People v. Bankhead
| Decision Date | 01 February 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 37132,37132 |
| Citation | 27 Ill.2d 18,187 N.E.2d 705 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. James BANKHEAD, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Thomas S. Metskas, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago for defendant in error.
Defendant, James Bankhead, was convicted of unlawfully possessing narcotic drugs after a bench trial in the criminal court of Cook County and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than five nor more than ten years. The sole issue presented on this writ of error is whether the trial court, by denying a motion to suppress the admission into evidence of a packet of heroin, deprived defendant of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
Bernard Brown, the arresting officer, testified that on the morning of August 8, 1960, about 11:45 P.M., a person purporting to be the manager of the Sacramento Hotel in Chicago telephoned the narcotics bureau and informed him there were several narcotics users in the hotel. He went to the hotel about an hour later, accompanied by two other officers, where he met with the manager, one Sam DeGraff, and was again told by the latter that several persons were selling and using narcotics in Room 404. According to the officer, he advised DeGraff he could not break the door down, but would have to procure a search warrant, whereupon DeGraff volunteered that he would have the janitor admit the officers to the room with a passkey. This was done, and as Brown entered the room, he saw defendant throw a piece of tinfoil on the floor. When retrieved the package was found to contain a white powder and when a field test gave a positive reaction defendant was placed under arrest. It was this packet of powder, determined by a subsequent chemical analysis to be heroin, which defendant sought to suppress from evidence. Concluding his testimony, officer Brown stated that defendant's brother and either three or four women were also present in the room.
The hotel manager, who who was called at the hearing as a court's witness, denied that he had telephoned the police. By his version, Brown and the other officers appeared at the hotel about 1:00 P.M. and inquired if a man named Bancroft was in Room 404. The witness said that after he informed the officer Bancroft was in the room, but registered under the name of Gray, Brown asked if he could have a passkey. This request was refused but according to DeGraff's further testimony he did call the janitor and instructed the latter to knock on the door of the room and to admit the officers if nobody was there.
Defendant, appearing as a witness in his own behalf, testified that the room was rented by his brother by the week, and that the officers had entered without permission, without knocking and without announcing who they were. Further, he stated the door was locked, that nobody in the room had summoned the police and that there had been no loud noises or disturbance in the room prior to the time the officers entered.
In the People's brief a claim is made that the arrest without a warrant was justified on the ground that officer Brown had reasonable grounds to believe a crime was being committed in his presence, thus manifesting some disposition 'to build the lawfulness of the search on the lawfulness of the arrest and so justify the search and seizure without a warrant.' (McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453-454, 69 S.Ct. 191, 192, 93 L.Ed. 153, 157.) This cannot constitutionally be done, however, for the decisions make it clear that the legality of a search is not to be determined by its results, and that where there is a wrongful entry upon protected premises without either a search warrant or an arrest warrant to justify it, the fruits of the entry are tainted with illegality. (People v. Parren, 24 Ill.2d 572, 182 N.E.2d 662; People v. Dalpe, 371 Ill. 607, 21 N.E.2d 756; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436.) The proof here shows that until the officers entered the room they had no reason either to know or suspect that defendant had committed any crime, or that he was even present, with the result that defendant's arrest was predicated in its entirety upon information obtained after entry to the room was gained. As we see it, the critical and pivotal issue to be determined is whether entry to the room without a search warrant or without...
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State v. Mollica
...It is recognized that hotel personnel do not have "the power to waive the constitutional rights of a guest." People v. Bankhead, 27 Ill.2d 18, 23, 187 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1963); see Sumdum v. State, 612 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Alaska 1980) ("A guest in a motel has a constitutionally protected right t......
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