People v. Arguello

• Decision Date: 08 February 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 10129
• Citation: People v. Arguello, 65 Cal.2d 768, 56 Cal.Rptr. 274, 423 P.2d 202 (Cal. 1967)
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 423 P.2d 202 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward Louis ARGUELLO, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Page 274

56 Cal.Rptr. 274

65 Cal.2d 768, 423 P.2d 202

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward Louis ARGUELLO, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 10129.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Feb. 8, 1967.

Rehearing Denied March 29, 1967.

Thomas Whelan, San Diego, under appointment by Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Bradley A. Stoutt, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

BURKE, Justice.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder and the penalty was fixed at death. On appeal, the judgment was reversed insofar as it related to penalty but affirmed in all other respects. (People v. Arguello, 61 Cal.2d 210, 37 Cal.Rptr. 601, 390 P.2d 377.) At the second penalty trial the death sentence was again imposed. On appeal we recalled the remittitur in People v. Arguello, supra, 61 Cal.2d 210, 37 Cal.Rptr. 601, 390 P.2d 377, vacated our judgment, and reversed the judgment appealed from in its entirety. (People v. Arguello, 63 Cal.2d 566, 47 Cal.Rptr. 485, 407 P.2d 661.) A jury again found defendant guilty of first degree murder and fixed the penalty at death. Motions for a new trial and for reduction of sentence were denied, and defendant's third automatic appeal is now before us. (Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)

Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, that evidence was erroneously admitted, that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct, and that the court erred in its instructions to the jury. We have concluded that none of these contentions can be upheld and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Much of the evidence at the prior trials was introduced at the present trial and may be summarized in a similar manner to that employed on defendant's prior automatic appeals.

The body of Marie Chapman, an 82-year-old widow, was found by a neighbor in the bathroom of her home in San Diego about 5 o'clock in the afternoon on November 9, 1961. According to the autopsy surgeon, death resulted from multiple skull fractures and lacerations of the brain and throat. Mrs. Chapman ordinarily kept the doors to her house locked and was cautious in admitting persons into her home. A police inspection of the house revealed nothing to indicate a forced entry. About 9 a.m. on the day Mrs. Chapman was killed a neighbor heard her talking to someone in a raised voice. Mrs. Chapman's sister-in-law telephoned her at 11 a.m. and got no answer.

Defendant had worked for Mrs. Chapman periodically for several years as a handyman. About 11:30 a.m. on the day Mrs. Chapman was killed he arrived at the home of his friend, Mrs. Josephine Mendoza, who lived in the same neighborhood as Mrs. Chapman. He changed his clothes at Mrs. Mendoza's home and gave his trousers to her daughter to wash. The police found blood on the trousers, and there was evidence that defendant cut his finger while wearing the same kind of trousers a few days before. However, it was determined that the blood was not defendant's type and that it was the same type as decedent's. Soon after arriving at Mrs. Mendoza's home on November 9 defendant wiped his hands on a towel that may have been used by others and tests revealed a substance on the towel that 'very probably was blood.'

A chemical analysis of a brick found in Mrs. Chapman's closet revealed 'the probable presence of blood,' and the autopsy surgeon testified that a brick could have caused one of her skull fractures. There was soil on the brick and on Mrs. Chapman's body, which tests disclosed was the same as that found in the yard behind the house of defendant's uncle, and the soils all contained distinctive characteristics not commonly found in soil. The police while searching the yard, discovered what appeared to be an impression made by the narrow side of the brick, and the brick found in Mrs. Chapman's closet had soil on its narrow side. Defendant's uncle testified that defendant did not sleep at his house on the night of November 8, 1961, but according to Mrs. Mendoza, who testified through an interpreter, when defendant left her house on the night of November 8 he stated that he was going 'with his uncle.'

A knife discovered in a kitchen drawer was bloodstained, but tests were inconclusive as to whether the blood was of human origin. A hammer was found attached to Mrs. Chapman's neck by a cord, and the autopsy surgeon testified that one of the injuries to her skull could have been inflicted with the hammer. The cord was tied to the hammer by a type of knot not commonly used, although it would be familiar to some members of certain groups such as sailors. On one occasion following his arrest defendant was asked to tie a piece of cord, and the knot he made was dissimilar to that used in fastening the cord to the hammer. Subsequently, while awaiting trial defendant tied a bundle of clothing with string, and the knot he made this time was the same type as the one used to tie the cord to the hammer.

