869 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Serrano, 676 N.E.2d 1011 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); State v. Hunt......
  • § 23.04 Duress as a Defense to Homicide
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2022 Title Chapter 23 Duress
    • Invalid date
    ...N.E.2d 783, 791 (Mass. 2012) (providing statutory cites).[39] E.g., Howell v. State, 214 A.3d 1128, 1131 (Md. 2019); People v. Anderson, 50 P.3d 368, 370-73 (Cal. 2002); Wright v. State, 402 So. 2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); People v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014); ......
  • § 23.04 DURESS AS A DEFENSE TO HOMICIDE
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Chapter 23 Duress
    • Invalid date
    .... Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d 783, 791 (Mass. 2012) (providing statutory cites).[39] . E.g., People v. Anderson, 50 P.3d 368, 370-73 (Cal. 2002); Wright v. State, 402 So. 2d 493, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014); Commonwe......
  • TABLE OF CASES
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...v., 414 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), 222 Anderson v. Superior Court, 177 P.2d 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947), 424 Anderson, People v., 50 P.3d 368 (Cal. 2002), 289, 290 Anderson, People v., 509 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), 417 Anderson, State v., 631 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 1993), 218 Anderson......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT