People v. Antaramian

Decision Date11 May 2023
Docket Number362604
PartiesPEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN DANIEL ANTARAMIAN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Kent Circuit Court LC Nos. 2021-005882-FH; 2021-011714-FH

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and HOOD and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM

In People v Jack, 336 Mich.App. 316; 970 N.W.2d 443 (2021), this Court held that the prosecution cannot redact witness contact information from police reports produced during discovery absent a showing of good cause under MCR 6.201(E) or (I). The question now before us is whether the contact information of crime victims in discoverable police reports is entitled to heightened protection. After considering the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, we hold that this information is not automatically shielded. Rather, a trial court must determine in each case whether there is good cause to enter a protective order under MCR 6.201(E) or to modify the discovery rules under MCR 6.201(I). We vacate the trial court order's protective order permitting the prosecution to redact the victims' contact information from the police reports presented to the defense and remand for further consideration under MCR 6.201(E).

I. BACKGROUND

In two separate criminal complaints, the prosecution charged John Daniel Antaramian with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder or by strangulation, MCL 750.84. The matters were submitted together in the trial court. During discovery the prosecution provided the defense with copies of the police reports related to the underlying offenses. However the birthdates, ages, addresses, phone numbers, and state identification numbers of the alleged victims were redacted.

The defense moved to compel the production of unredacted police reports pursuant to MCR 6.201(B)(2) and Jack, 336 Mich.App. 316. The prosecution countered that Jack is inapposite because it pertained to the production of witness, not victim, contact information. The prosecution argued that MCL 780.758(3) of the Crime Victim's Rights Act (CVRA), MCL 780.751 et seq., protects crime victims' rights to "dignity and privacy" and exempts their personal contact information from disclosure. Further, the parties agree that the Kent County Prosecutor's Office has a standard policy to redact driver's license numbers, social security numbers and other similar information from reports before disclosure. The prosecution provided new copies of the police reports revealing the victims' birthdates and ages.

At the Zoom hearing on Antaramian's motion to compel, defense counsel contended that MCR 6.201(B)(2) only permits the prosecution to withhold police reports "concern[ing] a continuing investigation." "[I]f the prosecution wishes to redact other presumptively discoverable information from a police report, it must seek a protective order under 6.201(E) or of modification of the discovery rules under 6.201(I)," the defense pressed. Jack forecloses a prosecutor's claim to "unilateral authority to redact information in a police report." Despite the court rule and Jack's pronouncement, defense counsel argued, the "Kent County Prosecutor continues to unilaterally redact police reports before disclosing them to criminal defendants, including in this case." The trial court held the matter in abeyance to meet with the attorneys in person to review the police reports.

Following the in-person meeting, the prosecution filed a motion for a protective order under MCR 6.201(E). The prosecution contended that the protections guaranteed crime victims by MCL 780.758(3) and Const 1963, art I, § 24 provide good cause for a protective order under the court rule. A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is not impaired by redacting the contact information of his or her alleged victims, the prosecution asserted. In the event defense counsel wishes to interview such individuals, the prosecutor's office could coordinate the meetings. Providing unredacted contact information to a defendant "would place the victims at a risk of harm, undue annoyance, intimidation, embarrassment, or threats," the prosecution continued. Specifically, the revelation of contact information would provide "an unsolicited means of contacting victims - either in person, by letter, or by phone call," that "could cause undue annoyance and ultimately affect the victims' willingness to participate in the trial." Antaramian's charge for an assaultive crime "further support[ed] a conclusion that this information in the wrong hands places the victims at risk of harm."

