People v. Aveni
| Decision Date | 17 October 2012 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Paul AVENI, appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John F. Ryan, White Plains, N.Y. (David B. Weisfuse of counsel), for appellant.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Raffaelina Gianfrancesco and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., ARIEL E. BELEN, L. PRISCILLA HALL, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
This case presents us with an opportunity to decide under what circumstances the police, while interrogating a suspect, exceed permissible deception, such that a suspect's statements to the police must be suppressed because they were unconstitutionally coerced. During the early morning of January 13, 2009, the defendant, Paul Aveni, who had been arrested the previous night for violating a temporary order of protection obtained by his mother, Mary Aveni (hereinafter Mary), was intentionally deceived and threatened by two detectives from the New Rochelle Police Department into making various inculpatory statements. Knowing that the defendant's girlfriend, Angela Camillo, had died in Mary's home earlier the previous night, Detective Claudio Carpano intentionally deceived and threatened the defendant by telling him that Camillo was receiving medical treatment at a hospital and that, “she's okay now but if you lie to me and don't tell me the truth now ... it could be a problem” because medical personnel would be unable to properly treat Camillo and the defendant could be held responsible for her death.
Shortly thereafter, the defendant made inculpatory statements that he had procured heroin and had injected Camillo with the drug. The cause of Camillo's death was later determined to be acute mixed drug intoxication involving heroin, ecstasy, and Alprazolam, also known as Xanax.
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, criminal injection of a narcotic drug, criminal contempt in the first degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, arguing, among other things, that his statements to the police should have been suppressed because they were involuntarily made as a result of the deception and threats used by the detectives, and that his will was overborne by the length of the detention, lack of food and water, his intoxication, and false promises made by the police. Furthermore, he contends, since his statements were thus rendered involuntary and, hence, inadmissible, there is legally insufficient evidence to support his convictions of burglary in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, criminal injection of a narcotic drug, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. He separately contends, on different grounds, that there is legally insufficient evidence to convict him of criminal contempt in the first degree and that the verdict of guilt with respect to that conviction was against the weight of the evidence.
We agree with the defendant that the statements he made to law enforcement officials at the police station must be suppressed, and that, therefore, his convictions of burglary in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, criminal injection of a narcotic drug, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree must be vacated as unsupported by legally sufficient evidence, and those counts dismissed from the indictment. However, the defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of criminal contempt in the first degree is unpreserved, and, in any event, without merit, and the verdict of guilt with respect to that conviction was not against the weight of the evidence.
The principal issue presented in this case is whether the defendant's will was overborne, in violation of the United States Constitution and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the New York Constitution, and the Criminal Procedure Law, when he made inculpatory statements indicating that he had procured heroin and had injected Camillo with the drug. We further consider whether the defendant's conviction of burglary in the second degree was supported by legally sufficient evidence with regard to the elements of “enter[ing] ... unlawfully,” based upon the violation of an order of protection, and “intent to commit a crime therein” (Penal Law § 140.25), based upon the intent to commit the offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, as charged in the indictment and the bill of particulars.
The Supreme Court held a pretrial suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of, inter alia, the defendant's inculpatory statements made to the police ( see People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179). During the hearing, the People presented the testimony of Detective Carpano, who testified that at approximately 11:30 P.M. on January 12, 2009, after advising the defendant of his Miranda rights ( see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), he interviewed the defendant at the New Rochelle police station. At that time, the defendant stated that he had seen Camillo earlier that day, but had dropped her off at a gas station, and had not seen her again until several hours later, after his brother contacted him and informed him that Camillo was in their mother Mary's home and under the influence of narcotics. When he arrived at Mary's home, he found Camillo unconscious in a chair in his old bedroom. After asking Mary to call 911, he left because there was an order of protection barring him from the home.
The defendant initially told Detective Carpano that some time later, the defendant returned to the house to check on Camillo's condition. The house appeared empty, and he fell asleep in his brother's bedroom. He awoke at approximately 11:15 P.M., fell out of bed, and heard a police officer instructing him to identify himself. According to the hearing testimony of two police officers, the defendant came down a stairway to a landing, was handcuffed by an officer, and was advised of his Miranda rights.
