People v. Bartlett
| Decision Date | 05 June 1975 |
| Citation | 368 N.Y.S.2d 799,82 Misc.2d 152 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Timothy R. BARTLETT, Defendant. |
| Court | New York County Court |
Daniel R. Taylor, Yates County Dist. Atty., for the People.
Weston H. Palmer, Penn Yan, for defendant.
Defendant is indicted for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeano in violation of § 1192 of the Vehicle & Traffic Law. Upon a prior application by the defendant, with the consent of the prosecution, an Order of this court dated September 9, 1974 directed that this charge be prosecuted by indictment and that the District Attorney present it to the Grand Jury for such purpose. (§ 170.25 Criminal Procedure Law.) The indictment is dated September 27, 1974.
Defendant was arraigned on this indictment on October 3, 1974 and entered a plea of not guilty. Defendant filed omnibus motions including, among other things, a request for a hearing to determine the admissibility of any oral statements made by the defendant to any police officer or official and for a hearing to determine the admissibility of the results of any blood test taken from the defendant. Upon the argument of the motion on December 16th, 1974, defendant, without objection from the prosecution, asked for a hearing to determine the voluntariness of any statements made by the defendant and for a hearing to determine the admissibility of any blood test taken. Defense counsel stated that the prosecution acknowledged there may be statements used.
This hearing was conducted on February 10, 1975 by consent of counsel without a Notice of Motion or supporting affidavit. At the opening of argument, defense counsel stated that the motion was to suppress the admissibility of the results of defendant's blood test upon the trial of the action and to suppress any oral statements made by the defendant to any police officer or officers. He stated that he did not know the nature of the statements, but that he had received a notice that the prosecution intended to introduce oral statements upon the trial of the action.
A pre-trial motion to suppress a record or potential testimony reciting or describing a statement of a defendant involuntarily made to a law enforcement officer is authorized under § 710.20(2) CPL.
Upon this hearing it was established that on May 16, 1974, the defendant was injured in a one-car accident on County Road 407. The deputy sheriff on routine patrol came upon the scene of this accident at 1:20 A.M. and discovered the defendant in the operator's seat of the automobile. Defendant was unconscious or semi-conscious at the time and the officer testified that he smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath and that there were beer cans on the floor of the automobile.
There were four persons in the automobile. The officer called an ambulance, administered first aid to the injured and arranged their transfer to the hospital.
At 2:10 A.M. the officer was with the defendant at the emergency room in the hospital. The officer testified that he had no prior conversation with the defendant.
The officer stated that at this time he advised the defendant that he was under arrest for driving while intoxicated and then requested defendant to take a blood test to determine alcohol content. The officer testified that defendant said, in substance, that he was guilty if he didn't take the test, so he would. (p. 5) This is also defendant's recollection. (p. 19)
It is clear that the officer did not advise the defendant of the four-fold warning that he had a right to remain silent, that any statement could be used in court, that he had a right to have an attorney present at interrogation and to have counsel appointed if he were indigent as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. (p. 9) Nor did the officer advise defendant of the consequences of his failure to submit to the blood test under § 1194(2) V & T Law.
Defendant here contends that the failure to give him his Miranda warnings and to advise him that his operator's license could be evoked and his refused admitted in evidence if he refused to take the blood test are grounds to suppress defendant's oral statements and the blood test as evidence on trial.
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is limited to evidence which is testimonial or communicative in nature (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908) and the defendant is not entitled to...
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State v. Fields
...interrogation after an arrest for driving while intoxicated is supported by decisions of other jurisdictions. People v. Bartlett, 82 Misc.2d 152, 368 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1975); State v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d 843 (1974); Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971). In......
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People v. Mosher
...negative . . . The failure to give Miranda warnings will not prevent the admission of proof of the blood test results. People v. Bartlett, 82 Misc.2d 152, 368 N.Y.S.2d 799; People v. Rosenthal, 87 Misc.2d 186, 384 N.Y.S.2d 358. It can only logically follow that if the taking of a blood test......
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People v. Dailey
...when a person exhales into the breathalyzer. The court denied the motion as premature with leave to renew at trial (see, People v Bartlett, 82 Misc 2d 152, 156). Defendant renewed the motion in limine at the outset of the trial. We conclude that the court properly denied the motion on the m......
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People v. Dailey
...when a person exhales into the breathalyzer. The court denied the motion as premature with leave to renew at trial (see, People v Bartlett, 82 Misc 2d 152, 156). Defendant renewed the motion in limine at the outset of the trial. We conclude that the court properly denied the motion on the m......