Mrs. Chapman had at least $58.60 in her purse six days before she was killed, but a search of her home after her death disclosed only two silver dollars in a trunk and less than 50 cents in her purse. Defendant tried unsuccessfully to borrow $5 from Mrs. Chapman's sister-in-law on November 7, 1961, and he told Mrs. Mendoza the next day that he had $2. He had about $35 when he arrived at Mrs. Mendoza's home on November 9, the day Mrs. Chapman was killed.

Defendant did not take the stand at the instant trial, and no witnesses were called to testify in his behalf.

At the penalty trial the parties stipulated that the evidence at the guilt trial might be considered by the jury in determining the penalty. In addition the prosecution introduced evidence that defendant was convicted of forgery in 1930 and served a term at San Quentin and that in 1956 he was again convicted of forgery. It was stipulated that the latter offense was a misdemeanor.

The evidence is clearly sufficient to support the verdict.

Over objection, the prosecution introduced testimony by Mrs. Patricia Baugh, a next-door neighbor of Mrs. Chapman, that during visits she had with Mrs. Chapman from 1959 to 1961 Mrs. Chapman stated (1) that for her own protection she did not allow strangers into the house, (2) that she had a cane 'as a means of defense,' and (3) that should she be in trouble she would scream from her bedroom windows and Mrs. Baugh would hear her. Immediately after the evidence was received the court instructed the jury that it was admitted to show the state of mind of Mrs. Chapman and for that purpose only. Defendant now urges that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. The evidence, however, was not objectionable as hearsay since it was admitted solely as evidence of the deceased's state of mind. (People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 784--785, 306 P.2d 480; see also People v. Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 171--172, 346 P.2d 764; see Witkin, Cal.Evidence (2d ed. 1966) p. 429; McCormick on Evidence, pp. 465--466, 567; 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1790.) The statements tended to show that the deceased was fearful especially of strangers, a matter relevant to the prosecution's theory that the murderer was not a stranger to her.

The present case is unlike People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal.2d 881, 13 Cal.Rptr. 649, 362 P.2d 473, relied upon by defendant. There declarations by the decedent referring to past conduct of the defendant that caused her to fear him were admitted solely to show her state of mind, and it was held that their admission constituted prejudicial error. The opinion pointed out (at p. 895, 13 Cal.Rptr. at p. 657, 362 P.2d at p. 481) that in such a case 'the authorities are agreed that it is impossible for the jury to separate the state of mind of the declarant from the truth of the facts contained in the declarations.'

Mrs. Marie Krusinsky testified that on November 8, 1961, she heard a male and a female voice coming from Mrs. Chapman's home. She was then permitted to testify, over objection, that she heard the female voice say 'No. I'm not going to give you any more. You got all you are going to get from me. I am not giving you any more money. * * * Get away from me. * * *' Defendant argues in effect that the evidence is irrelevant because Mrs. Krusinsky did not identify the voices she heard as those of Mrs. Chapman and defendant. However, since Mrs. Krusinsky heard the voices coming from Mrs. Chapman's house and there is no evidence that any other woman lived in the house, it could be inferred that the female voice was hers. Evidence that defendant was a male Mrs. Chapman would allow inside her house, that he borrowed money from her less than three weeks before the conversation, and that he tried to borrow money from her sister-in-law the day before the conversation tends to show that the male voice was his.

Defendant further argues that the statement Mrs. Krusinsky testified she overheard constituted inadmissible hearsay. However, it was not hearsay insofar as it was offered to prove that the man to whom Mrs. Chapman spoke believed she would not voluntarily give him any more money (People v. Marsh, 58 Cal.2d 732, 737 et seq., 26 Cal.Rptr. 300, 376 P.2d 800; see Witkin, Cal.Evidence (2d ed. 1966) pp. 429--432), a matter bearing on the question of motive. Insofar as it was offered to prove Mrs. Chapman's state of mind or intent not to loan any more money to the person to whom she spoke, a matter similarly bearing on the question of motive, it was hearsay but...