Antaramian abandoned his request for the alleged victims' state identification numbers but continued his pursuit of their addresses and phone numbers. Defense counsel quoted MCL 780.758(3) in full, which states that the CVRA only restricts the disclosure of crime victims' contact information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., not from discovery in criminal matters. Nothing in the CVRA limits discovery in a criminal case. Further, Const 1963, art I, § 24 is not self-executing; it is limited to granting the Legislature the authority to enact legislation to protect the rights of crime victims. Defense counsel noted that the prosecutor failed to address the good-cause factors in MCR 6.201(E) "in a case specific manner; rather, he addresses them in an entirely abstract and conclusory fashion." Fundamental fairness requires full disclosure of the full police reports and the ability of defense counsel to fully investigate the cases against Antaramian was hampered by the redaction, defense counsel argued. Defense counsel further contended that there are reasons beyond arranging interviews that a defendant might require the addresses and phone numbers of alleged victims. "What if, for example, the defense needed to investigate whether an alleged victim of a home invasion was 'lawfully present' in the dwelling?" And defense counsel took "umbrage at the implicit insinuation that he cannot be trusted to reach[] out to alleged victims in a professional manner."

At the hearing on the motion for a protective order, defense counsel asserted that unilateral redactions in police reports produced during discovery "has become a systemic issue." Jack clearly resolved that the contact information is discoverable, defense counsel argued, and the exemption in the CVRA applies only to FOIA requests. Defense counsel indicated a willingness to compromise as well, limiting the discovery of unredacted victim contact information to counsel and not to defendants.

Ultimately, the trial court denied Antaramian's motion to compel and granted the prosecution's motion for a protective order. The court found it to be a close call and suggested that an interlocutory appeal would be in order. The court agreed that "[t]he Jack case is significant," but found a "distinction" between victims and witnesses. The trial court issued a short, written opinion and order, stating:

3. The Prosecutor argues that Jack applies to identifying information about witnesses, not victims. Moreover, identifying information about victims is protected under the [CVRA].
* * *
5. The Court agrees with the Prosecutor on this issue. Defendant is not entitled to identifying information about victims under the [CVRA], the Michigan Constitution, and MCR 6.201(E). Moreover, Defendant is not seeking state identification numbers. Therefore, the Prosecutor has properly provided police reports to Defendant with the appropriate redactions.
6. No further analysis is necessary. MCR 2.517(A)(4).

Antaramian filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal, which this Court granted. People v Antaramian, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 19, 2022 (Docket No. 362604).

II. ANALYSIS

We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision on a motion to compel or limit discovery. People v Green, 310 Mich.App. 249, 252; 871 N.W.2d 888 (2015). "The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes or when it erroneously interprets or applies the law." People v Lane, 308 Mich.App. 38, 51; 862 N.W.2d 446 (2014) (citations omitted). We review de novo the underlying issues of statutory and court rule interpretation. People v Lee, 489 Mich. 289, 295; 803 N.W.2d 165 (2011). We begin by reviewing the statute's or court rule's plain language and apply unambiguous language selected by the drafters without further construction. People v Phillips, 468 Mich. 583, 589; 663 N.W.2d 463 (2003).

Discovery in criminal matters is governed by MCR 6.201. The court rule provides in relevant part:

(B) Discovery of Information Known to the Prosecuting Attorney. Upon request, the prosecuting attorney must provide each defendant:
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(2) any police report and interrogation records concerning the case, except so much of a report as concerns a continuing investigation[.]

"The plain language of MCR 6.201 is unambiguous." Jack, 336 Mich.App. at 324. The court rule requires the production of police reports on request by the defense absent an ongoing investigation. MCR 6.201(B)(2). "Thus," under MCR 6.201(B)(2), "redaction of police reports and interrogation records is permitted only when the information relates to an ongoing investigation." Jack, 336 Mich.App. at 324.

Given the plain language of MCR 6.201(B)(2), the prosecution was not permitted to unilaterally redact police reports to excise the victims' contact information as that information did not relate to an ongoing investigation.

The prosecution contends that Jack's proclamation regarding the plain language of MCR 6.201(B)(2) does not apply in this case because the issue in Jack was the redaction of witness contact...

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