People v. B.M. (In re B.M.)

• Decision Date: 27 December 2018
• Docket Number: S242153
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: IN RE B.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.M., Defendant and Appellant.

6 Cal.5th 528

431 P.3d 1180

241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543

IN RE B.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.B.M., Defendant and Appellant.

S242153

Supreme Court of California.

December 27, 2018

Elizabeth K. Horowitz, San Luis Obispo, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Donna Ford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Michael J. Wise, Michael C. Keller and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

LIU, J.

Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (hereafter section 245(a)(1) ) prohibits "assault[ing] ... the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm." In this case, the juvenile court found that defendant B.M.’s use of a knife with a dull tip and slightly serrated edge, which the court referred to as a "butter knife," violated section 245(a)(1). On appeal, B.M. argued that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding because she had not used the butter knife in a manner that was " ‘capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.’ " ( People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1029, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204 ( Aguilar ).) In rejecting B.M.’s claim, the Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with In re Brandon T. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1491, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 637 ( Brandon T. ), which held that a butter knife had not been used as a deadly weapon in part because the knife had broken during the alleged assault and failed to cause significant bodily injury prior to breaking. ( Id. at pp. 1497–1498, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.)

We hold, consistent with settled principles, that for an object to qualify as a deadly weapon based on how it was used, the defendant must have used the object in a manner not only capable of producing but also likely to produce death or great bodily injury. The extent of any damage done to the object and the extent of any bodily injuries caused by the object are appropriate considerations in the fact-specific inquiry required by Penal Code section 245(a)(1). But speculation without record support as to how the object could have been used or what injury might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently is not appropriate. We conclude that the evidence here was insufficient to sustain a finding that the knife at issue was used as a deadly weapon, and we accordingly reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

I.

On the morning of July 2, 2016, seventeen-year-old defendant B.M. returned to her family’s home after spending the night away. She was unable to unlock the front door with her key, so she began knocking on the door. When she received no response, she entered the house through a window.

Upon entering the home, B.M. went to the bedroom of Sophia, one of her sisters, and asked her why she had changed the locks. B.M. later acknowledged she was "mad" and "upset" when she confronted Sophia. B.M. yelled and threw a phone at Sophia and then went downstairs to the kitchen, where she grabbed a metal knife from the counter. B.M. testified she grabbed the knife because "it was just the heat of the moment, and [the knife was] just the first thing that caught [her] eye." The knife was about six inches long, with a three-inch blade that was not "sharp" and had "small ridges" on one side. Both B.M. and Sophia described the knife as a "butter knife."

B.M. returned to Sophia’s bedroom with the knife. Sophia was clothed only in a towel because she had just gotten out of the shower when B.M. had arrived home. Sophia testified that when she saw B.M. with the knife, she covered herself with the blanket that was on the bed because she "didn't know what [B.M.] was going to do." She also testified that she "was pretty scared" because she thought B.M. "could really ... hurt [her]." On the witness stand, B.M. was asked, "So did you use a motion like to stab her?" B.M. responded, "No, but as soon as I got close to her with the knife, she covered herself with the blanket."

B.M. approached Sophia, who was lying on top of the bed with her knees bent. Sophia testified that B.M. "came ... at [her] trying to stab [her]" and that from a distance of about three feet, B.M. made several "downward" "slicing" motions with the knife in the area around Sophia’s legs. Sophia further testified that the knife hit her blanketed legs "a few" times and that the amount of pressure B.M. used was "maybe like a five or a six" on a scale from one to ten "if one is the least amount of pressure and ten is the most pressure." Sophia initially said B.M. poked her with the knife, but she later clarified that B.M. did not poke or stab her and that B.M. did not "hurt" her. B.M. testified she only "wanted to scare [Sophia]" and "had no intentions in actually stabbing [Sophia] with [the knife]."

B.M. then began arguing with her stepsister, who was also in the room. The argument eventually turned physical, and the fight moved from the bedroom to the downstairs of the house before spilling outside. During this altercation, Sophia called the police, who showed up and arrested B.M. A police officer later testified that B.M. told him "she [had] wanted to scare Sophia and admitted to making several [downward] stabbing motions at the bedding ... that Sophia had pulled up over her and the bed." A juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that B.M.’s use of the butter knife against Sophia was an assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245(a)(1). (All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The juvenile court sustained the petition. In concluding that B.M. had violated section 245(a)(1), the court noted that Sophia had testified that she "did feel the [downward] slicing motion on her legs" applied with a pressure of "a five or a six out of ten." The court also observed that even though the case involved " ‘just a butter knife,’ ... the circumstances of what happened here ... make it a felony."

B.M. appealed the juvenile court’s order. As relevant here, the Court of Appeal rejected B.M.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her adjudication under section 245(a)(1). The court reasoned that "[i]t matters not that [Sophia] was able to fend off great bodily injury with her blanket" or "that [B.M.] was not adept at using a knife" because B.M. "could have easily inflicted great bodily injury with this metal butter knife and just as easily [could] have committed mayhem upon the victim’s face." The court concluded that the juvenile court’s findings—"that the six-inch metal butter knife could be used to slice or stab, even though it was not designed for such," and that the knife was in fact "used in a manner ‘capable’ of producing great bodily injury"—were "not ‘wholly irreconcilable’ with the evidence."

The court also said Brandon T. , supra , 191 Cal.App.4th 1491, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 637, was " ‘wrongly decided.’ " In that case, a juvenile "tried to cut [the victim’s] cheek and throat" with a knife that was "about three and a quarter inches long, with a rounded end and slight serrations on one side." ( Brandon T. , at pp. 1496–1497, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.) While wielding the knife, the juvenile "moved his arm up and down, applying a slashing motion" that resulted in " ‘welts’ " and " ‘a small scratch’ " but did not draw blood. ( Id. at p. 1497, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.) "The pressure that Brandon applied was not enough to cause death or great bodily injury to [the victim]. Yet it was too much pressure for the knife to bear, and the handle broke off." ( Ibid. ) The court in Brandon T. reversed the juvenile’s adjudication under section 245(a)(1), reasoning that "[t]he butter knife ... had a rounded end, not a pointed one. Brandon applied force, but the knife did not penetrate through the layers of [the victim’s] skin; sufficient force was used, however, to cause the butter knife to break during use. Although [the victim] perceived that Brandon was trying repeatedly to cut him, the knife failed and was not capable of use as obviously intended." ( Brandon T. , at pp. 1497–1498, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.) The Court of Appeal here said that Brandon T. "gives undue emphasis to the lack of injuries" and that the fact that the knife "broke during the assault preventing further stabbing should not inure to the defendant’s benefit."

We granted review.

II.

"As used in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), a ‘deadly weapon’ is ‘any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.’ " ( Aguilar , supra , 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1028–1029, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204.) Although "[s]ome few objects, such as dirks and blackjacks, have been held to be deadly weapons as a matter of law" ( id. at p. 1029, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204 ), we have said a knife is not such an object ( People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 188, 153 P.2d 315 ), and the Attorney General does not argue to the contrary here. "In determining whether an object not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, the trier of fact may consider the nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and all other facts relevant to the issue." ( Aguilar , at p. 1029, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204.) Our inquiry is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that B.M. used the butter knife as a deadly weapon. ( In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 822–825, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880.)

A.

At the outset, we clarify several principles that guide our analysis. First, the object alleged to be a deadly weapon must be used in a manner that is not only "capable of producing" but also " ‘likely to produce death or great bodily injury.’ " ( Aguilar , supra , 16...