People v. Bales

• Decision Date: 20 September 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 60347,s. 60347
• Citation: 483 N.E.2d 517,108 Ill.2d 182,91 Ill.Dec. 171
• Parties: , 91 Ill.Dec. 171 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jeffrey R. BALES, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Donna BUCKLEY, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. James DORSANO et al., Appellees. to 60349.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 517

483 N.E.2d 517

108 Ill.2d 182, 91 Ill.Dec. 171

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jeffrey R. BALES, Appellee.

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Donna BUCKLEY, Appellee.

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. James DORSANO et al., Appellees.

Nos. 60347 to 60349.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 20, 1985.

RYAN, Justice:

The defendants in these consolidated appeals were charged by information in the circuit court of Du Page County with residential burglary in connection with three unrelated occurrences, in that they, knowingly and without authority, entered the dwelling place of another with the intent to commit therein a theft in violation of section 19-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 19-3). Prior to trial, each defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge for failure to state an offense. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 114-1(a)(8).) The trial court dismissed the residential-burglary charges against the defendants, holding that the statute, on its face, was so vague that it violated the constitutional guarantees of due process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, sec. 2), and that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed upon conviction of the offense of residential burglary violated the limitation-of-penalties provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, sec. 11). The State appealed directly to this court from the trial court's finding that section 19-3 is unconstitutional (94 Ill.2d R. 302(a)(1)). The defendants still stand charged with burglary.

There are three issues on appeal: (1) whether the residential burglary statute, on its face, is so vague that it violates the due process provisions of the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution; (2) whether the legislative classification of residential burglary as a Class 1 felony violates the equal protection provision of the United States Constitution; and (3) whether the sentencing scheme for the offense of residential burglary violates the limitation-of-penalties provision of the Illinois Constitution.

In considering the vagueness-due process issue, the trial court considered the following three sections of the Criminal Code of 1961 as amended. Section 19-3 defines residential burglary as follows:

"Sec. 19-3(a). Residential burglary. A person commits residential burglary who knowingly and without authority enters the dwelling place of another with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 19-3(a).)

Residential burglary is a Class 1 felony, the sentence for which is not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(4)). Probation, periodic imprisonment or conditional discharge shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the offender for not less than the minimum sentence (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3(c)(2)(G)). Although section 19-3 refers to "dwelling place of another," it does not define that phrase. However, the word "dwelling" is defined in section 2-6 of the Code as follows:

"Sec. 2-6. 'Dwelling'. 'Dwelling' means a building or portion thereof, a tent, a vehicle, or other enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 2-6.)

Section 19-1 of the Code defines burglary as follows:

"Sec. 19-1. Burglary. (a) A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle as defined in The Illinois Vehicle Code, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft. This offense shall not include the offenses set out in section 4-102 of The Illinois Vehicle Code, nor the offense of residential burglary as defined in Section 19-3 hereof." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 19-1(a).)

Burglary is a Class 2 felony punishable by not less than three years and not more than seven years (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(5)). The trial court, by reading section 19-3 which defines "residential burglary," with section 2-6, which defines "dwelling," concluded that, as set forth in the statutes, there is no difference between burglary and residential burglary. Thus the trial court found the residential-burglary statute vague, ambiguous and violative of the due process clauses.

Before proceeding, we restate some of the general guidelines this court has previously set forth in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes. All statutes are presumed to be constitutional. (Sayles v. Thompson (1983), 99 Ill.2d 122, 124-25, 75 Ill.Dec. 446, 457 N.E.2d 440.) Thus, the party challenging a statute has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violation. (Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius (1979), 77 Ill.2d 287, 303, 32 Ill.Dec. 872, 395 N.E.2d 1376.) As this court emphasized in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Com. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 385, 389, 251 N.E.2d 253, "It is our duty to construe acts of the legislature so as to affirm their constitutionality and validity, if it can reasonably be done, and further if their construction is doubtful, the doubt will be decided in favor of the validity of the law challenged. [Citations.]"

There are two requirements under the due process-vagueness standard when the first amendment is not involved. First, the statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is lawful and what conduct is unlawful. Thus, the statute must give fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited. Second, the statute must provide standards, so as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and application by police officers, judges, and juries. (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28; People v. Garrison (1980), 82 Ill.2d 444, 453, 45 Ill.Dec. 132, 412 N.E.2d 483.) The determination of whether a statute is void for vagueness must be made in the factual context of each case. "A defendant therefore may be prosecuted under a statute without violating his due process rights if his conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription even though the statute may be vague as to other conduct. [Citations.]" People v. Garrison (1980), 82 Ill.2d 444, 454, 45 Ill.Dec. 132, 412 N.E.2d 483.

The defendants argue that the phrase "dwelling place of another" does not afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited by section 19-3. They also maintain that, due to the vagueness of that phrase, law-enforcement authorities are given unreasonable and arbitrary discretion over whether to charge a defendant with residential burglary or burglary.

The phrase "the dwelling place of another" is not defined in the Code. The trial court sought guidance by looking to the definition of the word "dwelling" found in section 2-6. By considering only the statutory definition of "dwelling" in conjunction with the other two sections of the statute quoted herein it is apparent that burglary may be committed by entering, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft, structures of the same nature as those described in section 2-6. However, as noted, section 2-6 defines only the word "dwelling" and not the phrase "the dwelling place of another" used in the residential burglary statute. Thus the distinguishing feature between burglary and residential burglary is that to constitute the latter offense the structure entered as described in section 19-3 must be "the dwelling place of another." This requires more than the mere ownership of the structure by another. The phrase "dwelling place of another" signifies a place where another dwells.

At common law burglary involved the breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another, and all outbuildings within the curtilage were protected. (See 13 Am.Jur.2d Burglary secs. 1, 3, at 320 (1964).) The gist of the crime at common law was that it constituted an offense against habitation and not just an offense against property in general. The offense was broadened in scope by statute in various jurisdictions to bring within the definition of burglary other buildings, structures and enclosures, the unlawful entry of which would not have been burglary at common law. (See Buser, The Illinois Residential Burglary Statute: When Is An Invaded Structure A "Dwelling"? 73 Ill.B.J. 262 (1985).) In Schwabacher v. People (1897), 165 Ill. 618, 46 N.E. 809, this court construed the use of the words "dwelling house" in the burglary statute then in force. The statute at that time, in addition to covering the entry into a "dwelling house" and numerous other types of buildings and enclosures, provided for an enhanced penalty for the unlawful entry of any "dwelling house" in the nighttime with the required felonious intent. Thus the entry of a dwelling house in the nighttime was distinguished from the entry of other buildings. The question in that case was whether the building that was entered was a "dwelling house," since the owner was not residing in it at the time of the burglary. The court held that a dwelling house does not cease to be such because of the temporary absence of its occupants. In such cases the intention to return is the controlling consideration. Schwabacher v. People (1897), 165 Ill. 618, 626, 46 N.E. 809.

We believe that the trial court's conclusion in our case is incorrect. It is apparent that whether a structure is a dwelling place of another depends on the purpose for which it is used, rather than the nature of the structure. Also, section 19-1, defining burglary, explicitly states that it does not include the offense of residential burglary, i.e., the unlawful entry into the dwelling place of another. The common sense construction of the phrase "the dwelling...