People v. Barron, No. 14

• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: O'HARA; Wiest; DETHMERS, C.J., and KELLY, ADAMS and BRENNAN, JJ., concurred with O'HARA
• Citation: 163 N.W.2d 219,381 Mich. 421
• Decision Date: 27 December 1968
• Docket Number: No. 14
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Preston BARRON, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 219

163 N.W.2d 219 381 Mich. 421 PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Preston BARRON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 14. Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 27, 1968.

[381 Mich. 422]

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William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Atty., Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Luvenia D. Dockett, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Edward F. Bell, Richard J. Coon, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

[381 Mich. 423] O'HARA, Justice.

The precise question presented by this appeal cannot arise again absent legislative action. ¹ C.L.1948, § 750.110 (Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 28.305), prior to amendment, imposed different penalties for breaking and entering with intent to commit any felony dependent upon whether such breaking and entering was committed in the daytime or nighttime. By P.A.1964, No. 133, effective August 28 of that year, the distinction was eliminated.

The issue before us is the quantum of proof necessary to the establishment of the Corpus delicti of the crime of breaking and entering with felonious intent in the nighttime. Defendant contends this is crucial because the testimony which implicated him was supplied by an admitted participant in the offense. He argues that if the proof of the Corpus delicti of the crime was not established independent of the testimony of the participant, it was not proper to receive that testimony. He contends that if the testimony other than that of the participant fell short of its purpose, the testimony implicating him was erroneously received and the case against him must fall. Certainly this is the settled rule as to the extrajudicial confession or admission of an accused himself. This is established in many cases in our State. We choose to cite People v. Kirby, 223 Mich. 440, 194 N.W. 142. We choose it, though a split decision as to the degree of proof necessary before the admission of the confession, the divided Court was unanimous as to the proposition above stated.

Mr. Justice Wiest addressed himself to the principle:

[381 Mich. 424] 'This court has ever been firm in requiring proof of the commission of a crime outside of an extrajudicial confession.' Kirby, supra, p. 449, 194 N.W. p. 145.

Further in the opinion he succinctly observed:

'There can be no criminal without a crime in fact committed.' Kirby, supra, p. 452, 194 N.W. p. 146.

For those Justices holding the degree of proof in that case sufficient to establish the Corpus delicti dehors the confession the same basic rule is approved:

'The rule stated by Mr. Justice MOORE that the Corpus delicti may not be proven by an extrajudicial confession alone seems to be well established in this State, since People v. Lane, 49 Mich. 340, 13 N.W. 622, was decided. It has been consistently followed in the cases cited and quoted from by him.' Kirby, supra, p. 453, 194 N.W. p. 146.

Since then it is the settled rule that the Corpus delicti cannot be established solely by the extrajudicial admission or confession of the accused, it would seem a logical contradiction to hold it could be established solely by the extrajudicial admission or confession of another who has

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admitted his participation in the events said to constitute the offense charged. We here so hold. This is not to say, and we would not be understood to mean that once the Corpus delicti has been established--that is that the elements of the offense charged have been established and hence that someone committed that offense--extrajudicial...