People v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 05 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 105457.,105457.
• Citation: 903 N.E.2d 409,232 Ill.2d 285
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. George K. BAILEY, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

903 N.E.2d 409

232 Ill.2d 285

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. George K. BAILEY, Appellant.

No. 105457.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 5, 2009.

Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, Elgin, and James K. Leven, Chicago, both of the Office of State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Paul A. Logli, State's Attorney, Rockford (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Section 12-603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(f) (West 2004)) and section 108-1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108-1(3) (West 2004)) both provide that a law enforcement officer may not "search or inspect" a passenger in a motor vehicle solely because the passenger has failed to comply with the seat belt statute (625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(a) (West 2004)). The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether these provisions were violated when a warrant check was run on the defendant, George K. Bailey, a passenger in a vehicle stopped because both the driver and defendant were not wearing seat belts. For the reasons that follow, we conclude they were not.

BACKGROUND

At approximately noon on July 2, 2005, Officer John Parry of the Winnebago County sheriff's office stopped a car after observing that both the driver and front seat passenger, defendant George K. Bailey, were not wearing seatbelts. After obtaining identification from the driver and defendant, Parry returned to his squad car "to listen to the license information and check for warrants." The warrant check revealed that defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant for misdemeanor domestic battery. Officer Parry arrested defendant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the backseat of the squad car. He then searched the interior of the stopped car. The search uncovered cocaine. Defendant was subsequently convicted, in the circuit court of Winnebago County, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, defendant contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because she failed to file a motion to quash his arrest and suppress the cocaine found in the car. Defendant contended that such a motion would have succeeded because the warrant check conducted by Officer Parry was impermissible under section 12-603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(f) (West 2004)) and section 108-1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108-1(3) (West 2004)) and, without the results of the warrant check and the ensuing arrest, there would have been no legal justification for the search of the car. Further, according to defendant, a motion to suppress would have succeeded because the search incident to arrest violated section 108-1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/108-1(1) (West 2004)), as well as the federal and state constitutions. The appellate court rejected these contentions and affirmed defendant's conviction. 375 Ill.App.3d 1055, 314 Ill.Dec. 575, 874 N.E.2d 940. We thereafter granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that he was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress the drug evidence found in the car.¹ To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted from that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). An attorney's performance must be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time the contested action was taken and will be considered constitutionally deficient only if it is objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693-94. In order to prove prejudice with regard to the failure to seek the suppression of evidence, the defendant must "show that the unargued suppression motion was meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different without the excludable evidence." People v. Harris, 182 Ill.2d 114, 146, 230 Ill.Dec. 957, 695 N.E.2d 447 (1998), citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2582-83, 91 L.Ed.2d 305, 319 (1986); People v. Moore, 171 Ill.2d 74, 108, 215 Ill.Dec. 75, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996).

As he did before the appellate court, defendant contends that there are four arguments which counsel should have raised in a motion to suppress. We address these arguments in turn.

Section 12-603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code and Section 108-1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 12-603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(f) (West 2004)) provides:

"A law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely because of a [seat-belt violation]."

Section 108-1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/108-1(3) (West 2004)) contains identical language:

"A law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely because of a violation of Section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code."

Defendant contends that a warrant check is both a "search" and "inspection" within the meaning of sections 12-603.1(f) and 108-1(3) and therefore prohibited under these provisions when the sole offense committed is a seat-belt violation. Thus, according to defendant, the warrant check run by Officer Parry in this case was illegal and his trial counsel could have filed a successful motion to suppress the fruits of the warrant check, including the cocaine, on this basis. We disagree.

"The law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense." Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 395, 40 S.Ct. 185, 186, 64 L.Ed. 322, 323 (1920). See also Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115, 60 S.Ct. 1, 7, 84 L.Ed. 110, 119 (1939) ("we adhere to the familiar rule that where words are employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in the law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires the contrary"); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46:04, at 152-53 (6th ed.2000) ("if the term utilized has a settled legal meaning, the courts will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate the established meaning"). The prohibition against conducting a "search" was included in sections 12-603.1(f) and 108-1(3) when they were enacted in 2003. See Pub. Act 93-99, eff. July 3, 2003; 375 Ill.App.3d at 1061, 314 Ill.Dec. 575, 874 N.E.2d 940. Then, as now, the term "search" had a settled meaning in the realm of criminal procedure which was derived from fourth amendment law: an examination of a person's body, property or other area in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Black's Law Dictionary 1351 (7th ed.1999).

It has long been held that the existence of an arrest warrant is a matter of public record. Gist v. Macon County Sheriff's Department, 284 Ill.App.3d 367, 377, 219 Ill.Dec. 701, 671 N.E.2d 1154 (1996). Recent decisions continue to adhere to this principle. See People v. Harris, 228 Ill.2d 222, 233, 319 Ill.Dec. 823, 886 N.E.2d 947 (2008); People v. Roberson, 367 Ill.App.3d 193, 201, 304 Ill.Dec. 975, 854 N.E.2d 317 (2006). By definition, a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public matters. Because a warrant check does not implicate any area of privacy, it is not a search under sections 12-603.1(f) and 108-1(3), and it is not prohibited by those provisions. Accordingly, a motion to suppress filed on this ground would not have been successful.

Defendant maintains, however, that even if a warrant check is not a search, it is an inspection within the meaning of sections 12-603.1(f) and 108-1(3) and thus is impermissible. According to defendant, the plain meaning of the term "inspect" is not limited to "physical or corporeal inspections" but may also include the investigation of a passenger's past wrongdoing that occurs during a warrant check. The State, in response, maintains that sections 12-603.1(f) and 108-1(3) say nothing about prohibiting an inspection of a passenger's public records. Thus, in the view of the State, the plain meaning of the statutory provisions is that only the physical inspection of a passenger is prohibited.

The appellate court below concluded that the word "inspect" is ambiguous in the context of sections 12-603.1(f) and 108-1(3). See 375 Ill.App.3d at 1062-64, 314 Ill.Dec. 575, 874 N.E.2d 940. The appellate court noted that several dictionaries offer definitions of the term which can be used to support either party's position. Moreover, as the appellate court explained, various intrinsic aids to construction do not resolve the word's meaning but, instead, only add ambiguity. 375 Ill.App.3d at 1063, 314 Ill.Dec. 575, 874 N.E.2d 940. We agree with the appellate court that the word "inspect" is ambiguous in the context of this case. Unlike the term "search," the word "inspect" does not have a settled meaning in the law of criminal procedure and may reasonably be read in more than one way.

Because the meaning of the word "inspect" is unclear, it is appropriate to consider legislative history in order to determine the legislature's intent in adopting this term. People v. Lowe, 153 Ill.2d 195, 203, 180 Ill.Dec. 90, 606 N.E.2d 1167 (1992). Senator Cullerton, the sponsor of Public Act 93-99, stated during the debates on the bill that the prohibition against a search or inspection...