People v. Anstey

Citation719 N.W.2d 579,476 Mich. 436
Decision Date31 July 2006
Docket NumberCOA No. 3.,Docket No. 128368.
PartiesPEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark Joseph ANSTEY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, James Cherry, Prosecuting Attorney, and Aaron J. Mead, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, St. Joseph, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Gail Rodwan) for, Detroit, the defendant.

CORRIGAN, J.

Defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or with an unlawful blood alcohol level (OUIL/UBAL), a violation of MCL 257.625(1)(a) or (b). Following defendant's arrest, defendant agreed to take a police officer-administered chemical breath test of defendant's bodily alcohol level. Under MCL 257.625a(6)(d), after having agreed to take the police-administered test, defendant was entitled to "a reasonable opportunity to have a person of his or her own choosing administer" an independent chemical test. The prosecution does not dispute the district court's ruling that the statute was violated.

We granted leave to appeal in this case and directed the parties to include among the issues briefed: (1) whether dismissal is the proper remedy for the denial of an independent chemical test in violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d); and (2) whether People v. Koval, 371 Mich. 453, 124 N.W.2d 274 (1963), was correctly decided. 474 Mich. 886, 705 N.W.2d 29 (2005).

We conclude that because the statute does not specify a remedy, dismissal is not warranted for a statutory violation. In so holding, we specifically overrule Koval, supra, and its progeny. We hold, however, that when the trial court determines that the defendant was deprived of his or her right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test under MCL 257.625a(6)(d), the court may instruct the jury that the defendant's statutory right was violated and that the jury may decide what significance to attach to this fact. We also hold that defendant's due process right to present a defense was not violated.

I. FACTS

Defendant was stopped by the police and arrested for OUIL/UBAL. The police transported defendant to jail and requested that he take a chemical breath test. Defendant agreed to take the test. It reflected that his body alcohol level was 0.21 grams per 210 liters of breath, plainly above the legal limit.1 Defendant then asked the arresting officer to transport him to a medical facility in Indiana for an independent chemical test, but the officer refused to do so. Defendant next asked the officer to transport him to Watervliet Community Hospital, about a 15- to 20-minute drive from the jail. The officer again refused, but offered to take defendant to Lakeland Hospital/St. Joseph Medical Center, a nearby location where the police routinely took suspects for chemical tests. Defendant refused this offer, apparently because he did not believe that he could obtain a truly independent test there. Consequently, defendant never received an independent test of his body alcohol level.

Defendant was charged with OUIL, second offense, and/or UBAL, second offense, MCL 257.625(1)(a) or (b); MCL 257.625(8)(b)2. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges because the arresting officer unreasonably denied his request for an independent chemical test under MCL 257.625a(6)(d). The district court found defendant's request to go to the Indiana hospital unreasonable because the officer would have had to travel outside his jurisdiction. But the district court found that defendant's request to go to Watervliet Hospital for an independent chemical test was reasonable, and that the officer violated MCL 257.625a(6)(d) by failing to honor defendant's request. The court determined that dismissal of the charges would be an "inappropriate and somewhat draconian" remedy because defendant was not completely denied his right to an independent chemical test, because he was given the opportunity to obtain such a test at Lakeland Hospital. Instead, the court held that suppression of the results of the police-administered chemical test was the proper remedy.

The Berrien County Trial Court reversed, ruling that Koval and its progeny interpreting MCL 257.625a had consistently held that dismissal was the appropriate remedy for the unreasonable denial of an independent chemical test. The court held that the Legislature would have specifically provided for a different remedy or amended the statute to provide for a different remedy if it had not intended for the remedy to be dismissal. Instead, the Legislature had silently acquiesced to the remedy of dismissal by not amending the statute in light of Koval and subsequent Court of Appeals decisions holding that dismissal is the appropriate remedy. The trial court then remanded to the district court for entry of an order dismissing the charges.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. People v. Anstey, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 8, 2005, 2005 WL 292237 (Docket No. 255416). We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. 474 Mich. 886, 705 N.W.2d 29 (2005).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The prosecutor challenges whether dismissal of the charges against defendant was appropriate under MCL 257.625a(6)(d). Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v. Denio, 454 Mich. 691, 698, 564 N.W.2d 13 (1997).

III. ANALYSIS
A. MCL 257.625a(6)(d)

The question before this Court is whether the Legislature intended that a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) should result in dismissal of the case because the officer unreasonably denied defendant's request for an independent chemical test administered by a person of his own choosing.3 "The primary goal in construing a statute is `to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' We begin by examining the plain language of the statute." People v. Stewart, 472 Mich. 624, 631, 698 N.W.2d 340 (2005) (citations omitted).

The right to a reasonable opportunity to have an independent chemical test is created by statute, MCL 257.625a(6)(d):

A chemical test described in this subsection shall be administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed a crime described in section 625c(1). A person who takes a chemical test administered at a peace officer's request as provided in this section shall be given a reasonable opportunity to have a person of his or her own choosing administer 1 of the chemical tests described in this subsection within a reasonable time after his or her detention. The test results are admissible and shall be considered with other admissible evidence in determining the defendant's innocence or guilt. If the person charged is administered a chemical test by a person of his or her own choosing, the person charged is responsible for obtaining a chemical analysis of the test sample. [Emphasis added.]

Notably, the Legislature did not specify what remedy to apply if a police officer failed to advise, or denied, a defendant of his or her right to a reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent chemical test.

By contrast, the Legislature has clearly specified that if a prosecutor fails to comply with subsection 8 of MCL 257.625a, the remedy available to a defendant for violation of subsection 8 of the statute is suppression of the results of the state-administered chemical test.4 Had the Legislature intended a comparable remedy for a violation of subsection 6(d) — or even the more drastic remedy of dismissal — it could have so specified. People v. Monaco, 474 Mich. 48, 58, 710 N.W.2d 46 (2006) (citation omitted) ("`Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute . . . .'").

MCL 257.625a(7) is also noteworthy. At the time defendant was arrested, MCL 257.625a(7) provided, in pertinent part, as follows:5

The provisions of subsection (6) relating to chemical testing do not limit the introduction of any other admissible evidence bearing upon the question of whether a person was impaired by, or under the influence of, intoxicating liquor . . . .6

Subsection 7 indicates that, notwithstanding the provisions regarding chemical testing evidence set forth in subsection 6, the Legislature intended to allow the prosecution to go forward on other evidence establishing impaired operation of a motor vehicle. Given this statutory language, a prosecutor could adduce evidence relating to a defendant's erratic driving, inability to perform field sobriety tests, or slurred speech, as well as other evidence tending to establish the defendant's impairment. Reading this subsection together with subsection 6, it would seem that the Legislature's intent, whether or not MCL 257.625a(6)(d) was violated, was to permit a prosecutor to go forward under MCL 257.625(1)(a) (OUIL) using other evidence, beyond chemical testing, to establish guilt. Dismissal, therefore, was not an anticipated remedy.7

Notwithstanding the absence of statutory language mandating dismissal for a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d), the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of the charges against defendant was required because of this Court's ruling in Koval, supra. This Court interpreted a previous version of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) in Koval, supra. In that case, the defendant was stopped for driving while intoxicated. Koval, supra at 456-457, 124 N.W.2d 274. The police officers failed to advise the defendant of his right to have an independent chemical test, contrary to defendant's statutory right.8 The previous version of the statute, like the present version, did not provide a remedy. This Court held that noncompliance with the mandatory statutory requirement required dismissal of the charges against the defendant. Id....

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