People v. Armstrong
Decision Date | 29 December 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 1-98-4278.,1-98-4278. |
Citation | 252 Ill.Dec. 641,743 N.E.2d 215,318 Ill.App.3d 607 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael ARMSTRONG, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle and Nicole M. Wilkes, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Rita Fry, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Emily Eisner, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant-appellant, Michael Armstrong, and Wardell McClain, who is not a party to this appeal, were each charged with first degree murder pursuant to sections 9-1(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998)), for the beating and burning of Richard Will. Armstrong was sentenced to 90 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence; (2) counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not moving to suppress statements under the fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V); and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him to an extended term of 90 years' imprisonment.
Prior to trial, Armstrong filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence based upon a violation of his fourth amendment rights. The motion asserted that Armstrong was seized from his home without probable cause. The following facts were elicited at the hearing on that motion.
On October 18, 1995, at approximately 1 a.m., Officer Haynie of the Ford Heights police department stopped a vehicle and arrested the driver on an outstanding warrant. The vehicle's passenger, Richard Will, who was also the vehicle owner, was not allowed to drive his vehicle. Officer Haynie instructed Will to walk to a phone booth located approximately two blocks away to call someone to pick him up. Officer Haynie called for a tow truck and took the driver to the police station.
While at the station, Officer Haynie received a call that a man was being burned and beaten in the 1600 block of Berkley in Ford Heights. When Officer Haynie arrived, he observed that the victim was Will. The victim was lying in the street in the fetal position, he had been severely beaten, his hair was smoking, and there was a smoldering flame in his groin area.
At 8 a.m. on the same day, Officer Haynie told juvenile officer Donna Bankston that a man had been beaten and burned. At approximately 11 a.m., Officer Haynie was informed by Ford Heights police department dispatcher Sue Wright that there were numerous anonymous phone calls "stating that Michael Armstrong was involved in the burning of a white guy." Officer Bankston also received an anonymous phone call at approximately 2 p.m. on the 18th of October. She testified:
She stated that she did not recognize the voice of the caller.
Officer Haynie testified that on the morning of October 19, 1995, the Bloom Trail High School police liaison, Officer Haskins, called the police department and left a message that he wanted to see Officer Haynie. During their meeting, Officer Haskins told Officer Haynie that one of the students had come to him in confidence and told him that he spoke to "somebody else" who had spoken to "Stacy Pickens," who said that "Michael Armstrong did that shit." Officer Haynie then placed a phone call to Officer Bankston to have her locate Armstrong. Officer Bankston told Officer Haynie that Armstrong was already at the station.
In fact, on the morning of October 19, Officer Bankston went to the home of Armstrong. When Armstrong answered the door, Bankston asked him if his grandmother was at home and he responded that she was. Officer Bankston testified that defendant "called upstairs for his grandmother to come down, and she yelled down, she asked who was it, and he said it's Lady Red, which is me, Officer Bankston." Officer Bankston also testified:
Armstrong's grandmother testified at the suppression hearing, stating that "when I seen her they was getting in the car, the police car," and she denied ever speaking to Officer Bankston. Officer Bankston transported Armstrong to the police department in a marked police car. He was not handcuffed and was seated in the front seat of the police car.
Officer Bankston further testified that she and Armstrong entered the station through the front doors. At the police station, Officer Bankston read Armstrong his Miranda rights and his juvenile rights from preprinted forms. When Officer Haynie returned to the police station on October 19, he spoke with dispatcher Wright, who related that she received more anonymous calls stating that Michael Armstrong was involved in the burning.
The record indicates that Armstrong was interviewed by Officer Bankston in an open lounge at the police station. Officer Bankston asked Armstrong if he knew anything about the beating and burning of the victim. Armstrong told her, and later Officer Haynie and the assistant State's Attorney, about his involvement in the beating and burning of Will. Armstrong relayed the following account:
Officer Bankston then told Armstrong that he was under arrest. At the time of his arrest, Armstrong was 16 years old and resided in Ford Heights, Illinois, with his grandmother, Patsy Armstrong, his guardian. He was in the ninth grade and was receiving "special education."
The trial court denied Armstrong's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Subsequently, the court found Armstrong guilty of two counts of first degree murder. He was sentenced to an extended term of 90 years' imprisonment for the murder.
As the reviewing court, we are asked to review several issues upon appeal. Armstrong first contends that his statements and fingerprinting should have been suppressed as the "fruits of an unlawful arrest without probable cause." We agree.
In denying defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, the trial court stated:
However, in our view, the anonymous calls, even when combined, do not provide an indicia of reliability. In Illinois, information received by the police from third parties must be justified by some indicia of reliability in order to establish probable cause. People v. Morris, 229 Ill.App.3d 144, 158, 171 Ill.Dec. 112, 593 N.E.2d 932 (1992). Probable cause is defined as facts and circumstances that would prompt a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused committed the offense. Morris, 229 Ill.App.3d at 158, 171 Ill.Dec. 112, 593 N.E.2d 932. Probable cause may be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527, 545 (1983).
Here, Officer Bankston only knew the details of how the victim died, where he died, and the name given to her by one anonymous phone call. The information given to her in that anonymous call had no indicia of reliability. The fact that a "white guy" had been...
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