People v. Baker

• Decision Date: 16 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 4-86-0618,4-86-0618
• Parties: , 110 Ill.Dec. 384 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank E. BAKER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 219

511 N.E.2d 219

158 Ill.App.3d 756, 110 Ill.Dec. 384

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank E. BAKER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-86-0618.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

July 16, 1987.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, Gary R. Peterson, Asst. Defender, for defendant-appellant.

John F. Dahlem, State's Atty., Virginia, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Pros., Springfield, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Linda Cullom, Staff Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice LUND delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Frank E. Baker, appeals an order which found him in contempt of court for failing to undergo an alcohol evaluation pursuant to section 11-501(e) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501(e)).

Following a plea of guilty to a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501(a)(2)), the circuit court ordered Baker to undergo an evaluation in order to determine whether an alcohol or other drug abuse problem existed and the extent of such problem. Baker subsequently filed a motion to rescind that order. A hearing on this motion, as well as a sentencing hearing, were set for August 26, 1986. Baker did not personally appear at that hearing. During the hearing, Baker's counsel suggested that if the circuit court did not agree with Baker's contention that section 11-501(e) is unconstitutional, it hold Baker in contempt, in order that the issue of section 11-501(e)'s constitutionality could be decided by the appellate court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied Baker's motion to rescind the order that he undergo an alcohol evaluation, found him in contempt of court for failure to comply with that order, and sentenced him to 7 days in jail, with the opportunity of purging himself of contempt by complying with the order that he undergo an alcohol evaluation.

Baker argues that the order finding him in contempt of court should be reversed because: (1) the order requiring him to obtain an alcohol evaluation to aid the court in imposing sentence upon him was violative of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the requirement that he procure an alcohol evaluation is not consistent with the relevant statutory language, and the circuit court's orders, to the extent that they require Baker, who is indigent, to pay for an alcohol evaluation, violate his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws; and (3) if his failure to obtain an alcohol evaluation was contemptuous conduct, it was an indirect contempt, for which the circuit court could not summarily punish him.

Section 11-501(e) provides:

"Prior to any disposition for an offense based upon an arrest for a violation of this Section or a similar provision of a local ordinance, individuals shall be required to undergo a professional evaluation to determine if an alcohol or other drug abuse problem exists and the extent of such a problem. Programs conducting these evaluations must be licensed by the Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse." Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501(e).

The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination guarantees that no person, without proper immunity, can be required to implicate himself in a crime or provide testimony which is relevant to imposing sentence for an offense of which he has already been found guilty. (In re Zisook (1981), 88 Ill.2d 321, 58 Ill.Dec. 786, 430 N.E.2d 1037, cert. denied (1982), 457 U.S. 1134, 102 S.Ct. 2962, 73 L.Ed.2d 1352; People v. Hartley (1974), 22 Ill.App.3d 108, 317 N.E.2d 57; Mills v. United States (4th Cir.1960), 281 F.2d 736.) Obviously, negative facts and conclusions contained in an alcohol evaluation could cause a court to impose a more severe sentence on an individual convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol than it would impose absent knowledge of the matters stated in the alcohol evaluation.

Normally, a defendant asserting the privilege against self-incrimination may refuse to answer only those questions with respect to which answers or explanations of why they cannot be answered might result in injurious disclosures,...