People v. Archuleta
| Decision Date | 15 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 18CA0407 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sandra ARCHULETA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Carty, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Joseph P. Hough, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant, Sandra Archuleta, of child abuse resulting in the death of her four-month-old grandson. Archuleta appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her requests for (1) a modified unanimity jury instruction and (2) a new trial based on jury misconduct.
¶ 2 A division of this court agreed with the first contention and concluded that the jury should have received a modified unanimity instruction. People v. Archuleta , 2019 COA 64, ¶¶ 21-22, 474 P.3d 132. The division therefore reversed Archuleta's conviction and didn't reach her second contention. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.
¶ 3 On certiorari review, however, the supreme court held that Archuleta "was not entitled to a modified unanimity instruction." People v. Archuleta , 2020 CO 63M, ¶ 1, 467 P.3d 307. The court then reversed and remanded the case to us "for consideration of Archuleta's remaining" appellate contention. Id. at ¶ 36.
¶ 4 That contention asks us to determine whether CRE 606(b) — which, subject to a few narrow exceptions, broadly prohibits the use of juror testimony to inquire into the validity of a verdict — applies where a juror alleges misconduct that occurred before deliberations began.
¶ 5 We hold that whether CRE 606(b) bars juror testimony depends on the nature of the misconduct alleged, not when it occurred. Because the juror affidavit here did not allege misconduct that falls within a recognized CRE 606(b) exception, we agree with the trial court that the affidavit was inadmissible under CRE 606(b) and Archuleta was not entitled to a new trial. We therefore affirm the conviction.
¶ 6 The court empaneled a twelve-person jury with one alternate. Before the presentation of evidence, the court instructed the jury that it "must base [its] decision only upon the evidence received" and "the law that [the court] give[s]." The court also instructed the jurors that they "may not discuss the case amongst [themselves] until [they] have heard all of the evidence." Throughout the trial, the court repeated its instruction that the jurors must not discuss the case with anyone, including other jurors. It ended each trial day with the same admonishment. During the trial, no juror reported any discussions in violation of these instructions.
¶ 7 At the end of evidence, the court identified Juror 11 as the alternate juror and excused him from deliberations. Juror 11 did not report any concerns to the court when he was excused. The jury then deliberated and found Archuleta guilty of child abuse resulting in death.
¶ 8 Four months later, Juror 11 testified at Archuleta's sentencing hearing.1 He requested that the court "consider imposing the minimum sentence available." He testified that he didn't "believe the evidence added up to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [Archuleta] caused the injuries" that led to her grandson's death. And he expressed shock at the verdict, explaining that he "went home during the deliberation believing [Archuleta] would be cleared of all charges" and he did "not understand how [the conviction] happened." Juror 11 continued by commenting on his view of the evidence and why he believed there was "reasonable doubt." He also said that he "heard other jurors" laugh about Archuleta's recorded statement to police, and say, "Does she really expect us to believe that?" Other than this statement, Juror 11 did not report other juror comments. At the end of the hearing, the court sentenced Archuleta to a twenty-four-year prison term — neither the minimum nor the maximum available sentence.
¶ 9 Almost a month later, Archuleta filed a motion for a new trial under Crim. P. 33 alleging juror misconduct — specifically, that jurors engaged in premature deliberations. Alternatively, Archuleta requested an evidentiary hearing. In support of the motion, Archuleta attached an affidavit from Juror 11 alleging the following:
¶ 10 The prosecution opposed Archuleta's motion, arguing that Juror 11's affidavit was inadmissible under CRE 606(b), and, in any event, Archuleta failed to demonstrate prejudice.
¶ 11 The trial court agreed with the prosecution. It found that Juror 11's affidavit was inadmissible under CRE 606(b) to impeach the verdict because it did not "concern information extraneous to jury deliberations, nor any outside influence, clerical mistake, or racial bias." The court also concluded that, if any "premature deliberations [did occur, they] did not prejudice" Archuleta. It therefore denied the motion without a hearing.
¶ 12 Archuleta contends the trial court erred by denying her motion for a new trial. She specifically argues that the court erred by (1) finding Juror 11's affidavit inadmissible under CRE 606(b) ; and (2) concluding that, to the extent any premature deliberations occurred, they did not prejudice Archuleta. We agree with the trial court that Juror 11's affidavit was inadmissible under CRE 606(b). And, because Archuleta presented no other evidence supporting her motion for a new trial, we don't reach Archuleta's second contention.
¶ 13 "The decision of a trial court to grant or deny a new trial is a matter entrusted to the court's discretion." People v. Wadle , 97 P.3d 932, 936 (Colo. 2004). So too are its evidentiary rulings. People v. Glover , 2015 COA 16, ¶ 10, 363 P.3d 736.
¶ 14 We review de novo, however, a trial court's interpretation of a rule "governing the admissibility of evidence." People v. Salas , 2017 COA 63, ¶ 30, 405 P.3d 446.
¶ 15 Courts have long been hesitant to peek behind a jury verdict by inquiring into a jury's deliberations or its thought processes in reaching the verdict. This rule — commonly known as the "no-impeachment rule" — is codified in CRE 606(b) and its federal counterpart, Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). E.g. , Tanner v. United States , 483 U.S. 107, 117-21, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987) (); Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Rice , 47 P.3d 316, 320-22 (Colo. 2002) ().
¶ 17 The rule recognizes three narrow exceptions to the ban on post-verdict juror testimony. A juror may testify to (1) extraneous prejudicial information improperly brought to the jurors’ attention; (2) any outside influence improperly brought to bear on any juror; and (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict on the verdict form. CRE 606(b) ; accord Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
¶ 18 In addition to these rule-based exceptions, the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional exception that applies when "a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant." Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado , 580 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869, 197 L.Ed.2d 107 (2017).
¶ 19 Substantial policy considerations support the broad prohibition on post-verdict challenges based on juror testimony. Chief among them are the interests in verdict finality and protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations. See, e.g. , id. ; see also Stewart , 47 P.3d at 322 (). Indeed, rejecting a challenge that Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) violated an individual's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, the Supreme Court observed that post-verdict scrutiny of juror conduct would not only "seriously disrupt the finality of the process" but would also undermine "full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople." Tanner , 483 U.S. at 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739 ; see also Pena-Rodriguez , 580 U.S. at ––––, 137 S. Ct. at 865. The Court also reasoned that "several [other] aspects of the trial process" protect a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury, including jurors’ ability to report misconduct to the court during trial. Tanner , 483 U.S. at 127, 107 S.Ct. 2739.
¶ 20 Thus, absent a recognized exception, juror testimony (through an affidavit or otherwise) is inadmissible to impeach a verdict. See Stewart , 47 P.3d at 320 (...
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