People v. Bargy

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: Before DANHOF; D. E. HOLBROOK
• Citation: People v. Bargy, 248 N.W.2d 636, 71 Mich.App. 609 (Mich. App. 1976)
• Decision Date: 19 October 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 23481
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billie Lee BARGY, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 636

248 N.W.2d 636

71 Mich.App. 609

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billie Lee BARGY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 23481.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Oct. 19, 1976.

Released for Publication Jan. 12, 1977.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., David L. Smith, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C.J., and D. E. HOLBROOK and MUNRO, ^* JJ.

D. E. HOLBROOK, Judge.

The instant case involves a first-degree premeditated murder ¹ conviction of defendant Billie Lee Bargy. Defendant appeals as of right. The evidence linking defendant to this crime was largely circumstantial and included defendant's out-of-court in-custody statements, the truth of which were denied at trial, and inferences drawn therefrom. Unfortunately, there were no eyewitnesses and no direct physical evidence which linked anyone to the crime. Nevertheless, the jury was convinced and found defendant guilty.

On June 18, 1970, the partly unclad decomposed body of Stanley Casey was discovered in rural Eaton County. The boy had been missing for several days. Approximately four years later, an Eaton County sheriff's detective was dispatched to Denver, Colorado, to interview defendant regarding the incident. ² Defendant was interviewed several times, all after proper Miranda ³ warnings. Defendant was apparently in custody in Colorado on a separate offense. Finally, defendant gave a statement to the Michigan officer. Defendant stated that he and a second man had picked up the deceased who was hitchhiking. Defendant further indicated that he and the other man apparently talked the boy into engaging in some sexual activity. The other man and the boy allegedly were engaging in limited sexual activity when an argument ensued, the man produced a gun and the boy was killed. Defendant's statement indicated that he had no idea that the other man was armed and did not know a shooting might occur until after the fact. Defendant did indicate in the statement that he helped his companion remove the deceased's body and clothes from the automobile and the two men left the scene. The prosecution based its case on the truth of this statement and in his closing argument the prosecutor mentioned that this statement was 'how things actually happened'.

A summary of the evidence shows that the entire record consists of the following facts. First of all, the body and the already related circumstances of its condition. The prosecution then introduced defendant's in-custody statement which indicated that another man shot the deceased, although defendant was present. The third piece of evidence was a letter which defendant wrote purporting to relate a dream which defendant had. The dream related circumstances similar to those contained in defendant's other statement except that the dream indicated that the defendant and a teen-age boy were about to engage in sexual activities when the boy had a change of heart, produced a weapon and after a struggle the boy was accidently shot and killed. ⁴ There was no direct physical evidence linking defendant to this crime. Therefore, the jury was free to disregard defendant's statements which could have been inculpatory as to lesser degrees of homicide, but exculpatory as far as first-degree premeditated murder. There was no other evidence which could establish the element of premeditation necessary for a first-degree murder conviction.

The necessary elements of premeditation and deliberation are not present in the instant case. Use of a lethal weapon alone is insufficient. There must be shown to have been some time span between initial homicidal intent and ultimate action. People v. Hoffmeister, 394 Mich. 155, 161, 229 N.W.2d 305, 308 (1975). Therefore, in light of previous judicial guidance, we conclude there is no evidence to support a first-degree murder conviction. See, People v. Morrin, 31 Mich.App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971); People v. Vail, 393 Mich. 460, 227 N.W.2d 535 (1975), and People v. Hoffmeister, supra.

Having come to the conclusion that submission to the jury of first-degree murder was improper, we must decide the proper relief. In People v. Hoffmeister, supra, the Court remanded for entry of judgment of conviction of a lesser included offense where the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the higher charged offense upon evidence sufficient only to prove the lesser offense. In People v. Vail, supra, the case was remanded for retrial. We must examine the record to ascertain if there was sufficient evidence to establish second-degree murder.

Defendant's criminal liability was based on the theory that although he was not the actual principal, he aided and abetted in the commission of this homicide. The liability of an aider and abettor is not distinguished from that of a principal where the aider procured, counselled, aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. M.C.L.A. § 767.39; M.S.A. § 28.979. Mere presence is insufficient to constitute one a principal, unless there is something in this conduct showing a design to encourage, incite, or in some manner aid the commission of the crime. People v. Macklin, 46 Mich.App. 297, 309, 208 N.W.2d 62, 69 (1973); People v. Trudeau, 51 Mich.App. 766, 216 N.W.2d 450 (1974), Cert. den., 419 U.S. 868, 95 S.Ct. 125, 42 L.Ed.2d 106 (1974).

The instant case demands a discussion of the distinction between a principal and an accessory after the fact. Although we have not addressed the question recently, we must remind bench and bar that a distinction between a principal and an accessory after the fact remains. See, Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540 (CA 3, 1967). ⁵ See also, 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 32, p. 324, which defines an accessory after the fact, at common law, as one 'who, knowing that a felony has been committed, intentionally receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon, or in any manner aids him to escape arrest or punishment'. After deliberations in the instant case had begun, the jury asked for an instruction clarifying the law. The request was as follows: 'What is Michigan law relative to aid and abetting before, during And after the crime. Number two, redefine first degree, second degree murder and manslaughter.' (Emphasis supplied.) The trial judge then gave the following instruction:

'As I previously told you in relationship to your request number one, the law of the State of Michigan is that there is no distinction between principal and accessory. That means there are no accessories for all legal purposes. They are all principals. The specific statute I read to you is (M.C.L.A. § 767.39); M.S.A. 28.979 and that specifically states: 'Every person concerned in the commission of an offense whether directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, councils, (sic) aids or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indited, (sic) tried and on conviction, shall be punished as a principal. An accessory to crime may be convicted as a principal. One may not participate in a crime without being liable for the consequences. Where two or more persons combine to commit a felony and a murder is committed in furtherance thereof all parties to agreement to commit felony are liable for a murder although a homocide (sic) was not planned.' This is in relationship to the words accessory or accomplice. One who is associated with another in the commission of a crime, a criminal offense, is called in law an accomplice. Sometimes they are called an accessory.'

We feel this instruction was not sufficient to clearly apprise the jury of the task before it. First of all, the instruction did not answer the jury's question as to the liability of one who is 'aiding and abetting after the fact'. Secondly, this instruction injected felony murder principles into a premeditated murder trial. In the instant case, the prosecution based its case on defendant having aided and abetted the commission of homicide. Because of this instruction, the jury could have been led to believe that if defendant aided and abetted the commission of a separate crime, in this instance engaging in sexual activities with a 15-year old boy, he was subject to liability for the resulting death. We cannot be sure the jury was not so confused....