People v. Arnold
| Decision Date | 21 April 1880 |
| Citation | 5 N.W. 385,43 Mich. 303 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. ARNOLD. |
Upon the second trial of a defendant charged with crime, the prosecution offered in evidence a statement made by defendant upon his own behalf on the first trial, and then introduced evidence to show its falsity. Defendant made no statement on the second trial. Held, that the admission of such statement and the contradiction thereof were not error.
Error to recorder's court of Detroit.
Otto Kirchner, Attorney General, for the people.
Geo. H Penniman, for respondent.
This case comes up on exceptions to the rulings of the recorder of Detroit, taken on the second trial of the defendant for the crime of larceny, charged to have been committed October 3 1878. The firm of A.N. Sabin & Co., produce and commission dealers, were the prosecutors, and the theory of the prosecution was that defendant came to their place of business, on pretence of making a purchase of flour, and engaged their attention while a confederate committed the larceny. On the first trial the defendant took the stand in his own behalf, and undertook to account for his presence at Sabin's in the following statement: That he lived in Cleveland, Ohio, and had been engaged there, among other things, in shipping cheese to Chicago; that a few days before the time of the alleged offence a gentleman from Buffalo named Foster, had come to see him to get him to buy apples in Michigan; that he had gone to Chicago on business there, making inquires as to apples on the way; that he came to Detroit October 1, 1878, and on the next day he received a letter from his cousin, who was head book-keeper in the firm of Chandler & Son, on Ontario street, Cleveland, requesting him to make inquiries as to flour in Detroit, and that it was in pursuance of this request that he went to Sabin's and was there at the time of the alleged larceny.
The defendant was convicted on the first trial, but the verdict was set aside, and on the second trial the above statement was put in evidence by the prosecution, with the avowed purpose of following it with evidence that defendant's pretence of business at Sabin's was wholly false. The defendant objected to its introduction, but the objection was overruled.
William Chandler then testified for the prosecution that he had for years been employed by the firm of Chandler & Son, in Cleveland; that in September and October, 1878, he was the head book-keeper of that firm; that he did not know defendant, nor did he ever see him, to his recollection; that defendant was not his cousin; that he had never written to defendant in September or October, 1878, or at any other time or place, to inquire from him the price of flour, and that Chandler & Son never dealt in flour at all.
The only question worthy of notice, which the record presents, is whether the court erred in admitting in evidence the statement of the defendant on the former trial, and the evidence of Chandler to contradict it. The defendant, on the second trial, made no statement whatever.
It cannot be claimed, with any reason, that giving in the evidence the defendant's statement violates any privilege which the statute confers upon him. He gives evidence in this manner on his own behalf, at his option, and is not to be subjected to unfavorable inferences because he withholds it. But when it is in, it is to be treated like any other evidence, and may be contradicted and shown to be false. Defendant has no claim to be protected against the exposure of this falsehood, where he indulges in it for his own exculpation. He runs the risk of this exposure when he invents a false defence. The peculiarity of this case consists in the defendant's statement being put in on the second trial, not by the defendant himself, but by the prosecution. It is not, therefore, evidence in the case except as the prosecution makes it so; and the presecution puts it in, not that reliance may be placed upon it, but for the very purpose of showing its falsity. It is proved as a declaration by the prisoner, that it may be followed by evidence that he has attempted to deceive and mislead by it; and the question is whether, from the statement itself, or from the use which was made of it, inferences unfavorable to the prisoner's innocence may rightly be drawn.
It was never doubted that the conduct of a suspected party, when charged with a crime, may be put in evidence against him, when it is such as an innocent man would not be likely to resort to. Thus, it may be shown that he made false statements for the purpose of misleading or warding off suspicion. Though these are by no means conclusive of guilt, they may strengthen the inferences arising from other facts. State v. Williams, 27 Vt. 724; Rex v. Higgins, 3 C. & P. 603; Rex v. Steptoe, 4 C. & P. 397. So it may be shown that the accused fled to escape arrest, or broke jail, or attempted to do so, (Whaley v. State, 11 Geo. 123;) or offered a bribe for his liberty to his keeper, (People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509.) These are familiar cases and rest in sound reason. But the case of deliberate fabrication of evidence, or of attempt in that direction, would seem to be still plainer.
In People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31, 39, an objection to evidence that the defendant had attempted to tamper with a witness and with the jury was thought so manifestly baseless that it could scarcely be made seriously. In Commonwealth v. Webster, Bemis' Reports, 210, anonymous letters written by defendant to mislead the officers were received as bearing upon his guilt. All these attempts to avoid a trial to evade conviction by frauds upon the law, or to lead suspicion and investigation in some other direction by false or covert suggestions or insinuations, are so unlike the conduct of innocent men that they are justly regarded as giving some...
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