At approximately 2:00 A.M., Detective Carpano presented the defendant with a transcription of the above statement, which the defendant refused to sign.
More than four hours later, at approximately 6:30 A.M., the defendant, after again being advised of his Miranda rights, was interviewed again at the police station by Detective Carpano and another detective. During that interview, Detective Carpano, who knew that Camillo was dead, testified that he told the defendant,
Immediately thereafter, the defendant made an inculpatory statement that he had injected Camillo with heroin.
At approximately 7:00 A.M., Detective Carpano began videotaping the interview. During the recorded interview, the defendant stated that, before going to Mary's home, he had purchased the heroin that he later injected into Camillo. Throughout the recorded interview, Detective Carpano continuously stated that Camillo was alive and that she had told the police she had been forced to take heroin, which contradicted the defendant's assertion that Camillo did so voluntarily. Further, when the defendant asked about the criminal contempt charge arising out of the violation of the order of protection, the detectives promised him, on numerous occasions, that they would help him with that matter if he was cooperative, although the District Attorney would ultimately decide how to proceed.
During her summation at the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued, inter alia, that the police acted improperly by deceiving the defendant into believing that Camillo was still alive and threatening him that his failure to tell them what drugs she had taken would make him responsible for her death.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the hearing court, among other things, declined to suppress the statements made by the defendant at the police station.
The matter then proceeded to trial before a jury. As part of the People's case-in-chief, Camillo's mother testified that, prior to Camillo's relationship with the defendant, Camillo had dated and lived with another man who was a heroin addict. On January 11, 2009, the day before she died, Camillo told her mother that she was going out to lunch with the defendant.
The defendant's mother, Mary, testified that on January 12, 2009, at approximately 4:00 P.M., the defendant and Camillo entered her home, despite the temporary order of protection against the defendant barring him therefrom, and went to his second-floor bedroom. Previously, Mary had unsuccessfully attempted to have the order vacated or modified to allow the defendant to visit her home, and on this date, and on prior occasions, she allowed him to enter and stay in her home notwithstanding the order.
At approximately 8:45 P.M., the defendant told Mary that something was wrong with Camillo. Mary went into the bedroom and saw Camillo sitting in a chair with her legs crossed and her eyes open, looking straight ahead. At approximately 9:10 P.M., Mary called 911.
Meanwhile, the defendant's older brother, Eric Aveni (hereinafter Eric), was watching videos with a friend in a third-floor apartment in Mary's home. According to Eric, the defendant banged on the door and stated that there was something wrong with Camillo. The defendant then grabbed a chair, stood on top...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Dunbar
...542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828; People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d at 41, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318; People v. Aveni, 100 A.D.3d 228, 953 N.Y.S.2d 55; People v. Carey, 67 A.D.3d 925, 888 N.Y.S.2d 615). Post- Miranda, confessions that are deemed to be involuntary under this......
-
People v. Carnevale
...2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828 [2004];People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 39–40, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318 [1977];see e.g. People v. Aveni, 100 A.D.3d 228, 236–37, 953 N.Y.S.2d 55, 61–62 [2012];People v. Thomas, 93 A.D.3d 1019, 1021–1028, 941 N.Y.S.2d 722 [2012],lv. granted19 N.Y.3d 1105 [2012......
-
People v. Sanders
...U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037; People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d at 41, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318; People v. Aveni, 100 A.D.3d 228, 237, 953 N.Y.S.2d 55). Moreover, “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ with......
-
People v. Johnson
...burden, the defendant then bears the burden of persuasion (see People v. Santos, 112 A.D.3d 757, 758, 976 N.Y.S.2d 565 ; People v. Aveni, 100 A.D.3d 228, 237, 953 N.Y.S.2d 55 ). Proof of voluntariness compatible with due process depends upon the particular circumstances—“ ‘the totality’ ”—o......