People v. Barringer, 66.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1945
• Docket Number: No. 66.,66.
• Citation: 311 Mich. 345,18 N.W.2d 850
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BARRINGER.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

311 Mich. 345

18 N.W.2d 850

PEOPLE

v.BARRINGER.

No. 66.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 14, 1945.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Circuit Court, Ingham County; Leland W. Carr, judge.

Hubert Bruce Barringer was convicted of the crime of robbery unarmed, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Before the Entire Bench.

John Wendell Bird, of Lansing, for defendant and appellant.

John R. Dethmers, Atty. Gen., and Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., Victor C. Anderson, Pros. Atty., and John P. O'Brien, Asst. Pros. Atty., all of Lansing, for appellee.

BUSHNELL, Justice.

This is an appeal by defendant Hubert Bruce Barringer from a sentence imposed after conviction by a jury, under an information charging him with the crime of robbery unarmed.

The complaining witness, William Ormsbee, testified that on September 20, 1942, after he had retired for the night, he was awakened by two men who forcibly entered his apartment, one of them being Norman Brown and the other defendant Barringer. These men took him downstairs to another apartment in the same building, where he had met them earlier that night. He saw a woman lying on a bed who bore evidence of having been severely beaten. Ormsbee claimed that, under the threat of being beaten himself, he permitted the two men to take his purse containing money in the sum of about $119.00. After the two men left the apartment, Ormsbee went to a lunch room in the vicinity, where he saw these two men; as they were leaving he had someone call the police.

Both Brown and Barringer testified in their own behalf and denied each and every allegation made by the complaining witness. The woman in question testified that she did not remember what had occurred. There were no other eyewitnesses. Although the testimony is in direct conflict, it is nevertheless sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.

Defendant argues on appeal that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury relative to the elements of the offense charged, and that the claim of the people was unduly emphasized. Specifically, it is urged that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that it must find each of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the absence of any definite instruction with respect to intent constitutes reversible error. Error is also assigned on the court's instructions respecting impeaching or contradictory testimony.

On the matter of reasonable doubt the court said to the jury:

‘The expression ‘Reasonable doubt’ I have discussed with you in other cases and I have no doubt that you have its meaning rather clearly in mind now. It does not mean a captious or facetious doubt but rather such as the words themselves import an honest doubt arising from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case, a doubt for which a reason satisfactory to the mind of the person having the doubt may be given.

‘If after considering the evidence here you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the respondents or either of them, then it will be your duty to give the respondent or the one as to whom you have the reasonable doubt the benefit thereof and return a verdict of not guilty. But if, on the other hand, after considering the evidence carefully, as I know you will, you have no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the respondents, then it will become your duty to return a verdict of guilty as charged.’

Defendant challenges the fairness of this charge by taking the words ‘as I know you will’ from their context and arguing that the use of this language could not help but suggest to the jury that the claims of the defense ‘were not so important as those of the prosecution.’ This part of the court's instructions to the jury must be read in its entirety. So read, in the light of the entire charge, there is no undue emphasis in favor of the people.

As said in People v. McKeighan, 205 Mich. 367, 171 N.W. 500, intent is such an important factor in the commission of an offense that this element should be clearly and definitely outlined to the jury. But in that case, notwithstanding the absence of specific language in the charge regarding intent, the court observed that when the charge is read as a whole the jury was not misled, and reversal there was not because of the absence of a specific instruction on intent but because of the trial judge's limitation on evidence as...