People v. Ashley
| Decision Date | 11 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4-15-0293,4-15-0293 |
| Citation | 2018 IL App (4th) 150293 -U |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARSHALL ASHLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of McLean County
Honorable Scott D. Drazewski, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the stalking statute (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a) (West 2012)) (1) did not violate the constitutional guarantee of due process, and (2) defendant's stalking conviction could be sustained based on conduct other than "communicating to or about a person," which was otherwise prohibited by the stalking statute.
¶ 2 In October 2014, the State charged defendant, Marshall Ashley, with two felony counts of stalking, alleging he knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at Keisha Tinch, which defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person (1) to fear for his or her safety (count I) (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) (West 2012)), and (2) to suffer emotional distress (count II) (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2) (West 2012)). Following a February 2015 bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty on count II. In April 2015, the court sentenced defendant to a term of one year and six months' imprisonment, followed by a four-year term of mandatory supervised release.
¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing subsection (a) of the stalking statute violates state and federal constitutional guarantees of (1) due process, because it lacks a mens rea requirement and is unduly vague; and (2) free speech, because it overbroadly criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 5 In October 2014, the State charged defendant with two felony counts of stalking, alleging he knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at Tinch, which defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person (1) to fear for his or her safety (count I) (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) (West 2012)), and (2) to suffer emotional distress (count II) (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2) (West 2012)), in that he drove by her residence, sent her threatening text messages, made threatening phone calls, and went to her residence.
¶ 6 In October 2014, defendant and Tinch had been dating for approximately two years and had a daughter together. Tinch and defendant lived together in an apartment on Dustin Avenue in Normal, Illinois. Karen Miller, Tinch's mother, testified she and several relatives and children were having dinner at Tinch's apartment on October 21, 2014. At some point that evening, Tinch received a phone call from defendant. Miller testified she heard Tinch arguing on the phone and went into the kitchen. Tinch put the telephone on speaker, and Miller heard defendant threaten to come over and kill Tinch with a "banger," and he did not care who was at Tinch's apartment. Tinch testified defendant told her that if she had a man at her apartment, he was going to come and kill her with a "banger," meaning a gun. After receiving this phone call, Tinch, Miller, and the other relatives all went to Miller's house.
¶ 7 On the way to Miller's house, Tinch called the police and gave them both her address and Miller's address. Nicholas Mishevich, an officer with the Normal PoliceDepartment, testified he responded to Miller's address and spoke with Tinch. While Mishevich was present, Tinch received multiple telephone calls and text messages from the same telephone number. Mishevich testified he took photographs of the text messages and identified People's Exhibit Nos. 1-A and 1-B as accurately depicting the text messages he saw on Tinch's telephone that night.
¶ 8 Officer Jonathan McCauley testified he was on patrol on October 21, 2014, and was dispatched to the area near Tinch's apartment to look for defendant. McCauley pulled over a vehicle with defendant in the passenger seat and took defendant into custody. McCauley interviewed defendant at the police station and took photographs of the text messages exchanged with Tinch on defendant's phone.
¶ 9 Tinch identified the photographs of the text messages the police took from both her telephone and defendant's telephone. Defendant sent Tinch the following relevant text messages:
Defendant also sent Tinch a photograph of a handgun. The photographs taken of the messages on defendant's telephone were consistent with those taken from Tinch's telephone. However, defendant's phone did not include the message sent at 8:31 p.m. referencing guns. Tinch testified the text messages "scared" her and the message sent shortly after 7 p.m. "terrified" Tinch because she "knew right then and there that [defendant] was going to come after [her] even more."
¶ 10 Defendant testified he and Tinch lived together in October 2014 and had been arguing a lot. At some point, Tinch told defendant she was getting evicted from her apartment.
On October 21, 2014, defendant was out and Tinch called him and asked him to help her move because someone was coming to change the locks at 3 p.m. Defendant testified he was "heated" because he had given Tinch money for rent and she used the money for something else. Defendant admitted he and Tinch had some heated discussions, but he denied threatening her and specifically denied threatening her with a gun.
¶ 11 Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of count II, finding that defendant's text messages and phone calls would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. In April 2015, the court sentenced defendant to a term of one year and six months' imprisonment, followed by a four-year term of mandatory supervised release.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues subsection (a) of the stalking statute violates state and federal constitutional guarantees of (1) due process, because it lacks a mens rea requirement and is unduly vague; and (2) free speech, because it overbroadly criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech. On November 30, 2017, the supreme court filed an opinion addressing the constitutionality of the stalking statute in People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094. That same date, this court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs in light of Relerford. We first discuss the relevant statutory provision before turning to defendant's claims.
¶ 16 Prior to the supreme court's decision in Relerford, the stalking statute provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
The statute further defines "course of conduct" as follows:
720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(1) (West 2012).
¶ 17 Although not at issue in the present case, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Relerford addresses the cyberstalking statute. Therefore, we point out the cyberstalking provisions are substantially similar to the stalking statute provisions, with the additional requirement that the defendant used electronic communication in committing the offense. See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.5(a), (c) (West 2012)).
¶ 18 B. The Present Case
¶ 19 As noted above, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the stalking statute, arguing it violates (1) due process because it lacks a mens rea requirement and is unduly vague,and (2) the first amendment because it overbroadly criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech. In his supplemental brief, defendant argues the stalking statute expressly writes out the requirement of intent from the true threats exception to first amendment protection and, thus, is unconstitutional. We address these claims in turn.
¶ 20 1. Standard of Review
¶ 21 Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party raising a challenge to the constitutionality of a...
To continue reading
Request your trial