People v. Artis

• Decision Date: 23 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 105751.,105751.
• Citation: 232 Ill.2d 156,902 N.E.2d 677
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Maurice A. ARTIS, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

902 N.E.2d 677

232 Ill.2d 156

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Maurice A. ARTIS, Appellee.

No. 105751.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January 23, 2009.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, Joliet (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, Jonathan J. Silbermann, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Terry A. Mertel and Thomas D. Arado, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Kenneth D. Brown, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

The issues in this appeal are whether this court should abandon the one-act, one-crime doctrine of People v. King, 66 Ill.2d 551, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977), and if not, whether the State should be allowed to exercise its prosecutorial discretion on appeal to choose which conviction should survive and which should be vacated, where both offenses are of the same legislative classification.

BACKGROUND

In September 2003, defendant, Maurice A. Artis, entered a plea of guilty in the circuit court of Will County to two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, perpetrated during the course of residential burglary and home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(4) (West 2002)), and one count each of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2002)), residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2002)), and unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3(a) (West 2002)).

The State's factual basis for the guilty plea was that in the early morning hours of April 1, 2003, defendant broke into the home of A.W. When A.W. confronted defendant, he demanded that she give him $100, which she did. Stating that $100 was not enough, defendant forced A.W. into her bedroom, where he sexually assaulted her. He then tied her to a chair, but she was able to free her hands and call 9-1-1.

The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 20 years' imprisonment on the aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions, to be served consecutively to concurrent terms of 15 years for home invasion, 12 years for residential burglary, and an extended-term sentence of 6 years for unlawful restraint. Defendant filed postplea motions, which were denied. The appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on home invasion, and his convictions for residential burglary and unlawful restraint. The court vacated the convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on residential burglary and for home invasion. The court also vacated the extended-term sentence for unlawful restraint and reduced the sentence to the maximum nonextended term of three years. 377 Ill.App.3d 216, 316 Ill.Dec. 360, 879 N.E.2d 427.

In the appellate court, defendant argued for the first time that the conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on residential burglary should be vacated because it was based upon the same act of penetration as the sexual assault conviction based on home invasion. Defendant reasoned that the latter conviction was the more serious and, thus, under the one-act, one-crime doctrine, the conviction based upon residential burglary should be vacated. Defendant also argued that his conviction for home invasion should be vacated as a lesser-included offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault committed during the course of home invasion. The State conceded before the appellate court that one of the sexual assault convictions should be vacated based on one-act, one-crime principles; however, the State argued that the sexual assault conviction based upon residential burglary was the more serious conviction and that, in any case, the State should be allowed to elect which conviction should be vacated, based upon prosecutorial discretion.

The appellate court rejected the State's argument as to the relative seriousness of the sexual assault convictions, noting that (1) home invasion is a Class X offense with a possible sentencing range of 6 to 30 years, whereas residential burglary is a Class 1 offense with a possible sentence of 4 to 15 years, and (2) the elements of the offense of home invasion, as compared with those of residential burglary, demonstrate that home invasion is a more serious offense than residential burglary. The court concluded, based upon existing case law, that the State lacked prosecutorial discretion to elect to vacate what the court viewed as the more serious charge. 377 Ill.App.3d at 221, 316 Ill.Dec. 360, 879 N.E.2d 427. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

Where, as here, the issues raised are ones purely of law, our review is de novo. People v. Daniels, 187 Ill.2d 301, 307, 240 Ill.Dec. 668, 718 N.E.2d 149 (1999).

II. One-Act, One-Crime Doctrine

The one-act, one-crime doctrine was articulated by this court in People v. King, 66 Ill.2d 551, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977) as follows:

"Prejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act. Prejudice, with regard to multiple acts, exists only when the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, some of which are, by definition, lesser included offenses. Multiple convictions and concurrent sentences should be permitted in all other cases where a defendant has committed several acts, despite the interrelationship of those acts. `Act,' when used in this sense, is intended to mean any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense. We hold, therefore, that when more than one offense arises from a series of incidental or closely related acts and the offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses, convictions with concurrent sentences can be entered." King, 66 Ill.2d at 566, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838.

The State argues that this court should abolish the one-act, one-crime doctrine because the rationale for the doctrine no longer exists. That rationale, according to the State, is found in this court's decision in People v. Schlenger, 13 Ill.2d 63, 147 N.E.2d 316 (1958). There, the defendant was convicted of one count of armed robbery and one count of grand larceny. Both charges arose from a taking of money from the same person at the same place and time. The defendant entered pleas of guilty to both counts and received concurrent sentences. On appeal, the defendant argued that he should have been convicted of only one crime, that of armed robbery, and that the sentence for grand larceny was void. He argued that the additional sentence was prejudicial because it might adversely impact his opportunity for parole. This court observed that, based on its prior decisions, it would normally hold that, while the sentence for grand larceny was unnecessary and superfluous, the two sentences must run concurrently and would therefore not be prejudicial. Noting that the question presented was one of first impression, this court relied on three decisions from the state of Indiana in agreeing with the defendant that the second conviction would be prejudicial to his chances for parole. Schlenger, 13 Ill.2d at 66-67, 147 N.E.2d 316.

Prior to Schlenger, this court had consistently held that a defendant was not prejudiced by multiple convictions and concurrent sentences for offenses committed during the same transaction. King, 66 Ill.2d at 560, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838. This court noted in King that the result in Schlenger was "predicated solely" on the defendant's argument in that case that multiple convictions arising from a single act might adversely affect his chances for parole. King, 66 Ill.2d at 564, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838. The State points out that the General Assembly abolished parole for all felons sentenced after February 1, 1978, and replaced it with mandatory supervised release, the length of which is determined according to the class of the offense or by the specific offense itself. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2002). With the exception of those prisoners serving a term of natural life imprisonment, prisoners now must serve the full term of their sentences, less time credit for good behavior. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-3(c) (West 2002). Thus, according to the State, since the rationale for the doctrine no longer exists, it has outlived its usefulness and should be "jettisoned."

The State also argues that (1) the doctrine is not constitutionally mandated; (2) it interferes with the trial court's sentencing discretion; (3) applicable statutes authorize multiple concurrent convictions and sentences arising out of the same conduct when that conduct establishes more than one offense; (4) the doctrine produces confusing results and is not amenable to consistent application; and (5) it consumes resources that are better spent elsewhere in the criminal justice system.

Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the doctrine is sound and that the State has failed to show it should be abandoned under the principles of stare decisis. He further argues that the doctrine is rooted in principles of double jeopardy, is reasonable and workable in practice, and protects the substantial rights of defendants.

Initially, we address defendant's argument that the State has forfeited its contention that the one-act, one-crime doctrine should be abandoned by conceding in the appellate court that one of defendant's convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault must be vacated under one-act, one-crime principles. In the alternative, defendant argues that the State should be estopped from urging the abandonment of the King rule because of its tacit agreement in the appellate court that King is still good law.

The State argues that, as the appellee in the appellate court, it...