People v. Armlin

Decision Date19 June 1975
Citation332 N.E.2d 870,371 N.Y.S.2d 691,37 N.Y.2d 167
Parties, 332 N.E.2d 870 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ervun L. ARMLIN, Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Frederic Block, Centereach, for appellant.

Robert L. Maider, Dist. Atty., for respondent.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

The questions presented in this appeal may be phrased as follows: (1) having found that reasonable ground existed to believe that the defendant was an incapacitated person, did the County Court's failure to provide the defendant with an examination by two qualified psychiatrists, as required by CPL 730.20 (subd. 1), deprive the accused of his right to a full and impartial determination of his mental capacity to stand trial; and (2) by his plea of guilty, did the defendant waive his right to the proceedings mandated by CPL article 730? Since we are of the opinion that the first question must be answered in the affirmative and the second in the negative, we modify the order of the Appellate Division which affirmed Armlin's conviction, and remit the case to the County Court for a hearing to determine whether the defendant was competent at the time of sentencing (CPL 730.20).

On September 15, 1972, the defendant, who was charged with having entered a Johnstown, New York, home in the early morning hours of August 10, 1972 and forcing a 12-year-old girl to engage in sexual intercourse, was indicted on two counts of burglary in the first degree and for rape in the first, second and third degrees. Prior to his arraignment on these charges, Armlin's assigned counsel, who had in his possession medical information indicating that the defendant was a 'chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic' suffering from 'Acute psychotic reaction with delusions of grandeur', moved for an examination of the defendant 'to determine his sanity' on the ground that Armlin was 'insane, incompetent and incapable of understanding the charge or proceedings against him or of making his defense'.

On December 29, 1972, the County Court Judge made an order which, pursuant to CPL 730.20 (subd. 1), directed the Superintendent of Utica State Hospital to cause an examination of the defendant's mental condition by 'two qualified psychiatrists', the court believing that reasonable ground existed that the defendant 'is in such a state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity that he is incapable of understanding the charge, or of making his defense'.

On January 11, 1973, the County Court Judge made yet another order, committing the defendant to Utica State Hospital 'for a reasonable period, for treatment, observation, examination and report as to his physical and mental condition', the court being of the opinion that Armlin was then 'in need of medical treatment' and that on this date there was 'reasonable ground for believing that said defendant may be insane or may be a person of unsound mind and incapable of understanding the proceeding herein.'

In accordance with this latter order, the Sheriff of Fulton County was to transport Armlin to Utica and to return him to the Fulton County Jail upon completion of the examination, the results to be reported to the court by the Director of the Psychiatric Division of the Hospital. The record is barren of any evidence that either of the orders were complied with, but it may fairly be concluded that in lieu of complying with either order, arrangements were made for a psychiatric examination at the Fulton County Mental Health Clinic, since on January 25, 1973, Armlin was examined at that facility by a single psychiatrist, Dr. Leonard Rockmore, who rendered his report on February 5, 1973.

According to the psychiatrist's report, Armlin stated that when he learned his brother had been killed in action in Viet Nam, he enlisted in the military service in an effort to retaliate for his brother's death. During his tour of duty in Viet Nam, Armlin was awarded four Purple Hearts. It appears that Armlin's service records contain medical opinions indicating that he was a chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic who suffered an acute psychotic reaction with delusions of grandeur. The record does not indicate the date of these military psychiatric findings, but, after securing his honorable discharge from military service and only a short time before he was charged with these crimes, Armlin was treated as a psychiatric outpatient at the Veteran's Hospital.

Dr. Rockmore, the sole examining psychiatrist, conceded that Armlin had undergone an 'adjustment reaction' upon his return from the armed services, but stated that this was almost universal and did not consider it to be part of a psychopathological emotional disorder. That being the case, he concluded that Armlin was not suffering from any mental disorder and that he was competent to face the charges against him.

The record indicates that no further action was taken by either the County Court or by the defendant in regard to Armlin's capacity to stand trial, and on the third day of trial Armlin pleaded guilty to rape in the first degree in satisfaction of the entire indictment.

The majority at the Appellate Division held that by pleading guilty and by not objecting and not bringing the noncompliance with the orders to the court's attention, Armlin waived his right to insist on compliance with the procedure set forth in CPL 730.20 (subd. 1) which requires, Inter alia, that: 'The appropriate director to whom a criminal court issues an order of examination * * * must designate two qualified psychiatrists * * * to examine the defendant to determine if he is an incapacitated person, except that if the director is of the opinion that the defendant may be mentally defective, he may designate one qualified psychiatrist and one psychologist to examine the defendant.' Mr. Justice Kane dissented and argued that '(o)nce * * * the provisions of CPL article 730 are invoked by the trial court at its own instance or by the grant of a motion of a defendant, it is incumbent upon the court to carefully adhere to the statutory provisions.' (43 A.D.2d 782, 783, 350 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798.) The dissenting Justice further held that there could be no waiver of the safeguards afforded a defendant by CPL article 730 by a subsequently entered plea of guilty since 'it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to...

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