People v. Baldi
| Decision Date | 11 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 55457,55457 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert D. BALDI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Elmer Gertz and Wayne B. Giampietro, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.
Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Robert A. Novelle, Themis N. Karnezis, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
Appellant, Robert Baldi, was charged with failing to register as a real estate salesman, in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat., 1969, ch. 114 1/2, par. 1. The complaint alleged that he 'did * * * offer to sell and did negotiate a sale' of a particular parcel of real estate to one Mary Cook without obtaining a certificate of registration from the Illinois Department of Registration and Education. After a bench trial defendant was found guilty and sentenced to one year probation, the first fifteen days to be spent in the County Jail. Defendant appeals from that judgment, contending that he was not proven guilty of the offense charged.
The statute under which defendant was convicted may be violated by engaging in either of two distinct types of conduct: 1) acting as a real estate broker or real estate salesman without a certificate of registration, or 2) advertising or assuming to act as a real estate broker or real estate salesman without a certificate of registration. The first proscribed course of conduct contemplates the actual commission of certain acts, normally performed by real estate salesmen, which are listed in Ill.Rev.Stat., 1969, ch. 114 1/2, par. 2. The second proscribed course of conduct involves a holding out of oneself as a real estate broker or salesman, and does not require the commission of such acts. The State, by its complaint, chose to prosecute defendant for acting as a real estate salesman. Therefore, evidence as to whether he professed to be a real estate salesman is of minor consequence. See City of Waukegan v. Penny, 45 Ill.2d 463, 259 N.E.2d 280; Zito v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission, 113 Ill.App.2d 103, 251 N.E.2d 727. The State further limited the issues before us by appropriately conceding its failure to establish that defendant did 'negotiate a sale' of real property. Accordingly, we limit our review to an evaluation of only that evidence pertaining to whether defendant offered to sell real property. A determination of whether the State's allegation was proven requires a brief review of the evidence.
The prosecution rested its case primarily on the testimony of Mary Cook. She testified that on July 29, 1969 she went to the officers of Sky Realty Company, defendant's employer, and expressed an interest in purchasing a two-flat building. After defendant spoke briefly with her, he telephoned the owner of a building at 529 North Leamington and arranged an immediate showing of that property. He drove Miss Cook there and accompanied her during her viewing. They returned to the office after viewing one other building. Upon their return, defendant quoted her a price for the property. Miss Cook testified that he then typed a 'second option' for her for the property at 529 North Leamington in return for $50. (She also testified that she received a copy of the 'second option' and a receipt for her payment, but she could produce neither of these documents at the trial). Thereafter, all dealings concerning this property were handled by brokers from Sky Realty.
Defendant's testimony regarding his initial dealings with Miss Cook differed in several respects from her account, most notably in the denial that he executed a 'second option.' His testimonial variations served merely to raise an issue of credibility to be resolved by the trier of fact. Of greater significance was the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Cohen, a salesman for Sky Realty, and of Mr. LoPiccolo, the comanager, which placed in perspective the role played by defendant. Mr. Cohen testified that it was he who received a $2,000 down payment for the North Leamington property. He identified a copy of the receipt bearing his signature. Mr. LoPiccolo testified that Miss Cook...
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