People v. Andrews

• Decision Date: 20 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. 67718,67718
• Citation: 614 N.E.2d 1184,185 Ill.Dec. 499,155 Ill.2d 286
• Parties: , 185 Ill.Dec. 499 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Lawrence ANDREWS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1184

614 N.E.2d 1184

155 Ill.2d 286, 185 Ill.Dec. 499

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Lawrence ANDREWS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

No. 67718.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 20, 1993.

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1993.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago and Renee Goldfarb and Randall E. Roberts, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender and Kenneth L. Jones, Asst. App. Defender, of the office of the State App. Defender, Chicago, for appellee and cross-appellant.

Justice BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Lawrence Andrews, was convicted in a jury trial of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1), armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 18-2), and aggravated battery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 12-4). The jury which convicted Andrews failed to reach a unanimous decision on whether to impose the death penalty. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to an extended term of 70 years' imprisonment on the murder conviction, 30 years' imprisonment on the armed robbery conviction, and 5 years' imprisonment on the aggravated battery conviction. The sentences were to run concurrently. The defendant appealed.

While the defendant's appeal was pending in the appellate court, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. The appellate The appellate court remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to conduct a hearing to allow the State to come forward with race-neutral reasons for the use of its peremptory challenges. (Andrews, 172 Ill.App.3d 394, 122 Ill.Dec. 369, 526 N.E.2d 628.) The defendant and the State cross-appealed to this court. We concluded that the appellate court erred in deciding whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been established pursuant to Batson and that the defendant was not eligible for an extended-term sentence. (People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.2d 451, 139 Ill.Dec. 469, 548 N.E.2d 1025 (Andrews I ).) This court retained jurisdiction and remanded the cause to the trial court for a hearing to allow the defendant the opportunity to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination and for resentencing.

                [185 Ill.Dec. 502] court applied Batson to the defendant's case.  (See Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (holding that Batson would apply to all cases pending on direct review at the time Batson was decided).)   The court concluded that the defendant had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the manner in which the State exercised its peremptory challenges during jury selection, in violation of Batson.  (People v. Andrews (1988), 172 Ill.App.3d 394, 404, 122 Ill.Dec. 369, 526 N.E.2d 628.)   The appellate court further concluded that the defendant was properly sentenced to an extended term on his murder conviction.  Andrews, 172 Ill.App.3d at 401, 122 Ill.Dec. 369, 526 N.E.2d 628
                

On remand, the trial court determined, following a hearing, that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The trial court also resentenced the defendant to 40 years' imprisonment for murder and 20 years' imprisonment for armed robbery, to run consecutively, and 5 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery, to run concurrently. This court reversed the trial court's determination that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. (People v. Andrews (1992), 146 Ill.2d 413, 167 Ill.Dec. 996, 588 N.E.2d 1126 (Andrews II ).) The court again retained jurisdiction and remanded the cause to the circuit court for a hearing to permit the State to come forward with race-neutral explanations for the use of its peremptory challenges. The trial court found that the explanations advanced by the State for its use of peremptory challenges against certain venire members were race neutral. This court issued an order directing the parties to file briefs on the issue of whether the State's explanations were sufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of racial discrimination. This cause now comes before this court for the third time.

The sole issue presented for our review is whether the State advanced race-neutral explanations for the exercise of its peremptory challenges sufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of racial discrimination. Because of the limited nature of our review, only a brief recitation of the facts surrounding the crimes for which the defendant was convicted is necessary. A more detailed recitation of the facts can be found in People v. Andrews (1988), 172 Ill.App.3d 394, 122 Ill.Dec. 369, 526 N.E.2d 628. On February 20, 1984, the murder victim, Richard Steinbrecher, and his girlfriend, Angela Atiles, exited the Eisenhower Expressway at Kostner Avenue in Chicago. Steinbrecher and Atiles, who were both white, stopped at a traffic signal. While they waited for the light to change, two black men, one of whom Atiles identified as the defendant, approached the vehicle. The defendant entered the automobile and pointed a gun at Steinbrecher and Atiles. The defendant then fatally shot Steinbrecher, hit Atiles in the eye with the gun and demanded money from Atiles. Atiles gave the defendant all the money she had, which was seven dollars, and the defendant and the other man left.

During jury selection prior to the defendant's trial, the State exercised 8 of the 14 peremptory challenges allotted to it. (See 134 Ill.2d R. 434(d).) The State used all eight of those peremptory challenges to excuse black members of the venire. The State's peremptory strikes against black venire members were not exercised consecutively. Rather, they occurred in between At the hearing, the State, which was represented by the same assistant State's Attorney who had represented the State at Andrews' trial, explained what qualities it had been looking for in the venire members who would be selected to hear the case. The State noted that because it was seeking the death penalty, it wanted jurors who were mature and would not be afraid to make a difficult judgment about another person. According to the State, it believed that those venire members who were self-employed or who had prior jury service would have those qualities. The State further explained that it did not want jurors the same age as the defendant, who could more easily identify with him, or jurors who might feel sympathy toward the defendant because they had children his age.

                [185 Ill.Dec. 503] the State's acceptance of black venire members.  The jury which convicted the defendant was comprised of three black and nine white jurors.  This court found that the State's use of eight out of the eight peremptory challenges which it exercised to excuse black members from the venire constituted a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  (Andrews II, 146 Ill.2d at 436, 167 Ill.Dec. 996, 588 N.E.2d 1126.)   As stated, the court remanded this cause to the trial court for a hearing at which the State was required to articulate race-neutral reasons for excusing the eight black venire members
                

Finally, the State explained that it had anticipated during jury selection that the defendant would assert at his trial that he had signed a confession only because police had beaten him. Because of the nature of the defendant's anticipated defense, the State wanted jurors who knew and were favorably disposed toward police officers. In addition to explaining the general qualities that it was looking for in jurors, the State articulated specific reasons for excusing each of the venire members against whom it exercised its peremptory challenges. Additional facts with respect to individual venire members will be included later in this opinion as necessary. Following the hearing, the trial court found that the explanations presented by the State were "credible, non-pretextual, race-neutral, satisfactory and acceptable under Batson v. Kentucky," and sufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of racial discrimination.

In determining whether the explanations advanced by the State were sufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of racial discrimination, we keep in mind the following basic principles of law. In Batson, 476 U.S. at 85, 106 S.Ct. at 1716, 90 L.Ed.2d at 80, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the State denies a defendant who is a member of a racial minority equal protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded. In so holding, the Court rejected the evidentiary standard previously enunciated in Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759. The Swain standard required a defendant to show a systematic and purposeful pattern of excluding venire members from the jury-selection process on the ground of race in "case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be." (Swain, 380 U.S. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 837, 13 L.Ed.2d at 774.) In Batson, the Court held that a defendant would be able to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87.) Since Batson, the Court has recognized that race-based exclusion of jurors through the use of peremptory challenges is impermissible even where the defendant and the excluded venire members do not share the same race. Powers v. Ohio (1991), 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411.

Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the...