People v. Archer
| Docket Number | CR-029799-22QN,No. CR-029799-22QN |
| Decision Date | 18 July 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 NY Slip Op 50749 (U) |
| Parties | The People of the State of New York v. Archer, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Criminal Court |
Unpublished Opinion
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney of Queens County (by Sumayyah Siddiqui)
For Mr. Archer: Queens Defenders (by Christopher Miller & David Byrne)
The defense has filed a C.P.L. § 30.30 motion to dismiss. They argue that the People failed to complete a prerequisite task before stating ready for trial: filing a facially sufficient information as to all counts. (See C.P.L § 30.30[5-a]). They argue that four counts in the information charging third-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument are all insufficient. Upon considering all the papers submitted, the court agrees. The motion is granted.
Where as here, an information's top count is a misdemeanor punishable by 364 days in jail, the People have 90 days from filing their complaint to validly state ready for trial. To validly state ready, the People must first file a facially sufficient information. (People v. Colon, 59 N.Y.2d 921 [1983]; People v. Maslowski, 187 A.D.3d 1211 [2d Dep't 2020]; People v. Sosa, 71 Misc.3d 140 [A] [App. Term, 2d Dep't 2021]).
An information is facially sufficient only if it contains non-hearsay evidentiary factual allegations that, if true establish "every element" of the charged offense. (People v. Rodriguez, 214 A.D.3d 908, 908 [2d Dep't 2023]; see also C.P.L. §§ 100.40[1][c]; 100.15[3]). This standard is called a "prima facie" case. (People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 138 [1987]). The prima facie standard is "necessary because of the 'unique function that an information serves'" under our criminal procedure law. (People v. Parsons, 69 Misc.3d 11, 14 [App. Term, 1st Dep't 2020] [quoting Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d at 137]). Unlike an indictment, which requires support "by legally sufficient evidence before a Grand Jury," an information is an accusatory instrument for which the People "need not, at any time prior to trial, present actual evidence." (Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d at 137-38 [internal citations omitted]). Of course, the law does not require that an information contain the most precise words that most clearly express the alleged narrative. So long as the factual allegations "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." (People v. Sanson, 59 Misc.3d 4, 6 [App. Term, 2d Dep't 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Before the 2020 reforms to the criminal procedure law, the People were permitted to treat each count of an information as a separate "information." (See People v. Brooks, 190 Misc.2d 247 [App. Term, 1st Dep't 2001]). As a result, if one count of an information were facially insufficient, that would not affect the People's readiness on a second, facially sufficient count. (See id. at 249). This doctrine was called "partial conversion."
The 2020 reforms to the criminal procedure law abrogated this doctrine. They included C.P.L. § 30.30[5-a], which now explicitly requires the People to certify that "all counts" are facially sufficient before their statement of readiness may be "valid." Otherwise, "a statement of readiness shall not be valid." (C.P.L. § 30.30[5-a]). Therefore, it is now the People's burden to "prove the sufficiency of each count of the information" to validly state ready. (People v. Ramirez-Correa, 71 Misc.3d 570, 574-75 [Crim. Ct., Queens County 2021]).
As C.P.L. § 30.30[5-a] plainly "mandates that a statement of readiness is only valid when all charges in an accusatory instrument are facially sufficient," this court follows the statute's plain text. (See People v. Matos, 180 N.Y.S.3d 890, 893 [Crim. Ct., Kings County 2023] [doing the same]). A statute's plain text is "the clearest indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning." (Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653, 660 [2006]). In fact, the plain text here accords with the legislative intent of the statute. (See Matos, 180 N.Y.S.3d at 893 []; see also People v. Saavedra, 76 Misc.3d 626, 631 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]). Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30[5-a] was "designed to abrogate decisional law that authorized the prosecution to answer 'ready for trial'" on an information that was only facially sufficient as to some of the charges. (Hon. William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, C.P.L. § 30.30). Effectuating that intent, "partial conversion or readiness [is] no longer available under the changes made to the applicable statutes effective January 1, 2020." (People v. Jackson, 74 Misc.3d 1224 [A], at *5 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2022]; see, e.g., People v. Herrera, 73 Misc.3d 334 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2021] [same]; People v. Young, 72 Misc.3d 1203 [A], at *3 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2021] [same]).
Therefore, from both plain text and context, it is now a "pre-requisite to a valid statement of readiness that an accusatory instrument is facially sufficient as to all charges." (Matos, 180 N.Y.S.3d at 893). The People do not argue otherwise.
The court first turns to the four counts charging third-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument. (P.L. § 170.20). A person commits that offense when, "with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses a forged instrument." (Id.). Here, the information alleges, in full:
(Information at 2). The four counts thus cover four documents: Georgia temporary license plate #S1365654; Georgia temporary license plate #S1341844; and the registration card for each.
The defense argues that the information fails to establish two elements of the forged-instrument offenses: (1) that Mr. Archer had knowledge that the instruments were forged; and (2) that Mr. Archer possessed the instruments with the intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another. (See Def. Mot. at 7-11). In response, the People shadowbox an argument that the defense never made-whether the instruments were, in fact, forged. (See Pr. Resp. at 5-7 []). They defend nothing else.
The court next turns to appellate case law. In People v Mbaye, an officer alleged in an accusatory instrument that he recovered an "International Driver's License" from a person's wallet. (51 Misc.3d 142[A], at *1 [App. Term, 1st Dep't 2016]). The officer swore that "based upon his training and experience" he "recognized" the document to be "forged" because "there is no such valid document as an International Driver's License," only an "International Driver's Permit, but that document is a paper pamphlet, whereas this... is a laminated flat card." (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). The Appellate Term held that this was not even facially sufficient to establish the lesser reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint. (Id.). That was because it did not "give rise to the inference that the defendant possessed the 'forged' license with the knowledge and intent required by the Penal Law § 170.20." (Id.). The Appellate Term noted that accusatory instrument did not set forth any "conduct and events" from which "knowledge of the forged nature" could be inferred, such as "how...
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