People v. Angel
| Decision Date | 14 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 12SA24.,12SA24. |
| Citation | 2012 CO 34,277 P.3d 231 |
| Parties | In re the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff v. Brittney Breann ANGEL, Defendant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel H. May, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District, Andrew S. Vaughan, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Cynthia J. Jones, Deputy Public Defender, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant.
¶ 1 We accepted jurisdiction over this C.A.R. 21 original proceeding in order to determine the scope of the work product doctrine, under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), as a protection against a prosecutor's general obligation to disclose information and materials to the defense.
¶ 2 In its order below, the trial court ruled that the prosecutorial work product doctrine under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) is limited to work product prepared in anticipation of the case before the court and does not extend to work product prepared in anticipation of a different but related criminal prosecution. Thus, the trial court ruled that work product prepared in anticipation of a separate prosecution fell outside Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1)'s protection of “legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members of his legal staff,” and ordered disclosure of materials that the prosecution had prepared in anticipation of a different but related criminal investigation. Prior to disclosing the contested materials, the People petitioned this court under C.A.R. 21 to reverse the trial court because, the People argue, the prosecutorial work product protection under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) extends to all work product and is not limited to materials preparedin anticipation of prosecuting the case immediately before the court.
¶ 3 Resolving this issue in accordance with the intent of Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) to protect the professional judgment and mental impressions of prosecutors from disclosure so that they may candidly analyze the merits of a case and plan their litigation strategy, we reverse the trial court's order and make the rule absolute. We hold that the protection of prosecutorial work product, under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), extends to opinion work product prepared by the prosecution in anticipation of any criminal prosecution. 1 Because the trial court did not inspect the contested materials nor decide whether they constitute opinion work product prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution, we remand this matter to the trial court to make this determination through an ex parte, in camera review. Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), (III)(f).
¶ 4 Defendant Brittney Angel is awaiting trial on charges of vehicle eluding, evidence tampering, concealing death, third-degree assault, and reckless driving. All of these charges stem from a single incident that occurred in Colorado Springs on September 13, 2011.
¶ 5 On that date, three sheriff's deputies were attempting to serve an arrest warrant on a suspect that they believed to be living in a motel. Although no one answered the motel room door, one of the deputies noticed that the suspect they were looking for appeared to be sitting in a vehicle in the motel parking lot. The vehicle also contained three other individuals: Angel in the passenger's seat, Christen Vargas in the driver's seat, and a third passenger in the back of the car with the suspect that the deputies were seeking to serve with the warrant. The three sheriff's deputies approached and surrounded the vehicle in an attempt to arrest the suspect.
¶ 6 As one of the deputies, Deputy Miller, approached the driver's side door, however, Vargas shifted the vehicle into gear and allegedly ran over Deputy Miller's foot.3 Deputy Miller immediately drew his firearm and shot Vargas before the vehicle sped off. Shortly thereafter, Vargas died, and the People allege that Angel moved Vargas' body out of the driver's seat and proceeded to operate the vehicle recklessly in order to further elude the police. Three hours after the shooting, Vargas' body was discovered in the vehicle outside of a nearby emergency room. A warrant was issued for Angel's arrest in connection with the events of the shooting, and she eventually turned herself in to the police.
¶ 7 Although the People investigated Deputy Miller's actions in fatally shooting Vargas, the district attorney's office apparently concluded that Deputy Miller engaged in reasonable self-defense and declined to charge him in connection with the shooting.
¶ 8 To prepare her defense against the present charges, Angel requested that the People disclose “the District Attorney's investigation into the shooting and [its] findings,” including the office's investigation into the potentially wrongful conduct of Deputy Miller. The People agreed in part and disclosed its investigation file to Angel with the exception of two items: (1) the People refused to disclose an internal PowerPoint presentation that a deputy district attorney prepared to aid the elected district attorney in making a charging decision with respect to Deputy Miller; and (2) the handwritten notes that a deputy district attorney took during a witness interview while investigating Deputy Miller's potential criminal culpability. The People claimed that these materials were protected from disclosure as work product, pursuant to Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1). Angel moved for the trial court to compel the disclosure of these materials.
¶ 9 After a hearing on this issue, the trial court ordered the People to disclose the requested materials. In its ruling, the trial court reasoned that Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) did not excuse the People's refusal to disclose work product that was prepared in connection with its investigation into the conduct of Deputy Miller because the protection for prosecutorial work product only applies to work product prepared in connection with the case immediately before the trial court—in this instance, the prosecution of Angel. Because the court reasoned that the contested materials did not fall under the protection for attorney work product, it ordered the People to release them without undertaking an ex parte, in camera review of the materials or making a finding of fact as to whether they did constitute work product with respect to the People's investigation of Deputy Miller.
¶ 10 The People petitioned this court pursuant to C.A.R. 21 to review the trial court's discovery order. We granted the petition and now make the rule absolute.
¶ 11 We first address whether an original proceeding is the proper method to review this trial court order. Relief under C.A.R. 21 is extraordinary in nature and is solely within the discretion of this court. “This court may exercise original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 where a trial court proceeds without or in excess of its jurisdiction or to review a serious abuse of trial court discretion, and where an appeal would not be an adequate remedy.” Ray, 252 P.3d at 1047.
¶ 12 Here, there is no other adequate remedy because, at this point in the trial, the People cannot seek an interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.1(a), nor is there a final judgment that can be appealed pursuant to C.A.R. 1(a)(1). Appellate review after the conclusion of the underlying criminal trial would provide an inadequate remedy because, by then, the contested documents would already have been disclosed and any work product protection would be destroyed. Under these circumstances, we conclude that original jurisdiction is appropriate and proceed to interpret the prosecutorial work product exception contained in Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1).
¶ 13 Under the Colorado Constitution, this court retains plenary authority to promulgate and interpret the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21. Thus, although discovery orders are committed to the broad discretion of the trial court, the interpretation of a rule in making a discovery order is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Peterson v. People, 113 P.3d 706, 708 (Colo.2005).
¶ 14 This case presents the question of whether Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) protects only the prosecution's work product in connection with the criminal proceeding before the court or if the exception extends to all other prosecutorial work product prepared in anticipation of other criminal prosecutions.
¶ 15 Crim. P. 16(I)(a), 16(I)(b), and 16(I)(c) explicitly set forth a litany of materials that the prosecution must disclose to the defense, including all materials in its possession related to its investigation of the accused in the case at hand, all exculpatory evidence, and, upon the defense's request, all related material that is held by another government agency that can be recovered by the prosecution through diligent good faith efforts. Additionally, Crim. P. 16(I)(d) states that a trial court may, in its discretion, compel the prosecution to disclose other materials that are not explicitly enumerated in Crim. P. 16, provided that the trial court finds that the other materials are relevant to the defendant's case and that the defense's request is reasonable.
¶ 16 This broad prosecutorial obligation to disclose materials to the defense, however, is not without limit. One such limitation—relevant here—is Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), which provides that the People are excused from disclosing materials that contain its legal strategies or opinions created in anticipation of a criminal prosecution:
Disclosure shall not be required of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members of his legal staff.
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